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1. INTRODUCTION 
Historians have long been aware that German science underwent a 
profound qualitative and quantitative transformation during the first 
half of the nineteenth century. This paper investigates the qualitative 
aspects of that change in a single field of study, electricity and mag 
netism. Because this area of physical research was more actively pur 
sued, and pursued by a greater number of individuals, than any 
other, it may reasonably serve as a first approximation to the state of 
affairs in other areas of physics as well. Only future research will 
indicate whether certain generalizations based on this study depend 
upon factors peculiar to research in electricity and magnetism. 
A broad overview of the developments in electricity and magnetism 
in Germany during this period reveals the following picture. The 
early years of the century saw a flurry of activity on the voltaic pile 
and various associated electrostatic and electrochemical phenomena 
by men such as Ritter, Erman, J?ger, Pfaff, and, in the 1810's, 
Schweigger. (See Table 1 for dates and given names.) With the dis 
covery of electromagnetism in 1820 came contributions by Seebeck, 
Muncke, Poggendorff, Pohl, and Schmidt, in addition to continued 
work by Erman, Pfaff, and Schweigger. These individuals set the tone 
for the study of electricity in Germany during the first quarter of the 
nineteenth century. Although some of them remained active in the 
field into the 1830's (Erman and Muncke), 1840's (Pfaff and Pohl), and 
even later (Poggendorff), a new approach to the study of physics had 
already begun to emerge in the late 1820's, represented first by Ohm's 
and Fechner's treatment of current and the pile. In the next decade 
this new approach was extended to electromagnetism by Lenz, 
Jacobi, Gauss, and Weber and to terrestrial magnetism and static 
electricity by Moser and Riess. In the mid-1840's it appeared in the 
theoretical electrodynamics of Fechner, Weber, Neumann, and 
Grassmann. These twenty individuals were, with Dove, the most 
important contributors to electricity and magnetism in Germany dur 
ing the period 1800 to 1846, their importance being judged on the 
basis of contemporary and subsequent recognition and extent of pub 
lication in the leading scientific journals. The sample represented in 
Table 1 has been checked for completeness against two extensive 
specialized bibliographies and a standard history, even though it is 
impossible to select a historiographically useful sample solely on the 
basis of an objective procedure such as entry-counting.2 
2For a discussion of other possible candidates for inclusion, see Kenneth L. Caneva, 
Conceptual and Generational Change in German Physics: The Case of Electricity, 1800-1846 
(diss., Princeton Univ., 1974), pp. 19-22, for the results of a numerical tabulation based 
Table. 1. Principle German Contributors to Electricity and Magnetism during the First 
Half of the Nineteenth Century 
1760 - 
- ERMAN, Paul (1764-1851) 
- SCHMIDT, Georg Gottlieb (1768-1837) 
1770 - SEEBECK, Thomas Johann (1770-1831) 
- RITTER, Johann Wilhelm (1776-1810) 
- GAUSS, Carl Friedrich (1777-1855) 
- SCHWEIGGER, Johann Salomo Christoph (1779-1857) 
1780 - 
- POHL, Georg Friedrich (1788-1849) 
- 
OHM, Georg Simon (1789-1854) 
1790 - 
- POGGENDORFF, Johann Christian (1796-1877) 
- NEUMANN, Franz Ernst (1798-1895) 
- DOVE, Heinrich Wilhelm (1803-1879) ( LENZ, Heinrich Friedrich Emil (1804-1865) 
.j RIESS, Peter Theophil (1804-1883) - MOSER, Ludwig Ferdinand (1805-1880) ( WEBER, Wilhelm Eduard (1804-1891) 
- MUNCKE, Georg Wilhelm (1772-1847) 
1800 
- GRASSMANN, Hermann G?nther (1809-1877) 
1810 - 
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It is the major thesis of this paper that these scientists represented 
two very different paradigms of science, a distinction implicit in the 
above sketch of major figures and areas of research.3 The earlier ap 
proach, called "concretizing science" in Section 2, was characterized 
in particular by the qualitative nature of its experiments, by the belief 
that experience is a direct and epistemologically primary source of 
scientific knowledge, and by the notion that there is an essential 
distinction between physical understanding and mathematical de 
scription. The later approach, the "abstracting science" of Section 3, 
was, in contrast, marked by an overriding concern with quantitative 
measurement, by the free use of theoretical assumptions in conjunc 
tion with their subsequent hypothetico-deductive control, and by the 
relative abstractness of what it regarded as scientific knowledge. The 
explication of these two paradigms and the presentation of evidence 
that they were in fact held by the members of the two groups will be 
the task of the next two sections of this paper. 
To some extent these groups have been identified not only in terms 
of their attachment to a particular paradigm, but also on the basis of 
their intercommunication and attention to the same problems.4 
Schmidt, for example, whose appreciation for mathematics and use of 
the hypothetico-deductive method were atypical of his generation, 
has nevertheless been classed among the concretizing scientists, al 
beit as something of an exception, because he was clearly a member of 
the same larger community and addressed himself to it and to its 
problems; for example, to the anti-Amp?rian theory of transversal 
magnetism. His work was unknown to the younger scientists. Pohl, 
well known in his day as virtually the only exponent of Natur 
philosophie among German university physicists, was regarded se 
on the following three works: Heinrich Wilhelm Dove, "Literatur des Magnetismus und 
der Elektricit?t," Repertorium der Physik, 5 (1844), 152-288; Catalogue of the Wheeler Gift of 
Books, Pamphlets and Periodicals in the Library of the American Institute of Electrical Engineers, 
ed. William D. Weaver, 2 vols. (New York, 1909); and Edmund Hoppe, Geschichte der 
Elektricit?t (Leipzig, 1884; rpt. Wiesbaden, 1969). My termini for this tabulation were 1800 
and 1846: 1800 is a meaningful beginning because Volta's announcement of his pile in 
that year began a new era in electricity; 1846 is convenient because it includes the impor 
tant electrodynamics work of 1845-1846 but excludes almost all the early papers of men 
such as Kirchhoff and Beetz, who belonged to the next generation of German physicists 
born aroiind 1820. 
3I use the word "paradigm" to mean "the entire constellation of beliefs, values, 
techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community" (Thomas S. Kuhn, 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. [Chicago & London, 1970], p. 175). 
4On this basis it proved impossible to place Dove, most of whose work was in 
meterology but who also did experimental work on electromagnetic induction, particu 
larly with respect to qualitative differences between frictional and galvanic electricity. In 
addition to the idiosyncratic quality of his work, he seems not to have interacted with 
anyone except Riess, who, as an amateur studying static electricity, was himself some 
thing of an anomaly. See also note 213. 
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riously enough by his contemporaries to warrant consideration, and 
his papers continued to be published in Poggendorffs Annalen der 
Physik, the supposed enemy of Naturphilosophie.5 Pohl addressed 
himself to the same problems that occupied the other representatives 
of concretizing science, although his treatment was different in some 
respects. Poggendorff, the oldest member of the younger generation, 
was intellectually more at home with the science of the preceding 
generation than with the style of physics being developed by his 
contemporaries. As might be suspected, his pivotal position as editor 
of the Annalen der Physik has contributed to a distorted image of 
physics in Germany during the second quarter of the nineteenth cen 
tury. Poggendorff was not among those who assimilated Ohm's 
theory; that was done by Fechner, Jacobi, Lenz, Moser, Neumann, 
Weber, and Gauss. The separation of the two groups was so great 
that the few cases of contact between representatives of the two 
paradigms, such as between Muncke and Lenz and Pohl and Ohm, 
serve only to underscore the extent to which they represented dif 
ferent and even noncommunicating styles of science. 
The most striking feature of Table 1 is that the scientists in it fall, 
with two exceptions, into two well-defined generations according to 
year of birth. Indeed, there is some evidence that this generational 
split was not confined to electricians but was a general feature of 
German science. Johannes M?ller (1801-1858), the great anatomist 
and physiologist, noted the change as it was taking place. He wrote of 
the 1828 Naturforscherversammlung in Berlin that "the predominant 
impression was one of fresh, ambitious youth, alongside the old men 
also present in large numbers?that is very significant."6 This genera 
5An important issue in the historiography of nineteenth-century German science is 
the nature and role of Naturphilosophie. I have elsewhere argued that if must be distin 
guished from the mainstream physics of the early decades of the century (i.e., 
concretiz 
ing science) and that it in no way set the tone for the physics of the period. Not only did 
the younger generation not represent a conscious reaction against it, but several of them 
drew inspiration from it to look for unity where others had been satisfied with diversity. 
The electrodynamics of Fechner, Weber, Neumann, and Grassmann all bear 
an unmis 
takable stamp due to the direct or (with Weber) indirect influence of Naturphilosophie. See 
Caneva, op. at. (note 2), pp. 99-103, 132-157, and 364-413. 
6Letter of 27 September 1828 to his wife, quoted in Wilhelm Haberling, Johannes M?ller. 
Das Leben des rheinischen Naturforschers (Leipzig, 1924), p. 93. M?ller's impression is 
substantiated by the data. I have been able to identify twenty-six of the twenty-nine 
eigentliche Physiker present, a category including M?ller and the Naturphilosoph Henrich 
Steffens (1773-1845). With the exception of Ernst Gottfried Fischer (1754-1831), who was 
by ten years the oldest, the rest fall into three quite distinct groups: ten were born within 
the period 1764-1778, five within the period 1786-1790, and ten within the period 
1795-1804. (See Isis von Oken, 22 [1829], col. 246.) With respect to the possibility of there 
having been a similar generational discontinuity in chemistry, see Erwin Hiebert, rev. of 
Deutsche Chemiker in der ersten H?lfte des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts (Weinheim, 1956) by 
Wilhelm Prandtl, Isis, 50 (1959), 79-S1, on 80. 
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tional grouping takes on added significance from the fact that it corre 
sponds very closely to a division of the sample according to scientific 
paradigm, and I shall often speak simply of "the older generation of 
concretizing scientists" and "the younger generation of abstracting 
scientists." The close association between generational membership 
and adherence to a particular paradigm will be elaborated in Section 
4, which seeks to explain this episode of rapid and profound scien 
tific change in terms of the professional-institutional and social 
psychological context within which individuals did a particular kind 
of science. Of importance there will be not only the sharpness of the 
generational split but also the historical situation of the younger gen 
eration in a period of disruption and social reform. 
My conception of the role of generations in the history of science is 
different from the one recently advanced by Lewis S. Feuer.7 Feuer 
defined his generations primarily in personal and psychological 
terms, in particular with respect to the relationship between child and 
parent. My generations are groups defined conceptually and sociologico 
historically, and it is the nature of the relationship between these 
two modes of definition that this paper attempts to explain on the 
basis of a detailed analysis of the scientific work done by the two 
groups and the society to which they belonged. An essential aspect 
of my approach, which is sorely lacking in Feuer's book, is the iden 
tification of those particular aspects of scientific change that seem 
not to be explicable simply in terms of borrowing or of some kind of 
internal scientific dynamic. Feuer's preoccupation with personal 
"generational revolt" and his desire to avoid any kind of "genera 
tional relativism" with respect to what constitutes scientific knowl 
edge have led him to underestimate the force of community-defined 
standards and to overestimate the extent to which scientists are capa 
ble of resolving disputes on the basis of their supposed "common 
allegiance to verification." In this paper, on the contrary, I attempt to 
demonstrate the explanatory strength of paradigms as more or less in 
commensurable expectations of acceptable science. 
2. THE SCIENCE OF THE CONCRETE 
The dominant feature of the science of the concrete was a particular 
conception of the nature of knowledge and its relationship to experi 
ence, a conception reflected in the essentially qualitative character of 
most of the experimental work done by the members of the older 
7Lewis S. Feuer, Einstein and the Generations of Science (New York, 1974). 
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generation. In part their experimental standards reflected the ideal of 
the experimentum crucis, whereby researchers sought one simple ex 
periment whose results would tell directly and decisively either for or 
against a particular point without any need for quantitative data. 
Experiments done in that mode were typically either null-effect or 
those showing only the presence or absence of some substance or phe 
nomenon. The reliance on supposedly decisive, nonquantitative ex 
periments was one of the most significant features of the long and 
heated controversy between the chemical and contact theories of the 
voltaic pile. In part the experiments of the older generation reflected the 
vague ideal of a purely atheoretical physics, of facts and experiments 
without any hypothetical interpretation. This attitude can be seen in 
the title given to many of the papers of the period, "Versuche und 
Bemerkungen ?ber...," according to which model experiments were 
done, sometimes without much direction or clear expectation, and 
the results obtained were then commented upon. 
The most important general aspect of the older generation's view of 
the relationship between knowledge and experience was the belief 
that experiment was supposed to come?logically and, ideally, also 
temporally?before any conceptualization. This meant that experi 
ment tended to be regarded as a source rather than as a control of 
whatever theory there might be. Not only was scientific knowledge 
supposed to derive from experiment, but it was often supposed to be 
a direct expression of some basic, experimentally demonstrable phe 
nomenon, some Zentralph?nomen, Hauptph?nomen, or Fundamentalver 
such. It was strongly felt that a theory should capture and express the 
phenomena directly in something like pictorial representation. One 
repeatedly encounters the demand that a theory should be 
anschaulich, and this desire for Anschaulichkeit was one of the most 
distinguishing features of concretizing science. Indeed, since the 
usual English translation of Anschauung as "intuition" suggests 
an 
internal-mental source of knowledge, it is well to keep in mind that 
the basic meaning of anschauen is "to look at" and that the 
Anschaulichkeit demanded of theory implied an element of perceptual 
immediacy. 
The other side of this empiricism was an explicit rejection of the use 
of hypotheses in science. When hypotheses were used at all it was 
generally with the attitude that they were only provisional substitutes 
for sure knowledge. Hypothesizing prior to experimenting was re 
garded as almost dishonest and certainly liable to lead to distortion. 
Although an experimentum crucis might in principle have been part of 
a 
hypothetico-deductively elaborated theory, it was in practice not so 
conceived by the older physicists. Such an experiment tended rather 
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to be associated with a particular Fundamentalversuch and not with a 
tightly structured but perforce merely "hypothetical" theory. It is 
important to recognize that whereas the empiricism of the "classical" 
Baconian inductive method was primarily a method of discovery, the 
empiricism of German concretizing scientists was rather a method of 
presentation and proof. Furthermore, since by "theory" the latter 
characteristically understood a nonmathematical representation of 
the experimentally given, one could say that their empirical-experi 
mental method aimed at demonstrating "theories" rather than at dis 
covering facts, though again one of the aims of their methodology was 
to bridge, if not to eliminate entirely, the gap between fact and theory. 
This qualitative experimental bias and the demand that physical 
knowledge be anschaulich were naturally accompanied by a de 
emphasis of mathematics. Numerical data would have been of little 
relevance to a nonquantitative theory, and it was agreed that a theory 
could not be anschaulich if it were couched in the language of mathe 
matics, which was incapable of capturing the essentially "physical" 
aspects of phenomena. The very lively contemporary discussion of 
the relative merits of mathematical versus physical theories demon 
strated how the desire to avoid the over-mathematization of physics 
was a self-conscious position that reflected the prevailing view of 
what a physical theory was supposed to do. 
To these three strongly characteristic traits of the physics of the 
older generation may be added a fourth, which, although expressive 
of the same underlying attitude toward science, was not as prevalent 
in as much of their work. Because of their experimental, frequently 
antitheoretical bias, it is often difficult to infer any precise notion of 
scientific explanation from the books and articles they wrote. Never 
theless, one often encounters the notion that the explanation of a 
particular phenomenon should be sought in terms of its association 
with other known phenomena. What was desired was a schematiza 
tion or classification according to conceptual or analogical relation 
ships within the framework of the existing body of knowledge. The 
older generation was at the same time in general agreement that 
physical explanation was not to be equated with mathematical de 
scription or with the hypothetico-deductive confirmation of predic 
tions made on the basis of a precise theory. 
These characteristics of the physics of the older generation make up 
what I call "the science of the concrete," or "concretizing science."8 
Concretizing science may be regarded as the German variety of the physical sciences' 
empiricist tradition which had its counterpart in British natural philosophy and French 
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The rest of this section will illustrate the extent to which these traits 
defined a coherent style of physics practiced by a temporally and 
geographically localized group of scientists. 
The Qualitative Nature of Experiment 
A typical example of the concretizing scientists' qualitative ap 
proach to experimentation is the electromagnetic research of the Ber 
lin academician T. J. Seebeck. In keeping with much of the work 
done in immediate response to the discovery of electromagnetism in 
1820, Seebeck investigated the nature of the magnetic force exerted by 
a current-carrying wire or rod by noting the orientation assumed by 
magnetic needles held in different positions around it. On the basis of 
a number of such observations he threw out the conclusion that "the 
intensity of the magnetism is inversely proportional to the distance of 
the circle of action from the rod, and the magnetic middle of this circle 
of action is the axis of the rod."9 He further noted that the declination 
of the magnetic needle due to the effect of the current depended on 
the length of the needle, and he cited results obtained for needles of 
different length. However, his data only showed that the declination 
was greater for shorter needles. He did not attempt to derive any 
mathematical law, nor did he give any information on such factors as 
the distance of the needle from the wire or the relative strength of the 
needles. This work was typical of Seebeck's contentment with qual 
itative or crudely quantitative results and of his failure to provide a 
detailed description of the conditions of his experiments. 
physique exp?rimentale. See Robert E. Schofield, Mechanism and Materialism: British Natural 
Philosophy in an Age of Reason (Princeton, 1970); I. Bernard Cohen, Franklin and Newton. An 
Inquiry into Speculative Newtonian Experimental Science and Franklin's Work in Electricity 
as an 
Example Thereof (Philadelphia, 1956); and Jean Torlais, "La physique exp&imentale," 
Enseignement et diffusion des sciences en France 
au XVllle siecle, ed. Rene Taton (Paris, 1964), 
pp. 619-645. On the application of mathematics to the experimental sciences in France 
see Eugene Frankel, Jean-Baptiste Biot: The Career of a Physicist in Nineteenth Century France 
(diss., Princeton Univ., 1972). On scientific method see Laurens Laudan, "Theories of 
Scientific Method from Plato to Mach: A Bibliographical Review," History of Science, 7 
(1968), 1-63. On the place of these experimental traditions in the history of science see 
Thomas S. Kuhn, "Mathematical vs. Experimental Traditions in the Development of 
Physical Science," Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 7 (1976), 1-31. For 
a more detailed 
exposition and further references see also Caneva, op. cit. (note 2), pp. 29-42 and 
159-163. 
9Thomas Johann Seebeck, "Ueber den Magnetismus der galvanischen Kette," 
Abhandlungen der K?niglichen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, 1820-1821 (pub. 1822), 
Abhandlungen der physikalischen Klasse, pp. 289-346, on p. 299. For comparison 
see the 
careful quantitative measurements of Jean-Baptiste Biot and Felix Savart, 
"Sur l'aimanta 
tion imprimee aux metaux par l'electricite en mouvement," Journal des 
savans (Avril 
1821), pp. 221-235, and in much more expanded form in Biot's Precis ?imentaire de 
physique expirimentale, 3rd ed., 2 vols. (Paris, 1824), 2, 704-774. 
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In another series of incompletely reported experiments Seebeck 
investigated the relationship between the chemical activity in the pile 
and the "magnetic tension" exerted by the current-carrying wire. He 
placed a magnetic needle near the connecting wire of a copper-zinc 
cell whose liquid was made increasingly acidic, and he tabulated for 
each concentration the final rest position of the needle and the 
number of oscillations it made before coming to rest after the circuit 
had been closed. Although he made no attempt to analyze his data 
mathematically and had no measure at all of chemical activity (dif 
ferent from concentration), he stated his conclusion as if he had dis 
covered a precise relationship between electromagnetism and chemi 
cal activity: "From these experiments it therefore follows that the 
magnetic tension of a galvanic circuit is proportional to its chemical 
activity, and hence the magnetic needle will be able to be used to 
determine the energy [Energie] of the chemical process in the galvanic 
circuit."10 In these and other experiments Seebeck recorded quan 
tities of data, but in every case the data allow only qualitative or 
general order-of-magnitude conclusions. Never did he derive a pre 
cise functional relationship between two variables, not did he seem 
interested in the possibility of doing so. Although he wondered how 
the dimensions of a spirally wound conductor affected the magnetic 
tension it exerted, he never tried to determine exactly how that ten 
sion depended on the individual measurable factors such as thickness 
of wire or number of turns. 
The existence of a dispute between the Heidelberg physicist G. W. 
Muncke and the St. Petersburg academician H. F. E. Lenz affords an 
excellent opportunity for contrasting the experimental techniques of 
members of the older and younger generations. The interchange 
began with the publication of a paper of Muncke's in 1830 describing 
a torsion balance he had built to study faint electrical attractions and 
repulsions. The balance consisted of a beam made of a long thin glass 
rod with a small pith ball on one end and a gold-leaf counterbalance 
on the other, the whole suspended by means of a silk thread and 
enclosed in a hemispherical glass case. By chance Muncke noticed 
"an automatic rotation of the beam" when the balance was set up 
near a window.11 After eliminating terrestrial magnetism and light as 
possible causes, he decided to test whether the motion of the beam 
was due to heat. Placing a container of hot water near the glass 
10Seebeck, op. at. (note 9), p. 311. 
"Georg Wilhelm Muncke, "Thermoelektrische Beobachtungen, mitgetheilt in der 
Versammlung der Naturforscher und Aerzte zu Hamburg 1830," Annalen der Physik und 
Chemie, 20 (1830), 417-431, on 418. 
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hemisphere in which the balance was housed, he noticed that not just 
the pith ball but the entire beam moved against the glass wall and 
stayed there, sometimes for several seconds, only to fall back and 
then return again with "precisely such motions... as such balls are 
wont to make when one approaches them with an electrically charged 
conductor."12 On the basis of this similarity Muncke jumped to the 
conclusion that the motions he had observed were also due somehow 
to electricity, for, as he wrote, "the motions of light bodies attracted 
by electricity are, under somewhat greater electrical tension, of such 
peculiar character that a trained observer can easily distinguish them 
from others."13 In support of his explanation Muncke repeatedly em 
phasized the peculiar and distinctive motions of electrically charged 
bodies and the testimony of others that these motions "looked electri 
cal." In a subsequent paper he reported that "various physicists 
[including Captain Henry Kater] have since then seen the phenome 
non in my laboratory, and all have pronounced it to be decidedly 
electric."14 Muncke seems to have had the notion that questions in 
physics are decided on the same basis as in law, by agreement among 
honest witnesses. Lenz ridiculed him on this point by paraphrasing 
his statement above as 
" 
'I, Captain Kater, and other friends found 
that the motions look thoroughly like electrical/" and he had only 
contempt for Muncke's argument, "which is derived from the ap 
pearance of the motions and can have complete power of proof for at 
best eyewitnesses."15 
Having surmised from the supposed peculiar nature of the motions 
that the phenomenon was electrical, Muncke concluded that a dif 
ference in temperature on opposite sides of the balance had "ther 
moelectrically" excited the electricity. Nevertheless he did not try to 
detect this electric charge by means of an electroscope, nor did he 
determine how large a charge of static electricity produced by other 
12Ibid., pp. 419-420. 
"Ibid., p. 420. 
14Muncke, "Bemerkungen ?ber die Versuche des Hrn. Lenz in Betreff der Drehungen 
des Coulombschen Wagebalkens, und Nachricht von den akustischen Versuchen des 
Hrn. Scheibler," Annalen der Physik und Chemie, 29 (1833), 381-397 and 398-403 
("Nachschrift"), on 386. Cf.: "When one justly appreciates all the reasons given, in 
particular the fact attested to unanimously by three credible observers, that the rotations 
in a significantly evaculated space were similarly unchanged, when one [considers] the 
peculiar character of the oscillations, which one of course must have seen in order to 
declare them to be unquestionably electrical..., then I do not in fact understand how 
there can remain any doubt as to the correctness of the explanation given" (ibid., p. 389). 
For yet another example of this attitude, see Muncke, op. at. (note 11), p. 422. 
15Heinrich Friedrich Emil Lenz, "Bemerkungen gegen den in diesen Annalen (Bd. 
XXIX S. 381) enthaltenen, wider mich gerichteten Aufsatz des Hrn. Muncke ?ber Ther 
moelektricit?t des Glases," Annalen der Physik und Chemie, 35 (1835), 72-81, on 74 and 80. 
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means would be necessary to cause similar motions. Although he 
quite gratuitously asserted that the slight temperature difference at 
the surface of the glass hemisphere would not be great enough to 
produce air currents strong enough to move the balance beam, he 
accepted without hesitation or corroboration "the remarkable fact of 
the phenomena" that such a slight temperature difference was suffi 
cient to produce an electric charge great enough to cause the observed 
deflection.16 To test whether the air contributed to the motion, 
Muncke repeated the experiment with his balance in an evacuated 
bell jar. He found that the apparatus exhibited the same phenomena 
and with equal strength "as far as can be decided by simple estima 
tion without actual measurement."17 Not only did Muncke make no 
attempt to measure the magnitude of the force, as Coulomb had 
shown how to do forty-five years earlier, but he could make no 
theoretical prediction as to whether increased rarity of the air should 
diminish the effect if it were due to air currents. The inability to make 
meaningful measurements led him to desire the decisiveness (ent 
scheidender Beweis) of a nonquantitative, all-or-nothing experiment 
carried out in an (unfortunately unobtainable) perfect vacuum.18 
Muncke felt no need to control, vary, and measure the different var 
iables in his experiment so that his results would decide clearly either 
for or against his proposed explanation. 
Lenz responded to Muncke's claims in one of his earliest scientific 
papers. He had originally accepted Muncke's explanation but began 
to doubt it when he observed that the apparent attraction or repulsion 
of the balance beam depended on whether the hot body was held 
above or below the level of the beam. If the motion were due to 
thermoelectricity the beam should always be attracted, whatever the 
temperature of the body. If the motions were due to air currents, 
however, a hot body brought against the glass would cause the air 
adjacent to that side to rise, producing circular convection currents 
within the container. Hence, if the beam were hung toward the 
heated side near the top of the container it should move away from 
that side. Lenz performed a series of twenty-four experiments in 
16Muncke, op. dt. (note 11), p. 424. 
"Ibid., p. 420. 
18Ibid., p. 423. Lenz pointed out that since we do not know how the velocity of air 
molecules depends on density, Muncke was not entitled to use the results of an experi 
ment in a partially evacuated container as proof of the unimportance of air currents, 
especially in the absence of quantitative measurements. Such experiments, uncontrolled 
by precise theory, cannot support firm conclusions. See Lenz, "Ueber die Bewegungen 
des Balkens einer Drehwage, wenn demselben andere K?rper von verschiedener Tem 
peratur gen?hert werden/' Annalm der Physik und Chemie, 25 (1832), 241-265, on 263-264. 
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which he observed the deflection of the beam by a hot or a cold body 
placed alongside the glass container when the beam was hung either 
near the top or near the bottom. He found that the results of his 
experiments "correspond exactly to what I had already concluded 
beforehand on the basis of the theory of air currents."19 He then 
confirmed this explanation in additional series of experiments under 
varying conditions. Although his experiments were not always 
strictly quantitative, Lenz did seek to estimate the relative importance 
of several possible factors by controlling them one at a time. To detect 
the presence of free electricity on the cylindrical glass housing of his 
apparatus he performed twenty trials with a sensitive electroscope. 
Only two revealed very weak traces of negative electricity. He sought 
to demonstrate the nullity of the supposed thermoelectric effect di 
rectly, by using a torsion balance, the beam of which consisted of a 
copper wire with a gilded pith ball on one end and a mercury-filled 
thermometer bulb on the other. The entire beam was then suspended 
by a thin silver wire, enabling him to communicate positive or nega 
tive electricity to the gilded pith ball. He found that the motion of the 
beam was the same whatever the charge given to the pith ball, 
whereas if the thermoelectricity of the glass were positive and the 
electricity conveyed to the pith ball were also positive, then the beam 
should always have indicated repulsion. To be sure that the pith ball 
did in fact carry a charge he checked to see that it responded to the 
presence of a charged glass rod brought near the glass housing. He 
concluded that heat could not have produced the observed motions 
through the stimulation of electricity in the glass. 
Compared to the standards of their younger successors like Lenz, 
the experimental technique of older physicists like Seebeck and 
Muncke seemed to lack precision and control. Yet it cannot be said 
that they were simply poor experimenters. Rather their work re 
flected the striking absence of any interest in finding quantitative 
relationships between variables characteristic of concretizing scien 
tists. This tendency is further illustrated by the early investigations of 
the electroscopic phenomena of the pile carried out by the Berlin 
physicist P. Erman and the Stuttgart physician C. C. F. J?ger. The 
experiments they performed on the phenomena we now identify as 
showing a progressive voltage drop across an increasingly long resis 
tance were carefully and thoughtfully done, but neither man showed 
any interest in making precise measurements in order to discover 
exactly how the phenomena depended on the several identifiable vari 
19Lenz, op. cit. (note 18), pp. 252-253. 
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ables.20 Nor can it be maintained that this omission was solely due to 
the state of experimental technique, especially after Coulomb had 
shown how to measure exact quantities of static electricity. It was rather 
that a conviction of the importance of such measurements had not yet 
become the standard of German experimental physics. Erman, for one, 
who lived well into the era of modern physics in Germany, never 
adopted the quantitative approach. In a paper of 1832 he proposed to 
investigate "the mechanism of permanent, fixed magnetic polarity" in 
order to decide between the "Cartesian-Amperian" and the "Aepinus 
Coulombian" theories of magnetism, based respectively on the as 
sumption of molecular currents and discrete magnetic fluids.21 To this 
end he performed a number of experiments in which a magnetoelectric 
current was induced by altering the magnetic state of a fixed magnet by 
bringing the magnet into contact with either a piece of soft iron or 
another magnet. Erman's experiments were entirely qualitative, and 
he did not explain how his experiments were relevant to the question 
of the nature of magnetism. Certainly he did not come close to pro 
viding a decision between competing theories based on the confirma 
tion of a quantitative prediction. 
The first published paper of the Berlin physicist J. C. Poggendorff 
exemplifies concretizing science's closest approach to a quantitative 
procedure, but although he recorded some numerical data, the only 
conclusions he was able to draw were strictly nonquantitative and 
general. Poggendorff proposed to investigate how the deflection of 
the magnetic needle varied according to its position relative to the 
current-carrying wire "and thereby to reduce the phenomena to a 
general expression."22 This was the first task that many scientists set 
themselves after the announcement of Oersted's discovery of elec 
tromagnetism. However, Poggendorff's "general expression" was 
not a precise statement but a set of two Schemas and two figures 
which pictorially indicated the motion of the magnetic needle with 
respect to the current-carrying connecting wire. 
20Paul Erman, "Ueber die electroskopischen Ph?nomene der Voltaischen S?ule/' 
Annalen der Physik, 8 (1801), 197-209; "Ueber die electroskopischen Ph?nomene des 
Gasapparats an der Voltaischen S?ule," Annalen der Physik, 10 (1802), 1-23; and Carl C. F. 
J?ger, "Ueber die electroskopischen Aeusserungen der Voltaischen Ketten und S?ulen," 
Annalen der Physik, 13 (1803), 399^33. 
21Erman, "Ueber Erzeugung von Electromagnetismus durch blosse Modification der 
Vertheilung der Polarit?t in einem unbewegten Magnet," Abhandlungen der K?niglichen 
Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, 1832, Pt. 1 (pub. 1834), Physikalische Abhandlungen, 
pp. 17-32, on p. 18. 
22Johann Christian Poggendorff, "Physisch-chemische Untersuchungen zur n?hern 
Kenntniss des Magnetismus der voltaischen S?ule," Isis von Oken, 1821, Bd. 2 [des Jahres = Bd. 9 der ganzen Reihe], cols. 687-710, in col. 688. 
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The first relationship Poggendorff investigated was that between 
the deviation of the multiplier needle and the number of turns in the 
coil. He recognized that it was first necessary to determine "whether 
the angle of deflection is to be taken as the direct expression for the 
measure of the magnetic forces."23 His experiment consisted of con 
necting in turn one, two, or three simple piles with a multiplier of 
eight turns and observing the deflection of the needle for each case. 
From three resulting pairs of readings he concluded that the angle of 
deflection was not a direct measure of the electromagnetic force 
exerted by the wire. Although he recognized that one could not mea 
sure the magnetic activity without calculating the dependence of the 
angle on the force exerted by the wire, he apparently had no idea how 
to carry out this analysis. Poggendorff next tabulated the deflection of 
the needle as the number of turns was increased by hundreds, from 
100 to 1300. He noted that the maximum magnifying effect of the 
multiplier was reached somewhere between 800 and 900 turns. In 
other experiments he compared the effect of two batteries of widely 
differing plate size. This time he connected together the ends of all 
the coils to form a continuous wire but used only a particular number 
of turns at any one time. His readings, for both large and small bat 
teries, were taken for 1, 5,10, 25, 50, and 75 turns and by hundreds of 
turns from 100 to 1000. For the large battery the maximum effect was 
reached before 75 turns and for the small battery somewhere between 
200 and 300, though the value of the maximum deflection was the 
same in both cases, a fact for which Poggendorff had no explanation. 
Except for one other similar but much less extensive experiment using 
coils made of thicker wire, he made no attempt to control successively 
his variables in order to discover the exact relationship between them, 
contenting himself with the conclusion that "the action of the circuit 
does not increase without limit with the number of turns."24 Despite 
his early and promising start toward discovering the laws governing 
the behavior of the multiplier when connected with variously con 
structed piles, Poggendorff abandoned the subject after 1821. He 
never showed any interest in finding mathematical laws. 
Although the multiplier has come to be thought of as a measuring 
device, it was not immediately so conceived or used by the members 
of the older generation. It was not used in that way by Poggendorff or 
by its coinventor, the Halle professor of physics and chemistry J. S. C. 
Schweigger. Nor did Oersted use the multiplier in the first instance as 
a measuring device but rather as a qualitative indicator of the direc 
2Hbid., col. 693. 
2Albid., col. 697; cf. the fourth of his fourteen conclusions, col. 709. 
78 KENNETH L. CANEVA 
tion of the current produced by piles composed of different metals 
and acids.25 Oersted was interested not in the quantitative relations of 
the multiplier for their own sake but in defending the contact theory 
and in arranging the different metals in the traditional electromotive 
series. 
The Role of Experiment: The Inductivist Ideal and the Rejection of 
the Hypothetico-Deductive Method 
Concretizing scientists' qualitative approach to experiment was 
closely related to their conception of its role vis-?-vis scientific knowl 
edge, a fact especially evident in their explanation of electromagnetism 
in terms of the theory of transversal magnetism, some form of which 
was accepted by most of the older generation. This theory held that a 
current-carrying wire becomes magnetically polarized transversally, 
with several lines of north and south poles running along its length, 
the exact number and position of them varying according to the par 
ticular version of the theory.26 This was regarded as a physically more 
plausible alternative to Ampere's theory, which was criticized in the 
following typical fashion by Muncke: 
The thing that has made the more exact knowledge and grasp 
[Uebersicht] of Ampere's theory so exceptionally difficult for me 
and certainly for many others, too, is the circumstance that its 
famous discoverer leaves completely unexplained the original 
principal fact, namely, the peculiar magnetic action of the simple 
electric conductor on the magnetic needle, while he with great 
cleverness derives the formation of a steel magnet out of elec 
tromagnetic, wound conductors and with remarkable skill de 
velops the mutual influence of both on each other under the most 
varied modifications. Even his geometrical construction of all 
electromagnetic phenomena, carried out with great skill in calcu 
lation and the application of the cleverest combinations, is based 
on the mutual action of two electric currents on each other and 
thereby passes over the action of the simple conductor on the 
25Hans Christian Oersted, "Sur le Multiplicateur electro-magn?tique de M. 
Schweigger, et sur quelques applications qu'on en a faites," Annales de chimie et de 
physique, 22 (1823), 358-365; reprinted in his Naturvidenskabelige Skrifter, ed. Kirstine 
Meyer, 3 vols. (Copenhagen, 1920), 2, 266-272. Poggendorff used the multiplier for 
exactly the same purpose: op. at. (note 22), cols. 703-704. 
26For a non-German variant see Jons Jacob Berzelius, "Lettre ? M. Berthollet sur l'etat 
magnetique des corps qui transmettent un courant d'electricite," Annales de chimie et de 
physique, 16 (1821), 113-119. 
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magnetic needle, which Ampere, to be sure, does not fail to 
report as a fact.27 
Although Muncke recognized that Ampere's theory had withstood 
every attempt to bring it into contradiction with the phenomena, he 
refused to accept it because it was not based on what he regarded as 
"the original principal fact," the action of a current-carrying wire on a 
magnetic needle. That he regarded this as the fundamental phenom 
enon and not, with Amp&re, the action between current elements 
stemmed in part from its historical priority with Oersted and in part 
from his dislike of the violation of the analogy from electrostatic forces 
that Ampere's law entailed. The fact that like-directed current ele 
ments attract in Ampere's theory, whereas like charges of static elec 
tricity repel, seemed unsatisfactory to Muncke. In addition, Muncke 
insisted on seeing transversal magnetism as directly given by the 
observable phenomena, especially by a certain "fundamental experi 
ment": 
A great number of physicists see in the wire conducting electric 
ity nothing other that a transversal magnet with north and south 
polarities running parallel to its axis. It reveals itself in reality so 
clearly as such... that this simplest of all modes of explanation 
had to find many supporters, all the more as it had significant 
support from the bipolarity of all known magnetic phenomena. 
Accordingly, each cross section of the electrical conductor forms 
a surface in which the opposed magnetic poles lie around the 
center of the electric current, the number of poles varying con 
siderably among the supporters of this viewpoint. All these di 
versely modified theories have, with Oersted and Faraday, the 
common advantage that their explanations proceed from the first 
fundamental experiment.28 
The primary role that Muncke assigned to experiment as the direct 
source of his theory of transversal magnetism corresponded to his 
general views on the character of physics. He insisted that physics 
was an Erfahrungswissenschaft based upon observations and experi 
ments and that it was built "solely upon experiences and the conclu 
sions derived therefrom."29 
27Muncke, "Elektromagnetismus," Johann Samuel Traugott Gehler's Physikalisches W?r 
terbuch, eds. Heinrich Wilhelm Brandes, Leopold Gmelin, Johann Caspar Horner, 
Joseph Johann von Littrow, Georg Wilhelm Muncke, and Christoph Heinrich Pfaff, 11 
vols. (Leipzig, 1825-1845), 3 (1827), 473-647, on 616-617. 
28Ibid., pp. 621-622. 
29Muncke, "Physik," Gehler's Physikalisches W?rterbuch, (note 27), 7, Pt. 1 (1833), 
493-573, on 501 and 505; see also 497. 
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When Muncke published his own theory of transversal magnetism 
in 1822, he noted that two similar theories had already been proposed 
to explain electromagnetism.30 Both of these theories had opposed 
the identity of electricity and magnetism postulated by Ampere, and 
they did not, as did Ampere's theory, apparently contradict the estab 
lished laws of electrostatics by assuming that the homogeneous elec 
tricities of two conducting wires attract each other. Muncke argued 
that one should stick to the long-known and observable facts which 
clearly attest to the existence of four symmetrically situated lines of 
magnetic polarity running parallel to the length of the electric conduc 
tor.31 Muncke's theory was supposed to be directly demonstrable by 
means of simple experiments, and he began its proof by observing the 
attractions and repulsions of a small magnetic needle held in various 
positions around a current-carrying wire. His initial results were 
often obscure or even contradictory, but he found a way out of this 
confusion by investigating the behavior of the needle with respect to 
bar magnets substituted for the wire, quite ignoring the objections 
that might be made to this substitution. He regarded these experi 
ments with magnets as the direct source and justification of his theory 
of transversal magnetism, insisting that his conclusions were "not 
asserted hypothetically but derived immediately from the phe 
nomena" and that they could not fail to be accepted by anyone 
who would simply observe the experiments he described, in particu 
lar the "peculiar character" of the oscillations of the needle.32 In 
Muncke's opinion his own theory avoided the structural defects of 
Ampere's theory that even its complete success in practice could not 
outweigh, namely, its arbitrariness and its presuppositions not drawn 
from the essence of the phenomenon.33 
Muncke subscribed to the belief that hypotheses are only pro 
visional substitutes for sure knowledge.34 When concretizing scien 
tists like Muncke did use them, hypotheses had more the character of 
30These were Berzelius, op. at. (note 26) and August Heinrich Jacob von Althaus, 
Versuche ?ber den Electromagnetismus, nebst einer kurzen Pr?fung der Theorie des Herrn 
Ampere. Mit einer Vorrede vom Hofrath Muncke (Heidelberg, 1821). Althaus (1791-?) was a 
nobleman who dabbled in science and whose contribution to electricity was this book of 
thirty-seven pages. 
31Muncke, "Versuche ?ber den Electro-Magnetismus zur Begr?ndung einer 
gen?genden Erkl?rung desselben," Annalen der Physik, 70 (1822), 141-174, on 145-146. 
See his final formulation of this Hauptgrundsatz on p. 169. 
32Ibid., p. 167. See also his "Fortgesetzte Versuche ?ber den Electro-Magnetismus zur 
Begr?ndung einer gen?genden Erkl?rung desselben," Annalen der Physik, 71 (1822), 
20-38, on 36. 
33Muncke, op. dt. (note 27), p. 615. 
34Muncke, op. dt. (note 29), pp. 503-504. 
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Figure 1. Erman's Rotations-Kette. 
a?silver or copper cup, filled with dilute acid, 
bcde?narrow strip of zinc or tin foil or wire, 
f?piece of zinc. 
The "arm" of the Rotations-Kette was a TS" strip of cardboard. 
after-the-fact possible explanations for puzzling phenomena than of 
sharply formulated statements to be tested by subsequent, controlled 
experiment.35 Muncke's protestation that his conclusions were not ad 
vanced hypothetically but deduced immediately from the phenomena 
reflects the common belief that it was somehow dishonest to try to 
prove a personal opinion with experiments contrived after the fact.36 
That Paul Erman, too, was wedded to the antihypothetical induc 
tivist and representationalist standpoint of concretizing science was 
vividly shown in his only published book in which he proposed his 
own theory of transversal magnetism. His method, essentially the 
same as Muncke's, was to present his theory as the direct expression 
of a series of easily repeated and wholly qualitative experiments. His 
primary piece of apparatus was his Rotations-Kette, a freely sus 
pended galvanic circuit which he believed would clearly reveal the 
nature of what he called "electric-chemical magnetism" (see Figure 
1). His procedure was to observe the motion of the Rotations-Kette as a 
hand-held bar magnet was brought up to it from different directions. 
For example, when the cup end of the Rotations-Kette was toward the 
35Cf. Muncke, "Hypothesen zur Erkl?rung einiger r?thselhafter Naturph?nomene/' 
Journal fir Chemie und Physik, 25 (1819), 17-28; and "Einige Bemerkungen zur Elec 
tricit?ts- und W?rmelehre," Journal f?r Chemie und Physik, 30 (1820), 193-217. 
36Cf. Althaus, op. cit. (note 30), p. 3. 
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ii 
Figure 2. The transversal magnetism of a current-carrying conductor, according 
Erman. 
to 
south, he found that the north pole of a magnet approaching the 
north end of the Kette from the east repelled that end, but approach 
ing that same end from the west attracted it. In an easy leap to the 
conclusion he wanted to draw, Erman likened this behavior to that of 
an iron bar magnetized transversally such that the magnetic poles 
stretched along the entire length of the bar's opposite sides. On the 
basis of this and a few other experiments, Erman concluded that a 
current-carrying conductor becomes magnetically polarized along a 
diagonal plane cutting it transversally, as in Figure 2 (his Figure 9). 
Here ABCD is a cross section of the wire or metal strip and ef is the 
imaginary plane separating the positively and negatively magnetized 
portions of the conductor. In his experiments and especially in his 
diagrams, Erman preferred rectangular to circular conductors as more 
clearly exhibiting the supposed transversal magnetism. He was espe 
cially concerned that his pictorial theory of diagonal polarization pro 
vide "a sufficient physical basis" for the most essential and charac 
teristic phenomena so that it would seem worthwhile to pursue it 
further. He recognized that his theory needed refinement "before it is 
adequate to reproduce exactly all the details of the phenomena in all 
particulars."37 His use here of the word nachkonstruiren?to copy, to 
reproduce?betrays the essentially physical-pictorial nature of his 
theory, and indeed it was of great importance to him that one could 
actually produce a bar magnet having the distribution of poles he 
assigned to the "electric-chemical" magnetism of the conducting 
wire. The further support he adduced for his theory was also of an 
explicitly concretely pictorial nature: "In order now finally to test 
graphically [mit Anschaulichkeit zu pr?fen] the possibly already attained 
cogency of our conception and the extent of its agreement with the 
phenomena in this and all other cases, let one prepare according to 
37Erman, Umrisse zu den physischen Verh?ltnissen des von Herrn Professor ?rsted entdeckten 
elektro-chemischen Magnetismus (Berlin, 1821), p. 76. 
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Figure 9 the picture of a suitably long and wide diagonally colored 
conductor, and, if one desires, also the picture of a compass needle 
enlarged in the same proportion."38 Using actual models in this literal 
manner, he described how a magnetic needle should move when 
brought into different positions with respect to such a diagonally 
transverse distribution of magnetism. 
Erman's theory of transversal magnetism is fully representative of 
concretizing science: it was totally qualitative and nonmathematical; 
its force was in the Anschaulichkeit with which it enabled one to con 
ceive and reproduce certain fundamental phenomena; and it was pre 
sented as if it had arisen naturally from a sequence of simple experi 
ments.39 Another subtle but important aspect of Erman's style of 
physics was his preoccupation with a narrow conception of 
straightforward honesty that discouraged use of the hypothetico 
deductive method: "Since the view sketched here of the physical 
phenomena of chemical magnetism, as far as they are now known, 
really arose with me in the order of the investigations as expressed in 
the three sections [of this work], I considered myself, as it were, 
obliged to maintain the same order of presentation, for it is far easier 
to uncover the paralogisms of a theory when one knows precisely the 
thought process that led or misled its author."40 Erman's words imply 
that it would have been a violation of scientific propriety to have 
reorganized one's evidence after having devised a theory. Concretiz 
ing scientists consistently sought to guarantee the truth of their 
theories by showing their unforced, direct relationship to experiment. 
Erman in effect apologized for having introduced the concept of 
transversal magnetism as early in his book as he did when he wrote of 
having ordered his facts "on the basis of a hypothetical guide, as a 
necessary evil toward a better overview."41 
The general character of concretizing science had a great influence 
on the tenor of the long and heated controversy over whether the 
electricity of the voltaic pile was due to the mere contact of 
heterogeneous metals, as Volta had taught, or to some original chem 
ical action, as maintained by Berzelius and later and with greater 
38Ibid., pp. 99-100. On pp. 103-104 he again called his procedure anschaulich. 
39These qualities also marked Schweigger's theory of a "double magnetic polarity" of 
the current-carrying wire and his "theory" (a pictorial schema) of the operation of the 
multiplier. See Caneva, op. cit. (note 2), pp. 80-84, and Schweigger, "Zus?tze zu Oersteds 
elektromagnetischen Versuchen," Journal f?r Chemie und Physik, 31 (1821), 1-17 and 
35-41. Schweigger referred to his hypothesis as one "that may be regarded as simply an 
expression of the fact" (ibid., p. 10). 
40Erman, op. at. (note 37), p. 36. 
^Ibid., p. 35. 
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fervor by Auguste de la Rive.42 Neither side had a theory that permit 
ted exact predictions to be made and then tested against experiment, 
nor could either side decisively disprove the evidence advanced by 
the other. Rather each side found its favorite argument in one or two 
supposedly clinching experiments, while ignoring or explaining away 
the opponents' counter-experiments. The contact theorists thus often 
cited the so-called fundamental experiment of Volta, in which traces 
of static electricity were detected when two heterogeneous metals 
were placed in contact with each other and with a suitable electro 
scope, as proving conclusively that the mere contact between metals 
was capable of producing electricity. In reply the chemical theorists 
would claim that those results were really due to traces of moisture, 
friction, or some other complicating cause, and they would counterat 
tack by citing a crucial experiment of their own. Each side relied on 
experiments of a generally qualitative, or at best crudely quantitative, 
all-or-nothing character. To be sure, the dispute could hardly have 
been resolved at a time when the relationship between static and 
current electricity was obscure and when there could be no recourse 
to arguments based on conservation of energy; but the manner in 
which the dispute was conducted attests eloquently to the method 
ological standpoint shared by both sides. 
C. H. Pfaff, professor of chemistry at Kiel, was probably the most 
vocal and indefatigable advocate of the contact theory in Germany, 
and he devoted a major part of his scientific output toward its de 
fense.43 The predominance of this one theme across more than forty 
years' work, as well as the polemical tone in which the inconclusive 
feud was carried out, distinguished Pfaff's work from that of the other 
representatives of concretizing science. Although he, too, believed 
42On this controversy see Wilhelm Ostwald, Elektrochemie, ihre Geschichte und Lehre 
(Leipzig, 1896) and Wilhelm Beetz, "Die Fortschritte des Galvanismus in den Jahren 
1837-1847," Repertorium der Physik, 8 (1849), 1-351. 
43See, for example, his "Grundz?ge von Volta's electrischer Theorie der 
Erscheinungen seiner S?ule," Annalen der Physik, 10 (1802), 219-238; an unfinished 
critical article (he never got past Berzelius), "Revision und Kritik der bisher zur Erkl?rung 
der galvanischen Erscheinungen aufgestellten Theorien, und der Erfahrungen, auf 
welche sie sich st?tzen. Rechtfertigung der Voltaischen Theorie gegen die Einwendungen 
von Berzelius, Davy, Erman, J?ger, Ritter, Schweigger u. a.," Journal f?r Chemie und Physik, 
10 (1814), 179-200; Der Elektro-Magnetismus, ?ne historisch-kritische Darstellung der bisheri 
gen Entdeckungen auf dem Gebiete desselben, nebst eigenth?mlichen Versuchen (Hamburg, 
1824); "Defense de la theorie de Volta, relative ? la production de l'?lectricit? par le simple 
contact, contre les objections de M. le professeur A. de La Rive," Annales de chimie et de 
physique, 41 (1829), 236-247; andRevision der Lehre vom Galvano-Voltaismus, mit besonderer 
R?cksicht auf Faraday's, de la Rive's, Becquerels, Karstens u, a. neueste Arbeiten ?ber diesen 
Gegenstand (Altona, 1837). 
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that the contact theory was a direct expression of a simple demonstra 
ble fact?Volta's fundamental experiment?he chose rather to em 
phasize its relationship to one or two other wholly qualitative crucial 
experiments. Insofar as the experimentum crucis was for Pfaff more of a 
test than a source of theory, it played a slightly different role for him 
than it did for others of the older generation. On the other hand, 
Pfaff s science never exhibited the kind of close correlation between 
theoretically deduced implications and subsequent experimental ver 
ification characteristic of the hypothetico-deductive method. In addi 
tion to the supposed cogency of Volta's fundamental experiment, 
Pfaff and other contact theorists made much of the absence of chemi 
cal action in an open pile, when closing the circuit (that is, establish 
ing metallic contact) led to the production of an electric current.44 
When dealing with the contact theory of the pile, not even those 
scientists who otherwise made use of the hypothetico-deductive 
method could break with the desire to find a single decisive experi 
ment; and the certainty and sufficiency of Volta's fundamental exper 
iment, regardless of any contradictory evidence, remained the basic 
issue for both Schmidt and Fechner.45 G. G. Schmidt, professor 
of mathematics and physics at Giessen, was in fact the only older 
generation scientist to make explicit and consistent use of the 
hypothetico-deductive method and hence is an exceptional case 
within the sample. His work, which tended to be much more 
mathematical than the contemporary norm, was devoted primarily to 
the physical properties of gases and liquids.46 
44That was the thrust of Pfaff's paper, "Ein Experimentum crucis f?r die Richtigkeit der 
Contacttheorie der galvanischen Kette, und f?r die ?konomische Anwendbarkeit der 
Kette als bewegendes Prindp durch Elektromagnetismus/' Annalen der Physik und 
Chemie, 53 (1841), 303-309. See also Poggendorff, "Ueber die Frage, ob es wirksame 
galvanische Ketten ohne primitive chemische Action gebe, und ?ber die Bildung der 
Eisens?ure auf galvanischem Wege," Annalen der Physik und Chemie, 54 (1842), 353-377, 
which contains a good discussion of the points at issue. 
45Georg Gottlieb Schmidt, "Einige electrisch-magnetische Versuche u. Wiederholung 
von Volta's Fundamental-Versuchen," Annalen der Physik, 70 (1822), 229-233; Gustav 
Theodor Fechner, "Rechtfertigung der Contact-Theorie des Galvanismus," Annalen der 
Physik und Chemie, 42 (1837), 481-516. See also Fechner's "Beitr?ge zur Lehre des 
Galvanismus," journal f?r Chemie und Physik, 57 (1829), 1-16. 
46Although I cannot satisfactorily explain why Schmidt was the exception that he was, 
it is perhaps significant that he was very interested in the construction and operation of 
instruments. Such a concern, involving control and prediction, is often associated with 
use of some form of hypothetico-deductive method. For a typical example of Schmidt's 
use of the hypothetico-deductive method see his "Versuche ?ber die Gesetze, wonach 
gasartige Fl?ssigkeiten aus engen Oeffnungen von verschiedener Gestalt und durch 
R?hren unter einem gegebenen Druck ausstr?men," Annalen der Physik, 66 (1820), 39-83. 
For further references see Caneva, op. eil. (note 2), p. 176. 
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Mathematical versus Physical Theories 
The constellation of attitudes that characterized concretizing sci 
ence included a strongly felt distinction between the concretely phys 
ical and the abstractly mathematical. Only theories of the former kind 
were thought capable of capturing the essence of the phenomena. 
Concretizing science was not simply unmathematical, a deficiency of 
learning, as it were, which might be remedied by reading a book. Its 
practitioners self-consciously defended an ideal of science that held 
mathematical description in no great esteem on the grounds that 
mathematics tended to mislead the physicist from his proper field of 
study. Pfaff clearly expressed concretizing scientists' sense of a dis 
tinction between mathematical and physical explanations, according 
to which only the latter could get at the essence of the phenomena: 
A mathematical explanation or construction of the phenomena is 
in certain respects to be distinguished from a physical one, and 
the former can, despite all its internal coherence and the logical 
consistency of its propositions, nevertheless still leave out of ac 
count the essential nature [das eigentliche Wesen] of the 
phenomena, which is the subject matter of the physical [mode]. 
The mathematician conceives the phenomena of electromag 
netism in the first instance only as diverse modifications of 
motions; if he succeeds in setting up a fundamental equation into 
which all the factors that influence the kind and magnitude of the 
motion enter as elements, whose particular values, exactly deter 
minable by the formula itself, exactly specify the motion itself, 
then he has incontestably satisfied the demands placed on the 
so-called mathematical physics.... By means of such a 
mathematical law all phenomena are as it were resolved into pure 
Anschauungen, divested of everything particularly qualitative, 
and even the opposites in the motions, the attractions and repul 
sions, appear in relationship to each other merely as positive and 
negative quantities. Such a mathematical law need not concern 
itself any further with the secret source out of which the effects 
proceed. A physical explanation penetrates further than a so 
to-speak mathematical explanation, which gives only a formula 
for the quantitative determination of the phenomena. It seeks to 
represent the phenomena in their larger general connections 
with the whole of nature and to connect the fact with which the 
mathematical construction starts still higher with the essence of 
the forces of nature themselves and thus to give an account of the 
qualitative [aspects] of the phenomena. Nevertheless every 
FROM GALVANISM TO ELECTRODYNAMICS 87 
genuine physical explanation must at the same time be 
mathematical.47 
This sentiment was echoed by Schweigger in a paper written in 
1825 for the fourth Naturforscherversammlung. Always skeptical of the 
propriety of the mathematical method, he complained that too many 
inadequate theories had been hastily proposed to explain Oersted's 
discovery: "In fact, however, the matter does not yet seem ripe for a 
strict physical theory. All the easier is it, therefore, to produce an 
abundance of mathematical formulas, with which one customarily 
merely calculates out what one has [already] inserted into the phe 
nomenon. But even that, like all intellectual games, is to be appro 
priately esteemed insofar as it stimulates new investigations."48 
Schweigger objected to the fact that the wide applicability of Am 
pere's theory was based on extended chains of mathematical reason 
ing. He cited with favor Biot's criticism of the lack of analogy between 
Ampere's fundamental law and other laws of attraction, and he en 
dorsed Biot's claim that Biot's own theory, although not yet calcula 
ble, was easy to conceive.49 The kind of mathematics Schweigger 
favored was not analysis but geometry, whose virtue lay in its Anschau 
lichkeit, for the mind has the ability to grasp geometrical truths immedi 
ately, and geometry expresses the essences of things directly.50 
Muncke, too, believed that the use of mathematics in physics had 
recently gotten out of hand: 
Since the time [of Descartes and Newton] the value of mathemat 
ics has been set very high, and one cannot fail to recognize that 
this has recently occurred to an exaggerated extent especially 
with the French and is still occurring now with many Germans, 
in part to avoid the charge of wishing to excuse their ignorance of 
this science by depreciating it. Nevertheless if one is sincere 
about promoting science and considers the present 
state of 
47Pfaff/ Der Elektro-Magnetismus, (note 43), pp. 200-201. 
48Schweigger, "Ueber Elektromagnetismus/' Journal f?r Chemie und Physik, 
46 (1826), 
1-72, on 15. He regarded mathematical analysis as easier than, hence in 
some vague 
sense not as honest as, real physical understanding. Note also the implicit association 
and rejection of the use of mathematics and the hypothetico-deductive 
method: by 
means of the latter one artificially assigns to nature what one wanted to prove 
was there 
all the time. 
49Ibid., pp. 16-18. Schweigger cited Biot from Fechner's translation of the Precis; for 
the 
original, which is of great interest, see Biot's book, op. 
cit. (note 9), 2, 771-772. 
50Schweigger, "Ueber Daltons Messkunst der chemischen Elemente, 
als Anhang zur 
vorhergehenden Abhandlung [von John Davy ?ber die Verbindung 
verschiedener 
Metalle mit Halogen]/' Journal f?r Chemie und Physik, 10 (1814), 355-381, 
on 356-358. 
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physics just as accurately as completely, one cannot for a mo 
ment fail to recognize that we now require observations and ex 
periments much more than calculations and geometrical for 
mulas. The principal cause of this [state of affairs] is that one can 
much more easily calculate at one's desk than experiment with 
ingeniously contrived and difficult-to-operate apparatus.51 
Note here not only Muncke's implied identification of the role of 
experiment as discovery, not as test, but also his attitude, precisely 
Schweigger's, that it is easier to manipulate mathematical formulas 
than to carry out difficult experiments, almost as if a higher morality 
attached to experimental than to theoretical physics. 
The first substantial mathematical treatment of electricity by a 
German was Die galvanische Kette, mathematisch bearbeitet (1827) by G. 
S. Ohm, who from 1813 to 1849 taught mathematics and physics in 
various secondary schools. In his book Ohm derived a law for the 
voltaic pile and circuit that related current strength to resistance and 
electromotive force, and on that basis he developed an elaborate 
mathematical theory which he successfully applied to a host of 
hitherto poorly understood electrical phenomena. Ohm was not a 
concretizing scientist, but an early representative of a wholly new 
style of physics that would become dominant in Germany in the 
1830's and 1840's. He had the misfortune of falling between two gen 
erations and of being judged at first by men who represented an older 
and different kind of physics. The nature of their criticism of his work 
throws into especially clear focus the distinction made by concretizing 
scientists between mathematical and physical knowledge. 
The most virulent example of this antagonism was the review of 
Ohm's book written by G. F. Pohl, later professor of physics at Bres 
lau. Pohl maintained that mathematics was an abstraction whose use 
in physics necessarily entailed the exclusion of essential aspects of the 
real physical world, and he had only contempt for the sterility of a 
physics that would be essentially mathematical.52 He asked rhetori 
cally years later: "What cannot be measured and subjected to the 
mathematical schematism without one's thereby being either prop 
51Muncke, op. at. (note 29), pp. 510-511. For a more considered discussion of 
Muncke's attitude toward mathematics see Caneva, op. at. (note 2), pp. 110-112. 
52Pohl, rev. ofDie galvanische Kette, mathematisch bearbeitet (Berlin, 1827), by G. S. Ohm, 
Jahrb?cher f?r wissenschaftliche Kritik, 1828, Bd. 1 [des Jahres], cols. 85-103, in col. 102. 
This well-known Berlin literary journal counted Pohl, Johannes Schulze, and G. W. F. 
Hegel among its editors. Cf. Pohl's Ueber das Wesen der Elektricit?t und Schwere. Offener 
Brief an Herrn Professor Dr. H. W. Dove (Breslau, 1848), where he said that he rejected 
Ohm's theory "weil sie... nicht concret genug ist" (p. 10), and where he criticized the 
inability of a mathematical theory to capture "die innere Anschauung" (p. 26). 
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erly acquainted with the superficially conceived object of the imagina 
tion or secured against the most absurd misconception [Begriffsver 
tauschung] of it?"53 As far as Pohl was concerned, Ohm's mathemati 
cal theory, whose essence was embodied in two formulas, was simply 
not a contribution to physical knowledge. In his opinion Ohm had 
wrongly isolated the electrical manifestations of the galvanic circuit 
from a fuller context that included chemical and magnetic 
phenomena. Pohl's criticism of Ohm was to be sure excessive even by 
the standards of the day, and it reflected the fact that his adherence to 
Naturphilosophie set him apart from nearly all other contemporary 
physicists. Nevertheless his basic dissatisfaction with Ohm's theory 
touched upon a distinction between physical explanation and 
mathematical description widely held by concretizing scientists.54 
Explanation as Schematization 
It is often difficult to extract any specific notion of scientific explana 
tion from the individual published works of concretizing scientists. 
True to their anti-hypothetical, empiricist bias, they frequently fa 
vored the unembellished recounting of experimental findings, and 
they certainly did not identify physical explanation with mathemati 
cal description or with the hypothetico-deductive confirmation of 
precise predictions.55 Nonetheless, a reasonably common mode of 
explanation was the association of one phenomenon with other 
known phenomena in terms of either reductionism (for example, of 
electromagnetism to common magnetism) or classification (for exam 
ple, of metals according to electric or magnetic tension). I have chosen 
the term "schematization" to capture these two aspects of concretiz 
ing scientists' implicit attitude toward explanation. This term also 
recalls the attachment to the ideal of Anschaulichkeit exemplified by 
the schematic representationalism of the conceptually reductionist 
theories of transversal magnetism. 
Although it would otherwise have been consistent with this view of 
explanation as schematization, concretizing scientists did not make 
53Pohl, rev. of lieber die Elektricit?t der galvanischen Kette (G?ttingen, 1840), by Friedrich 
Christoph Henrici, Jahrb?cher f?r wissenschaftliche Kritik, 1840, Bd. 2 [des Jahres], cols. 
382-390, in col. 390 (question mark supplied). On the amateur Henrici (1795-1885) see 
Caneva, op. cit. (note 2), p. 183. 
54For Ohm's reception by other concretizing scientists see Caneva, op. cit. (note 2), pp. 
114-115. 
55Of Erman's 1806 paper on the electrical conductivity of different substances we are 
told by his biographer that he was, "as always," very cautious in the explanation of the 
facts and scarcely indicated his own views (Wilhelm Erman, Paul Erman. Ein Berliner 
Gelehrtenleben, No. 53 of Schriften des Vereins f?r die Geschichte Berlins [Berlin, 1927], p. 
113). 
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particular explanatory use of analogies. On the contrary, facile 
analogizing was consciously avoided because it had become as 
sociated with a discredited Naturphilosophie. Muncke, for example, 
objected in the following terms to one author's attempt to draw paral 
lels between gravity, light, and heat: "To be sure, one cannot fail to 
recognize great similarity in the behavior of light and heat, but since 
finding analogies has been so damaging to the progress of science, 
the prudent scientist will do well to stress the differences."56 
The issues involved are best seen in an example such as the theory 
of transversal magnetism, which found great favor with virtually 
every representative of concretizing science. In addition to being di 
rectly constructable in terms of known quantities, this theory stayed 
within the existing framework of familiar magnetic forces. As Erman 
argued in 1821, "an attempt to keep even the most paradoxical 
novelty in the first instance within earlier existing analogies is always 
to be approved."57 The best procedure for discovering possible pecu 
liarities in the new phenomena would be "to begin with presently 
known laws and the heretofore acknowledged analogies between 
magnetism and galvanism in order to find physically based construc 
tions which correspond as much as possible to the new 
phenomena."58 He reasoned that his book "may therefore not unfit 
tingly contain, alongside the presentation of several of the principal 
factual features of electrochemical magnetism, a few preliminary at 
tempts at parallelization of the newly discovered with the already 
known."59 
Erman's words reflect the conservative tendency of concretizing 
scientists not to go beyond the framework of existing knowledge in 
the explanation of a new phenomenon. This attitude of explaining the 
new by relating it to the old was shared by Muncke, whose own 
explanation of electromagnetism also stayed within traditional con 
ceptual bounds. In an afterword to his series of papers on transversal 
56Muncke, rev. of Die Naturlehre nach ihrem gegenw?rtigen Zustande mit R?cksicht auf 
mathematische Begr?ndung (Wien, 1824), by Andreas Baumgartner, Heidelberger Jahrb?cher 
der Literatur, Jg. 18 (1825), 1st half, pp. 179-194, on p. 187. Baumgartner (1793-1865) was 
professor of mathematics and physics at the University of Vienna from 1823. 
57Erman, op. at. (note 37), p. 3; quoted in "Des Professors Erman in Berlin Unter 
suchungen ?ber den Magnetismus des geschlossenen Voltaischen Kreises, frei und 
pr?fend dargestellt, von Gilbert," Annalen der Physik, 67 (1821), 382-426, on 385. 
5SIbid. 
59Ibid., pp. 4 and 386. Schweigger's judgment echoed this characterization: "The 
purpose of this book... is to join the newly discovered electrochemical phenomena onto 
those already known" ("Ausz?ge aus der Schrift: 'Umrisse zu den physischen Ver 
h?ltnissen des vom Herrn Professor Oersted entdeckten elektrochemischen Magnetis 
mus skizzirt von P. Erman. Berlin 1821/ nebst einigen Zus?tzen von Dr. J. S. C. 
Schweigger," Journal f?r Chemie und Physik, 32 [1821], 38-50, on 38). 
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magnetism, Muncke observed: "In general it seems to me that the 
same thing is happening with the explanation of electromagnetism 
that was earlier the case after the discovery of the Ley den jar, the 
electrophore, and galvanism. Moved by the newness of the matter, 
people made an incredible to-do about it, but in the end all the 
phenomena fit very simply into the known natural laws."60 
Concretizing scientists believed that the essence of Ampere's 
theory was an assertion of the identity of electricity and magnetism. 
One of the chief advantages of the theory of transversal magnetism 
was that it kept electricity and magnetism distinct and noninteracting, 
although the theory was based on the phenomenological analogy 
between the behavior of current-carrying wires and transversally 
magnetized iron bars. Electromagnetism was thus subsumed under 
normal magnetic action while preserving the qualitative distinction 
between electricity and magnetism. 
An early example of the interest concretizing scientists showed in 
the classification of phenomena was Erman's reevaluation of a finding 
made in 1797 by Alexander von Humboldt (1769-1859). Humboldt 
had argued against the electrical nature of galvanism by claiming that 
the galvanic action was blocked by some things (e.g., dry bones, 
flames, and empty space) which let common electricity pass. Erman 
demonstrated that both forces behave in the same way with respect to 
these three nonconductors and to ice.61 These experiments led Erman 
to the discovery of "unipolarity," the supposed property of certain 
flames to conduct off only positive or only negative galvanic electric 
ity. This phenomenon was based on the observation that an alcohol 
flame held between the poles of a voltaic pile failed to conduct elec 
tricity across it, but while the negative pole remained isolated 
(charged), the positive pole was discharged. The reverse occurred 
with a phosphorous flame. His findings were published in a paper of 
1806 in which he identified five classes of conductors: nonconductors, 
complete conductors, bipolar incomplete conductors, and positive 
and negative unipolar conductors.62 His intention was to identify 
examples of each kind of conductor experimentally in order to illus 
60Muncke, "Nachtrag zu dieser Vorlesung [?ber Electro-Magnetismus]," Annalen der 
Physik, 71 (1822), 425^35, on 426. 
61Erman, "Ueber die F?higkeit der Flamme, der Knochen und des luftleeren Raumes, 
die Wirkungen der Voltaischen S?ule zu leiten," Annalen der Physik, 11 (1802), 143-168, 
on 147. See also Wilhelm Erman, op. cit. (note 55), p. 106. Humboldt's claim was made in 
Versuche ?ber die gereizte Muskel- und Nervenfaser, nebst Vermuthungen ?ber den chemischen 
Process des Lebens in der Thier- und Pflanzenwelt, 2 vols. (Posen & Berlin, 1797), 1, 433. 
62Erman, "Ueber die f?nffache Verschiedenheit der K?rper in R?cksicht auf galvan 
isches Leitungsverm?gen," Annalen der Physik, 22 (1806), 14-50. 
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tr?te the justness of a classificatory schema, based on qualitative dif 
ferences, which would embrace all substances. This was a typical 
undertaking of concretizing scientists, who, to be sure, more com 
monly limited themselves to the threefold distinction between non 
conductors and complete and incomplete conductors. The tendency 
of the physics of the next generation would be to try to quantify such 
qualitative, essential disjunctions. 
Seebeck's work in electromagnetism illustrates not only the qualita 
tive nature of experimentation practiced by concretizing scientists, 
but also their preoccupation with schematization as a favored mode of 
explanation. His chief concerns were the identity of electricity and 
magnetism (which he denied), the schematic orientation of what he 
identified as the magnetic poles of a pile with respect to its electric 
poles, and the drawing up of a linear table of metals according to their 
thermomagnetic activity, analogous to the electromotive series.63 
Typical of his approach is the paper in which he announced his dis 
covery of thermoelectricity, or rather thermomagnetism as he called 
it, since phenomenologically what one observes is not the current but 
the electromagnetic action manifested by a magnetic needle. In order 
to discover the interrelationship between electrical, magnetic, and 
chemical activities, he first established that a "magnetic polariza 
tion" ?not an electric current?is produced in a bimetallic ring 
if the junctions are kept at different temperatures. He performed 
a great many qualitative experiments on the behavior of different 
metals and ores and tabulated his results in an array which gave the 
direction (not strength) of the magnetism produced when his 
twenty-eight samples were connected together pairwise. There fol 
lowed an extended list of thirty-five metals and ores in a single 
"magnetic series," such that a metal connected with one above it 
produced an "easterly" declination of a magnetic needle, with one 
below it a "westerly" declination. Thus his series had both an "east 
ern" end (bismuth) and a "western" end (antimony and tellurium). 
Seebeck never experimented with one combination in order to find 
out exactly how the strength of the magnetic action might depend on 
the temperature difference, but contented himself with the general 
observation that they increased together. He used the radical lack of 
correspondence between the sequence of metals in his magnetic se 
ries and the traditional electromotive series as proof of the dissimilar 
nature of magnetism and electricity, and he interpreted this finding as 
63On the second of these concerns see Caneva, op. at. (note 2), pp. 123-125, or 
Seebeck, op. at. (note 9), esp. p. 345. 
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a refutation of Ampere's electrodynamie explanation of magnetism in 
terms of current loops.64 
Schweigger used his version of transversal magnetism?his 
hypothesis of a "double magnetic polarity"?as the basis of 
a peculiar 
theory of the operation of the multiplier which underscores the occa 
sionally pronounced graphic element of explanation by schematiza 
tion. He employed not a simple loop but a figure-eight shaped coil of 
wire so that the magnetic needle could be placed alternately in either 
half of the "eight," thereby more dramatically showing the opposite 
effect on the needle as its position was reversed relative to the direc 
tion of current. The schematic-pictorial nature of theory as conceived 
by concretizing scientists is illustrated in the schema by 
which 
Schweigger represented his theory of the multiplier. Refering 
to the 
diagram reproduced here as Figure 3 (his Figure 11) 
he concluded: 
"All phenomena will take place just 
as one is entitled to expect ac 
cording to the theory represented in Figure 11. And to that extent 
the theory may be allowed to pass as an expression suited 
at least 
to an overview [Ueberblicken] (dectpeiv) of all known electromagnetic 
phenomena."65 In Figure 3 the circles represent 
cross sections of the 
current-carrying wire forming Schweigger's figure-eight-shaped 
multiplier, the smaller arrows indicating the direction of the 
transver 
sal magnetism of each portion of the wire, the 
two larger arrows 
indicating the direction a magnetic needle would 
assume in the mid 
dle of each half of the "eight." When Schweigger elsewhere asserted 
that "every theory is indeed only a picture," he gave expression 
to the 
tendency of concretizing scientists to regard 
a theory as a simple and 
direct representation of the phenomena.66 In 
an extreme case such as 
^Seebeck, "Magnetische Polarisation der Metalle 
und Erze durch Temperatur 
Differenz/' Abhandlungen der K?niglichen Akademie der Wissenschaften 
zu Berlin, 1822-1823 
(pub. 1825), Abhandlungen der physikalischen Klasse, pp. 265-373, 
on pp. 292-293. Cf. 
Poggendorff's use of his Condensator (i.e., multiplier) 
not as a measuring instrument but 
to determine the order of twenty-nine substances in an electromotive 
series (op. at. [note 
22], cols. 703-707). 
65Schweigger, op. at. (note 39), p. 
38. In the accompanying Figure 3 (from ibid., Tafel I, 
Figur 11), the direction of the larger 
left-hand arrow has been reversed from the original. 
In another characterization of physical theory Schweigger 
used "Qeatpew" to gloss 
Beschauen, again underscoring the anschaulich quality 
of theory ("Einige Bemerkungen 
zu Davy's Abhandlung: ?ber die Verh?ltnisse 
zwischen elektrischer und chemischer Wirksam 
keit," Journal f?r Chemie und Physik, 52 [1828], 33-74, on 65). 
66The quotation is from 
a footnote signed "Die Redaction" in 
a "Schreiben des Herrn 
Professor Oersted an die Redaction vom 9. Sept. 1821," Journal f?r Chemie und Physik, 
33 
(1821), 123-131, on 125; reprinted in Oersted, Naturvidenskabelige Skrifter, (note 25), 2, 
246-251, on 247. Schweigger's coeditor from 1819 to 1823 was Johann Ludwig Georg 
Meinecke (1781-1823), though the sentiment 
was certainly Schweigger's. 
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this one it was not even necessary that the theory be expressed in words, 
much less in testable statements or mathematical formulas. Although 
this schematic aspect of Schweigger's notion of explanation played a 
more important role in his work than the kind of classification sought 
be Seebeck or Erman, Schweigger, too, stressed the need for the 
proper arrangement of facts in the construction of a theory. Indeed, 
these two were ideally one and the same: "An appropriate grouping 
of a series of phenomena, in order to apprehend the individual in its 
natural connection with the whole, is indeed basically that which we 
are alone accustomed to call a physical theory."67 
67Schweigger, "Nachschreiben des Herausgebers [zu den vorstehenden Aufs?tzen 
?ber D?bereiner 's neues Feuerprincip]/' Journal f?r Chemie und Physik, 39 (1823), 211-230, 
on 214. 
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3. THE SCIENCE OF THE ABSTRACT 
The abstractness of the physics of the younger generation contrasts 
sharply with the qualitative Anschaulichkeit of concretizing science. 
Against the former notion that one of the tasks of science was to 
capture the essence of the phenomena, the new physics dropped the 
requirement that a theory should provide a true representation of 
physical reality. Among the younger physicists this abstract approach 
became so much the norm that some, such as Neumann, never con 
cerned themselves with models or physical mechanisms as long as 
their mathematical theories were coherent and testable. The explana 
tion of a physical phenomenon came to be so inextricably associated 
with its mathematical description that the latter could be taken for the 
former to an extent the older generation would have pronounced 
entirely unacceptable. The new physics was also characterized by an 
unprecedented increase in the precision of its experiments and in the 
ambitiousness of its exhaustively conducted research programs. The 
relative laxness and contentment with qualitative or crudely quantita 
tive results which marked concretizing science gave way to a preoc 
cupation with exact measurement and an attention to technique 
which were part of a self-conscious emphasis on correct methodol 
ogy. There came into general acceptance nothing less than a com 
pletely new standard of scientific method in the performance of re 
search. 
A third fundamental characteristic of the new physics was the 
explicit adoption of the hypothetico-deductive method, representing 
a profound change from concretizing scientists' empiricist avoidance 
of anything "hypothetical/' Abstracting scientists tended to present 
their concepts and theories explicitly as hypotheses whose acceptabil 
ity depended on their subsequent experimental confirmation. Con 
cepts were not expected to be naturally entailed by experience, 
nor 
were empirically confirmed laws presented as convenient mathemati 
cal reexpressions of the data. The intrinsically hypothetical character 
of this methodology was reflected by the fact that abstracting scien 
tists largely ignored the question of whether their theories were 
"true" in any sense other than agreement with experience. By con 
trast, many French mathematical physicists of the same period still 
wished to attain certainty, and their model of scientific knowledge 
resembled deductive mathematics, which secures its premises di 
rectly and not on the basis of conclusions drawn from them. Al 
though the hypothetico-deductive method was occasionally used by 
some French physicists, theirs was not the dominant tradition in 
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France and German abstracting scientists did not simply import their 
new methodology from abroad.68 The strong rationalist tradition in 
French science seems to have contributed to the notion that scientific 
truth could speak for itself. German abstracting scientists, who repre 
sented no such tradition, felt a greater responsibility to experience, 
and arguments based on theoretical simplicity tend to be absent or 
unstressed even where they might be expected, such as in Weber's 
and Neumann's electrodynamics. 
The reasons for these developments in mathematization, ex 
perimentation, and methodology are complex. Adoption of the 
hypothetico-deductive method in a sense required experiments to be 
quantitative if they were to be capable of deciding the validity of 
precise statements drawn from mathematical theories. However, sci 
ence does not consist solely of testing theories, and diligent, quantita 
tive experimentation became a general trait of much of nineteenth 
century German science independently of whether any theory was 
being tested. Again, if it might seem that use of the hypothetico 
deductive method is a natural consequence of the mathematization of 
physical theory, the example of French mathematical physics indi 
cates that there is in fact no intrinsic connection between the two. 
Although an interest in instrumentation may have encouraged some 
abstracting scientists to use the hypothetico-deductive method, any 
strictly internal account of its widespread acceptance must be insuffi 
cient. Later I argue that its adoption was due to changes in society 
and in scientists' perception of their role which not only encouraged 
the practical testing of ideas but also led to a reversal in the concep 
tion of the relationship between knowledge and experience. 
The work in electrodynamics of an important subgroup of abstract 
ing scientists represented an approach to physics different from that 
of either their French or German predecessors. In contrast to the 
French, they did not content themselves with merely applying 
mathematical analysis to one particular class of phenomena but rather 
sought to construct a mathematical theory that would bring together 
conceptually a number of such classes. It is characteristic of the 
French attachment to established paradigms that Poisson's theory of 
magnetism of 1824 did not even make provision for an explanation of 
68On the metholodology of French mathematical physics see Caneva, op. cit. (note 2), 
pp. 331-363, which amplifies and substantiates the claims made here. Robert Kargon has 
implied that the "hypothetico-deductive approach" was characteristic of the French 
"mechanico-molecular school" of Laplace, Cauchy, Navier, and Poisson ("Model and 
Analogy in Victorian Science: Maxwell's Critique of the French Physicists, "Journal of the 
History of Ideas, 30 [1969], 423-436, esp. 423 and 426). This is not true with respect to the 
Laplacians' favored mode of presentation. 
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electromagnetic interaction, discovered four years earlier. Despite the 
dominance of French physics at that time, it remained for the Ger 
mans to seek the theoretical unification of electrostatics, elec 
trodynamics, and electromagnetic induction. This concern for syn 
thesis was the most fruitful legacy of German Naturphilosophie.69 
Mathematics and Abstraction 
That the physics of the younger generation was consistently 
mathematical is a point as basic as it is unproblematic. This section 
will deal with some implications of the mathematization and 
abstractness that completely replaced the Anschaulichkeit of concretiz 
ing science. Some of the younger generation felt that the use of math 
ematics in physics still had to be defended. The Berlin physicist P. T. 
Riess, a pioneer in the quantification of static electricity who consis 
tently expressed his findings algebraically, found himself faced with 
the charge that his use of mathematics had hindered the understand 
ing and dissemination of his work.70 Muncke's thousand-page article 
on heat in Gehler's Physikalisches W?rterbuch did not, he lamented, 
even "correctly and understandably" reproduce his basic formula for 
the static-electric generation of heat.71 K?nigsberg professor of 
physics L. F. Moser complained in the preface to his 1839 book on 
actuarial statistics that there were still many people "who placed the 
least possible weight on numbers and on all conclusions based on 
them, considering them to be insubstantial shadows, nests from 
which truth has flown."72 He suggested that people had difficulty 
following and accepting a mathematical argument because of the 
"small measure of immediate perception [Anschauung]" which charac 
terizes our relationship to mathematics.73 Applied to individuals, as 
in statistics, mathematics requires abstracting from all qualities be 
longing only to the individual; we are interested only in the fictitious 
"average man" representing the regularity of the apparently lawless 
phenomena.74 To Moser this abstractness of the mathematical han 
dling of phenomena was a virtue, even if science found itself "in a 
69For reasons of space this conclusion cannot be further developed here; see Caneva, 
op. ext. (note 2), pp. 364-413, where I discuss the work of Fechner, Weber, Neumann, and 
Grassmann. 
70Peter Theophil Riess, "Die Lehre von der Elektricit?t (Zweiter Bericht)," Repertorium 
der Physik, 6 (1842), 109-314, on 189. 
71Ibid. Muncke's article, "W?rme," appeared in Gehler's Physikalisches W?rterbuch, 
(note 27), 10, Pt. 1 (1841), 52-1179. 
72Ludwig Ferdinand Moser, Die Gesetze der Lebensdauer (Berlin, 1839), pp. xviii-xix. 
Ibid., p. xix, and cf. pp. xx-xxi. 
"Ibid., p. 3. 
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certain, more or less definite, distorted relationship [Missverh?ltniss] 
to reality" because of its one-sided attention to the "quantitative rela 
tionships" of objects.75 
One implication of the mathematical approach to science was the 
deemphasis of qualitative distinctions. An early example of this ten 
dency was Ohm's work on the electric current, which was the focus of 
some debate over the distinction between mathematical and physical 
knowledge. Ohm's originality lay in explicating the precise relation 
ship between tension and current and in associating a varying electric 
tension, or electroscopic force, with each point of a current-carrying 
wire. Previously there had been only confused notions of the rela 
tionship between these two classes of phenomena, some even con 
sidering them to be mutually exclusive. This was not surprising, since 
measurement of the electric tension of a pile had in general only been 
possible when no current flowed. On the other hand, the early exper 
iments of Erman, Ritter, and J?ger had demonstrated not only the 
presence of an electroscopic force at the poles of a pile closed by 
means of a poor conductor, such as water, but also the progressive 
decrease in this force from the poles toward the center of the connect 
ing conductor.76 To the extent that these experiments had not simply 
been forgotten, they were thought inapplicable to the case of metallic 
conduction because of the traditional classification of substances into 
perfect and imperfect conductors and nonconductors, each with its 
own peculiar characteristics. To Ohm, who had the mathematical 
physicist's tendency to regard properties less as an "either-or" of 
some quality than as a "more-or-less" of some quantity, such distinc 
tions could have no intrinsic validity; and he did not hesitate to apply 
to metals findings originally restricted to imperfect conductors. 
The disposition to play down the significance of qualitative distinc 
tions, or to interpret them as quantitative differences in the values of 
certain coefficients, was also a feature of one of the major optics 
papers of F. E. Neumann, professor of physics and mineralogy at 
K?nigsberg. Neumann reasoned that theory must treat uncrystallized 
bodies as special cases of crystallized ones because there could be no 
75Ibid., p. 5. Moser explicitly generalized his judgement to all of science. 
76Johann Wilhelm Ritter, "Versuche und Bemerkungen ?ber den Galvanismus der 
Voltaischen Batterie_Dritter Brief," Annalen der Physik, 8 (1801), 385-473; for Erman's 
and J?ger's papers see note 20. For Ohm's knowledge of these see his "Versuch einer 
Theorie der durch galvanische Kr?fte hervorgebrachten elektroskopischen 
Erscheinungen," Annalen der Physik und Chemie, 6 (1826), 459-469 and 7 (1826), 45-54 and 
117-118 ("Nachtrag"), on 53-54; reprinted in Gesammelte Abhandlungen von G. S. Ohm, 
ed. Eugen Lommel (Leipzig, 1892), pp. 37-54, on pp. 51-52. On the largely romantically 
inspired work of J. W. Ritter, see Caneva, op. at. (note 2), pp. 99-102, 140-145, and the 
references cited there. 
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qualitative difference between the two.77 It is also possible that the 
unification of electrostatics and electrodynamics achieved by W. E. 
Weber, professor of physics at Leipzig, owed something to the con 
sideration that Coulomb's law must be only a special case for particles 
at rest of a more general velocity-dependent electrical law. Despite 
the fact that Weber seems to have required Fechner's stimulation to 
occupy himself with the unification of electrostatics, electrodynamics, 
and electromagnetic induction, it reflects the character of thought of 
the mathematical physicist that this consideration was first made 
explicit by Weber and not by Fechner, who was not particularly adept 
at mathematics and who ignored electrostatics in his unification of 
electrodynamics and induction. 
Neumann's was the epitome of a kind of abstract physics which 
placed greatest emphasis on the mathematical development of 
theory. His student Woldemar Voigt contrasted Neumann's "less 
graphic [anschaulich] but always certain method" to "the use of such 
graphic pictures" that had characterized an earlier style of science.78 
Neumann had occasionally used the latter approach as an aid in con 
structing a theory, Voigt noted, "but he nevertheless always sharply 
distinguished between the results of that pictorial [bildlich] treat 
ment, which are susceptible to test by means of observation, and the 
auxilliary ideas themselves, which had shown the way to them and 
which do not permit being tested other than by means of the end 
attained."79 The most important example of Neumann's ability to 
deal with abstract concepts was his explanation of electromagnetic 
induction in terms of change in potential, a mathematically defined 
quantity not easily given a direct empirical basis. For Neumann to 
generalize change in potential as the cause of induction marked a 
significant departure from the kinds of explanatory concepts favored 
by concretizing scientists. 
Wilhelm Weber's approach to mathematical physics is often con 
trasted to Neumann's. The work of the latter, all commentators have 
77Franz Ernst Neumann, "Theoretische Untersuchung der Gesetze, nach welchen das 
Licht an der Grenze zweier vollkommen durchsichtigen Medien reflectirt und gebrochen 
wird," Abhandlungen der K?niglichen Akademie der Wissenschaften 
zu Berlin, 1835 (pub. 
1837), Mathematische Abhandlungen, pp. 1-160, on p. 4; reprinted in Franz Neumanns 
Gesammelte Werke, eds. Carl Neumann, Woldemar Voigt, and Albert Wangerin, 3 vols. 
(Leipzig, 1906-1928), 2 (1906), 359-574, on 364. 
78Woldemar Voigt, "Zur Erinnerung an F. E. Neumann, gestorben am 23. Mai 1895 
zu 
K?nigsberg i./Pr.," Nachrichten von der K?nigl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften 
zu G?ttingen, 
1895, Mathematisch-physikalische Klasse, pp. 248-265, on p. 259; reprinted 
as 
"Ged?chtnissrede auf Franz Neumann" in Newmann, Werke, 1 (1928), 1-19, on 13-14. 
79Ibid.f p. 259 and Werke, 2, 14. Note here the implied reliance on the hypothetico 
deductive method as the touchstone for the acceptance of a theory. 
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agreed, exemplified abstract mathematical theory that made no at 
tempt to provide a picture of reality or even to construct hypothetical 
mechanisms.80 Weber, in contrast, made extensive use of models and 
hypothetical mechanisms, especially in his 1846 electrodynamics pa 
per. Emphasizing this difference between the two men, however, 
neglects the conceptual component in Neumann's work, misinter 
prets the role of physical models in Weber's science as naive repre 
sentationalism, and promotes a misconception of the use of models in 
abstracting science. Abstracting scientists' employment of models 
might appear at first glance similar to concretizing scientists' desire to 
have physics express the nature of the phenomena, but in fact the 
difference between them is fundamental. When Weber made use of a 
physical model, he did so solely in virtue of its ability to be expressed 
in mathematical form, and no claim was made that it corresponded to 
the actual structure of the world. Its fruitfulness as a heuristic aid in 
the derivation of a theory and the degree of correspondence between 
theory and observation were the decisive factors in its use. 
Weber's attitude toward abstraction and the use of physical models 
in mathematical physics was characteristic of the transformation tak 
ing place in German physics. He himself was not uninterested in the 
actual structure of the physical world, but he kept such considera 
tions out of his physics unless they could be made an integral part of 
theory. At the end of his first electrodynamics paper he discussed the 
possibility that the form of his electrodynamic force law was due to 
the dependence of the propagation of the force on an intervening 
medium; he compared this electric medium to the luminiferous ether; 
he noted Faraday's recent discovery of the influence of electricity on 
light; and he referred favorably to Ampere's discussion of the plausi 
bility that the electrodynamic influence was transmitted by an ether.81 
In a letter to C. F. Gauss, professor of mathematics and astronomy at 
G?ttingen, he expressed the opinion that "the nicest solution to the 
puzzle [of electrodynamic action-at-a-distance] would be its explana 
tion on the basis of a gradual propagation of the force."82 Despite 
80"Vorwort zum dritten Bande," Neumann, Werke, 3 (1912), viii; Hoppe, op. dt. 
(note 2), p. 465, quoted in Karl Heinrich Wiederkehr, Wilhelm Eduard Weber, Erforscher 
der Wellenbewegung und der Elektrizit?t (Stuttgart, 1967), pp. 101-102; and Wilbur Morris 
Stine, The Contributions ofH. F. E. Lenz to Electromagnetism (Philadelphia, 1923), p. 114. 8 Wilhelm Weber, Elektrodynamische Maassbestimmungen (Leipzig, 1846), pp. 168-170; 
reprinted in Wilhelm Weber's Werke, 6 vols. (Berlin, 1892-1894), 3 (1893), 25-214, on 
212-214. The 1846 book was a separate printing of "Elektrodynamische Maassbestim 
mungen," Abhandlungen bd Begr?ndung der K?niglich S?chsischen Gesellschaft der Wis 
senschaften am Tage der zwdhundertj?hrigen Geburtsfder Ldbnizens herausgegeben von der 
F?rstlich Jablonowskischen Gesellschaft (Leipzig, 1846), pp. 209-378. 
82Letter of 31 March 1845, quoted in Karl Heinrich Wiederkehr, Wilhelm Webers Stellung 
in der Entwicklung der Elektrizit?tslehre (diss., University of Hamburg, 1961), p. 68. 
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these sentiments favorable to the physical existence of an ether, he 
was content in practice to derive his fundamental formula on the 
assumption of simple action-at-a-distance between electrical parti 
cles. Weber used an atomistic representation of the current because it 
was a mathematically analyzable model that allowed the elec 
trodynamic action-at-a-distance phenomena to be calculated.83 He re 
garded it as perfectly acceptable to base a theory on a model that he 
himself did not believe corresponded to reality. He later assigned the 
real cause of electrical resistance to the "alternate union and separa 
tion" of the two electricities, a type of double current, to be sure, but 
not one of discrete electric masses.84 
Weber's desiderata were clarity and susceptibility to exact mea 
surement. He knew that his velocity-dependent force law repre 
sented a break with tradition, and he tried to anticipate criticism of his 
abandonment of past norms by seeking refuge in the external unas 
sailability of his mathematical theory: 
The question [of whether there are velocity-dependent forces] 
cannot be decided a priori because the assumption of such forces 
does not contain, formally, either a contradiction or anything 
unclear or indeterminate. 
The laws of the dependence of forces on given physical rela 
tionships are called fundamental physical laws and serve, according 
to the aim of physics, not to give an explanation of the forces in 
terms of their true bases [Gr?nde], but only a clearly presented 
and usable general method for the quantitative determination of the 
forces in terms of the fundamental units of space and time estab 
lished in physics. From a physical standpoint there can therefore 
be no objection to a force being made a function of a time 
dependent relationship, just as little as its being made a function of a 
distance, since a time-dependent relationship is just as measura 
ble a quantity as a distance: both, that is, [are] by nature suited to 
precise quantitative determination, even if unsuited to the search 
for the internal basis [innerer Grund] of a force.85 
83Weber, op. dt. (note 81), Art. 19, p. 11 and Werke, 3, 136. 
84Wiederkehr, op. at. (note 82), p. 183; also cited in Wiederkehr, op. at. (note 80), p. 
153. The reference there is to Weber's "Elektrodynamische Maassbestimmungen ins 
besondere Widerstandsmessungen" of 1852. 
85Weber, op. dt. (note 81), Art 20, pp. 112-113 and Werke, 3, 149-150. Even where 
Weber discussed a possible physical analog of the potential he recognized that it 
was not 
less acceptable to physics by being purely ideal, since it 
was useful for the theoretical 
interpretation of experience; see the section he contributed to his and Gauss's Atlas des 
Erdmagnetismus nach den Elementen der Theorie entworfen (Leipzig, 1840), Sect. 25, pp. 
18-19; reprinted in Carl Friedrich Gauss Werke, 12 vols. (G?ttingen, etc., 1863-1933), 12 
(1929), 335-408, on 374-377. 
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Weber's physics, in order not to be deprived of the successes of its 
mathematization, had to give up any claim to providing a representa 
tion of reality. Weber believed that this change was a general charac 
teristic of contemporary physics, and he noted that there existed a ten 
dency (Bestreben) "to determine all natural phenomena in terms of 
number and measure, and thereby to secure for theory a foundation 
independent of sensual representation [sinnliche Anschauung] or mere 
approximation. 
"86 
Gauss's famous desire to have a "constructible representation" 
(construirbare Vorstellung) of the way in which the electrodynamic 
force might be propagated across space was of a piece with Weber's use 
of physical models as a heuristic picture susceptible to mathematical 
analysis.87 The desire to have a "precise physical principle" on which 
to base the mathematical theory of a physical phenomenon also 
underlay Gauss's judgement of the theoretical significance of Weber's 
experimental proof of the unequal distribution of electricity on a 
sphere composed of zinc and copper hemispheres.88 Gauss doubted 
whether the "physical foundation" underlying Poisson's theory of 
the distribution of electricity on the surface of conducting bodies 
could explain the phenomenon demonstrated by Weber. He sus 
pected that one would have to devise a physical model according to 
which the molecular forces acted other than according to the 
inverse-square law.89 That Gauss realized it might be possible to base 
a correct (that is, verifiable) theory on more than one model, hence 
that mathematical physics did not necessarily provide insight into the 
physical nature of a phenomenon, is clear from his work on terrestrial 
magnetism. In fact, for Gauss part of the beauty of a mathematical 
theory was that it could survive changes in physical conception.90 
Fechner might appear to be an exception to the hypothetical use of 
models that characterized abstracting science, for the author of the 
Atomenlehre seems to have believed in the fundamental atomicity of 
all physical phenomena rather than to have regarded atomism as only 
86Weber, op. at. (note 81), p. 9 and Werke, 3, 34. 
87Letter of 19 March 1845 to Weber, in Gauss, Werke (note 85), 5 (1867), 629. 
88Letter of 27 January 1844 to Weber, in Gauss, Werke, 11, Pt. 1 (1927), 175. 
89Ibid., p. 177. 
90Gauss, "Die Intensit?t der erdmagnetischen Kraft, zur?ckgef?hrt auf absolutes 
Maass," Annalen der Physik und Chemie, 28 (1833), 241-273 and 591-615, on 614-615 
("Intensitas vis magneticae terrestris ad mensuram absolutam revocata," Commentationes 
societatis regiae scientiarum gottingensis recentiores, 8 [1832-1837; pub. 1841], Classis 
mathematicae, pp. 3-44, on p. 44; reprinted in his Werke [note 85], 5, 79-118, on 118). See 
also Gauss, "Allgemeine Theorie des Erdmagnetismus," Resultate aus den Beobachtungen 
des magnetischen Vereins im Jahre 1838, 3 (1839), 1-57 and 146-148 ("Nachtrag"), on 6; 
reprinted in his Werke, 5, 119-193, on 126. 
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a convenient picture. On closer examination, however, Fechner's at 
titude toward scientific knowledge is entirely consonant with the 
"public positivism" of abstracting science. The key to understanding 
Fechner is to realize that he could consistently take both positions with 
respect to the reality of atoms, depending on whether he was speak 
ing "scientifically" or not. That was a crucial distinction reflected in 
the title and structure of his Ueber die physikalische und philosophische 
Atomenlehre: the first half dealt with the physical foundations of 
atomism, the second with the philosophical possibilities it allowed.91 
As far as science was concerned, atomism was a hypothesis, albeit to 
Fechner an extremely probable one, which had to be judged solely on 
the basis of its success in accounting for the individual phenomena 
and in providing a unified picture of their interconnections.92 Physics 
is not a source of certainty, nor does it have anything to say about 
essences or underlying reality.93 Although Fechner believed in atoms 
and assumed an atomistic model of electricity in his electrodynamics, 
he did not maintain that their existence was proved by science. Simi 
larly, he did not believe that the physicist's use of the concept of the 
luminiferous ether entailed any belief in its actual existence: "The 
quality of the luminiferous ether is, for the physicist, completely im 
material. He says nothing about it, he knows nothing about it, and 
even the existence of a substrate serves him merely as the basis for 
clear conceptions [Vorstellungen] of the motion [of light], as the formal 
nucleus of a play of phenomena, forces, and laws."94 If Fechner's 
use of such Vorstellungen was more conceptual and discursive than 
Gauss's and Weber's mathematically elaborated construirbare Vorstel 
lungen, the difference lies in the fact that Fechner was not a mathemat 
ical physicist rather than in any fundamental difference in their con 
ception of the nature of scientific knowledge.95 
91For the sharpness of this distinction see Fechner, lieber die physikalische und 
philosophische Atomenlehre (Leipzig, 1855), esp. p. ix. His electrodynamics paper of 1845 
was mute on these questions; hence one can only assume that what was explicit in 1855 
was implicit a decade earlier. The failure to appreciate the distinction between personal 
belief in atomism and its use as a scientific model is a critical flaw in Arthur Philip Molella, 
Philosophy and Nineteenth-Century German Electrodynamics: The Problem of Atomic Action at 
a Distance (diss., Cornell Univ., 1972); see esp. pp. 44, 103, and 111. 
92Fechner, op. tit. (note 91), pp. viii, 30, and 50. 
9Hbid., pp. 26, 93, and 113. 
^Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
95For Fechner's heuristic use of an atomistic model of the electric current see his 
"Ueber die Verkn?pfung der Faraday'sehen Inductions-Erscheinungen 
mit den Am 
pere'sehen elektro-dynamischen Erscheinungen," Annalen der Physik und Chemie, 
64 
(1845), 337-345. Compare also his Elemente der Psychophysik, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1860), 
which was a masterful example of exact scientific method in which the search for 
quantitative and experimentally demonstrable functional relationships between 
var 
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Although H. G. Grassmann was primarily a mathematician and not 
a physicist, the character of his work also demonstrates the increased 
abstraction shown by physics. In the first edition of his Aus 
dehnungslehre he announced that his aim was to abstract and 
generalize the formal relationships of geometry in order to eliminate 
all principles based on spatial intuitions (Raumanschauungen).96 He 
wished to replace an intuitive system by one that was purely concep 
tual and abstract. Grassmann's approach was criticized as an unwar 
ranted break with the mathematical tradition of Anschaulichkeit. The 
professor of philosophy at Jena, Ernst Friedrich Apelt (1812-1859), 
asked the mathematician and professor of astronomy at Leipzig, Au 
gust Ferdinand M?bius (1790-1868): "Have you read Grassmann's 
remarkable Ausdehnungslehre? I know it only from Grunert's Archiv 
but it seems to me to rest on a false philosophy of mathematics. The 
essential character of mathematical knowledge, the Anschaulichkeit, 
seems to have been totally banished from it. Such an abstract theory of 
extensive quantities as he attempts could only be derived on the basis 
of concepts. But the source of mathematical knowledge lies not in 
concepts but in Anschauung." In his reply M?bius agreed with Apelt 
that Grassmann "distances himself too much from all Anschaulichkeit, 
the essential character of mathematical knowledge."97 A similar 
abstraction from imaginable physical models in favor of systematic 
conceptual unity was an important feature of Grassmann's elec 
trodynamics paper of 1845.98 
Experiment and Measurement 
The most significant developments in the experimental study of 
electricity in Germany during the second quarter of the nineteenth 
century were a greater concern with quantitative measurement and a 
iables was carried out with conscious exclusion of all questions having to do with 
possible underlying psychological entities. Fechner was passionately concerned with 
things otherwordly and nonprovable, but he was acutely aware of what belonged to 
science and what did not. 
96Hermann G?nther Grassmann, Die lineale Ausdehnungslehre, ein neuer Zweig der 
Mathematik dargestellt und durch Anwendungen auf die ?brigen Zweige der Mathematik, wie 
auch auf die Statik, Mechanik, die Lehre vom Magnetismus und die Krystallonomie erl?utert 
(Leipzig, 1844), "Vorrede," pp. ix-x; reprinted in Hermann Grassmanns gesammelte 
mathematische und physikalische Werke, ed. Friedrich Engel, 3 vols. (Leipzig, 1894-1911), 1, 
Pt. 1 (1894), 1-319, on 10. See also Victor Schlegel, Hermann Grassmann. Sein Leben und 
seine Werke (Leipzig, 1878), pp. 17-18. 
97Letters of 3 September 1845 and 5 January 1846, in Grassmann, Werke (note 96), 3, Pt. 
2 (1911), "Grassmanns Leben, geschildert von Friedrich Engel," p. 101. 
98Grassmann, "Neue Theorie der Elektrodynamik," Annalen der Physik und Chemie, 64 
(1845), 1-18; reprinted in his Werke 2, Pt. 2 (1902), 147-160. 
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dramatic increase in the ambitiousness of scientists' research pro 
grams. The modest efforts of Pfaff, Muncke, and Erman are just not 
comparable to the pains taken by Fechner, Weber, Lenz, or Riess. 
These changes were especially evident in the relatively sophisticated 
instrumentation routinely used by virtually all members of the 
younger generation. When Schweigger, Poggendorff, and Schmidt 
measured the electric current?when they measured it at all?they 
used a multiplier and noted the equilibrium position of its needle. In 
contrast, Ohm used a precise Coulomb torsion balance; Fechner 
adapted Biot's method of counting the oscillations of a magnetic nee 
dle; and Weber (following Gauss's example) employed an extremely 
sensitive galvanometer making use of the mirror-and-telescope read 
ing of the deflection of a suspended magnetic needle. Fechner ex 
pressed amazement in 1831 that his contemporaries (which at that 
date in electricity meant concretizing scientists) had not enthusiasti 
cally adopted the more precise measuring procedures available: 
As far as the measuring procedure I used is concerned, to my 
knowledge it has up to now been applied only once to galvanic 
phenomena, by Biot. It is difficult for me to explain how one 
could have forgotten this method of measurement in favor of 
others which are in part downright inadmissible, in part very 
uncertain or of only limited applicability, and how in particular 
one could have clung so stubbornly to the method of deviations 
[of the multiplier needle], while the method of the torsion bal 
ance offered a so much more certain procedure, even if one did 
not wish to make use of the method of oscillations I used." 
The experimental standards that Fechner took for granted had not 
been deemed necessary by the older generation, who neither ex 
ploited the techniques available to them nor tried to develop new 
ones. 
Gauss's influential paper of 1832 on the intensity of terrestrial mag 
netism provides a noteworthy example of the instrumental precision 
he sought. Gauss described a method of measuring the intensity of 
the earth's magnetism in terms of standard units of length, time, and 
mass, thereby making possible the comparison of measurements 
made at different times and places. The sensitive instrument that he 
and Weber devised for this purpose incorporated two important in 
novations: the suspension of the magnet from a wire (instead of its 
being supported from below), and the use of a mirror and telescope in 
"Fechner, Massbestimmungen ?ber die galvanische Kette (Leipzig, 1831), "Vorwort," p. 
iv. 
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reading the deflection of the magnet.100 Gauss and Weber's mag 
netometer was adequate for measuring the magnetic declination but 
not the horizontal component of the terrestrial magnetic force. The 
latter measurement was normally carried out by calculating the 
period of oscillation of the suspended magnetic needle, but the con 
siderable length of time required to get an accurate reading made the 
magnetometer insensitive to short-term variations in the magnetic 
intensity. To remedy this defect Gauss devised his bifilar magnetome 
ter, which in its original form consisted of a twenty-five pound mag 
net suspended from two seventeen-foot long steel wires, the bifilar 
suspension serving to damp the magnet's oscillations.101 The place 
ment of the telescope and scale at a distance of sixteen feet from the 
magnetometer and mirror meant that even extremely minute deflec 
tions could be measured. Gauss noted later that his magnetometer 
was capable of measuring the magnetism of a needle and the intensity 
of the terrestrial magnetic force "with an exactitude... equal to the 
precision of the most accurate astronomical observations."102 Indeed, 
it was from astronomy that Gauss derived the standards of experi 
mental precision that he applied to physics. Weber knew that his and 
Gauss's instrumental study of magnetism marked a break with the 
previously dominant mode of science. "It is our conviction," he 
wrote, "that the traditional way of doing physics is obsolete and in 
need of reform and that our way of handling the magnetic problem is 
a first sample. It goes against many deep-seated habits and causes 
many to wish that such a thing had never been started. But if it is 
carried through it will soon develop further and have a beneficial 
effect on all areas of science."103 
The keynotes of Weber's physics were measure (Maass) and mea 
surement (Messung, Maassbestimmung). Repeatedly concerned with 
100Felix Klein, Vorlesungen ?ber die Entwicklung der Mathematik im 19. Jahrhundert, Pt. 1, 
ed. R. Courant and O. Neugebauer, Vol. 24 of Die Grundlehren der mathematischen 
Wissenschaften in Einzeldarstellungen mit besonderer Ber?cksichtigung der Anwendungsgebiete 
(Berlin, 1926), p. 20. On the historical importance of these innovations see the editor's 
comments in Gauss, Die Intensit?t der erdmagnetischen Kraft auf absolutes Maass 
zur?ckgef?hrt, ed. E. Dorn, No. 53 oi Ostwald's Klassiker der exakten Wissenschaften (Leipzig, 
1894), p. 54. 
101Gauss, "Ueber ein neues, zun?chst zur unmittelbaren Beobachtung der Ver?n 
derungen in der Intensit?t des horizontalen Theils des Erdmagnetismus bestimmtes 
Instrument," Resultate aus den Beobachtungen des magnetischen Vereins im Jahre 1837, 2 
(1838), 1-19; reprinted in his Werke (note 85), 5, 357-373. 
102Gauss, "Erdmagnetismus und Magnetometer," Jahrbuch f?r 1836, ed. Heinrich 
Christian Schumacher, pp. 1-47, on p. 28; reprinted in Gauss, Werke, 5, 315-344, on 332. 
See also ibid., pp. 42-43 and Werke, 5, 341. 
103Letter of 9 April 1841 to the historian of law Karl von Richthoven, quoted in 
Wiederkehr, op. at. (note 80), pp. 147-148. 
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questions of international standards and absolute units, he was deeply 
committed to a quantitative physics whose typical object of inves 
tigation was an instrument or a measuring device. In one paper, 
for example, he described a modification of organ pipes which kept 
their frequency constant at all pressures, and he outlined the analysis 
he had undertaken "in order to be able to subject this means of 
compensation to calculation and to apply it reliably" to the definition 
of a "normal tone" against which others could be compared.104 In 
another paper he described an instrument, his Monochord or Tonmes 
ser, which consisted of a vertical wire capable of producing a desired 
series of tones when its length or tension was suitably varied. This 
device could be used to measure very small time intervals and the 
speed of sound in solids as well as to define a "normal measure" in 
terms of which other tones could be measured precisely and interna 
tionally.105 Weber's preoccupation with problems of measurement 
dominated his work for most of the fifteen years following his initial 
collaboration with Gauss in 1831. In one two-year period alone 
(1837-1838) he published or wrote seven papers devoted to the com 
bined theoretical and experimental analysis of a variety of measuring 
devices.106 Typical of Weber's approach was his synopsis of the con 
tents of his paper on the bifilar magnetometer: 
We shall consider in order the following: 
1. the parts of the small measuring instrument, 
2. the observations to be made with it, 
3. the rules for the utilization of the observations, 
4. the calculation of the observations according to these rules, 
5. the results of the calculation, 
104Weber, "Compensation der Orgelpfeifen, ein Vortrag des Prof. Wilhelm Weber zu 
Halle, bei der Versammlung der deutschen Naturforscher zu Berlin, den 19. Sept. 1828," 
Annalen der Physik und Chemie, 14 (1828), 397-408, on 400-401; reprinted in his Werke (note 
81), 1 (1892), 257-265, on 259-260. 
105Weber, "Ueber die zweckm?ssige Einrichtung eines Monochords oder Tonmessers 
und den Gebrauch desselben, zum Nutzen der Physik und Musik," Annalen der Physik 
und Chemie, 15 (1829), 1-19, on 1-2; reprinted in his Werke, 1, 346-359, on 346-348. 
106Weber, "De tribus novis librarum construendarum methodis," Commentationes 
so?etatis regiae s?entiarum gottingensis recentiores, 8 (1832-1837; pub. 1841), Classis 
physicae, pp. 81-101; "Ueber Barometer- und Thermometerskalen," Annalen der Physik 
und Chemie, 40 (1837), 27-39; "Beschreibung eines kleinen Apparats zur Messung des 
Erdmagnetismus nach absolutem Maass f?r Reisende," Resultate aus den Beobachtungen 
des magnetischen Vereins im Jahre 1836, 1 (1837), 63-89; "Bemerkungen ?ber die Ein 
richtung und dem Gebrauch des Bifilar-Magnetometers," Resultate... [von] 1837, 2 
(1838), 20-37; "Das Inductions-Inclinatorium," Resultate... [von] 1837, 2 (1838), 81-96, 
reprinted in Annalen der Physik und Chemie, 43 (1838), 493-511; "Das transportable 
Magnetometer," Resultate... [von] 1838, 3 (1839), 68-85; and "Der Inductor zum Mag 
netometer," Resultate... [von] 1838, 3 (1839), 86-101; reprinted in his Werke, 1, 497-515, 
516-525, 2 (1892), 20-42, 43-57, 75-88, 89-104, and 105-118, respectively. 
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6. the advantage of the chosen dimensions of the apparatus for 
the sharpening of the results.107 
The section of Weber's electrodynamics paper of 1846 dealing with 
the validity of Ampere's law contained an extended criticism of the 
methods and accuracy of the experiments of his French predecessor. 
Weber argued that Ampere had not described his experiments in 
enough detail and that his apparatus did not allow the kind of precise 
measurement on which everything depended. Ampere had claimed 
that his law was derived uniquely from experiment and had discussed 
the theoretical implications of his apparatus, but Weber objected that 
there is lacking a precise description of the experiments them 
selves. With such fundamental experiments it is, however, not 
sufficient to indicate their purpose and to describe the instru 
ments with which they are made and in general merely to add 
the assurance that they were accompanied by the expected re 
sults; rather it is also necessary to enter more precisely into the 
details of the experiments themselves and to indicate how often 
each experiment was repeated, which modifications were made, 
and what influence these had?in short to give a complete and 
accurate record of all facts [protocollm?ssig alle Data mitzutheilen] 
which contribute to the basis of a judgement on the degree of 
certainty or definiteness of the result. Ampere has not given such 
a detailed account of his experiments, and they still require for 
their completion an actual direct proof of the fundamental elec 
trodynamic laws. The fact of the interaction of conducting wires 
has, to be sure, been placed beyond doubt by means of fre 
quently repeated experiments, but only with such means and 
under such circumstances where there could be no question of 
quantitative determinations, let alone that these determinations 
had attained the precision necessary for the law of those phe 
nomena to be regarded as experimentally proven.108 
After discussing in detail one of Ampere's null-effect, nonquantita 
tive experiments, Weber underscored Ampere's failure to provide 
any indication of the limits within which the observed results could 
be expected to hold: 
One misses in this Ampere's mentioning the obvious hindrance 
of that fourfold friction, and he does not even say explicitly that 
107From the third of the papers listed in note 106, quoted from Weber, Werke, 2, 20-21. 
For an especially good statement of Weber's method, see the last paper of note 106, ibid., 
p. 109. 
losweber, op. at. (note 81), pp. 6-7 and Werke, 3, 31. 
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he himself saw and observed the motion of the eccentric arc. 
Aside from any doubts that might thereby arise as to the actual 
observation of the fact, and assuming that Amp&re himself saw 
and also assured himself of the displacement of the arc under the 
conditions described, and assuming that this was really the effect 
of electrodynamic forces which were strong enough to overcome 
all opposing hindrances, even then it has in no way been said at 
what eccentricity of arc these motions first occurred and within 
what limits they did not take place. However, without the deter 
mination of such limits this experiment cannot be granted com 
plete power of proof.... 
By means of these remarks on Ampere's experiments I have 
only wished to show that the electrodynamic laws have received 
no sufficient proof from these experiments reported without 
more detailed information and that such proof cannot be ob 
tained by means of observations with Ampere's instruments, but 
that for that [proof] observations with precise measuring instru 
ments are required, which have heretofore been lacking.109 
Weber's attitude is that of the scientist for whom correct methodology 
is the sine qua non of scientific proof. Without quantitative mea 
surements one can have no appreciation of either the correctness or 
the range of validity of what purports to be knowledge. These were 
the considerations behind his conviction of the necessity to verify 
Ampere's law. Weber's extraordinarily extensive and careful experi 
ments represented a refinement of technique far beyond anything 
ever employed by concretizing scientists. Of his electrical papers the 
editor of his works correctly observed that "alongside their theoretical 
importance they constitute a model for experimental research."110 His 
work was nothing if not exemplary. 
Ohm, a forerunner of the new generation of mathematical physi 
cists, was also a careful experimenter who appreciated the necessity 
of basing quantitative conclusions on precisely controlled experi 
ments, and in his first paper he indicated how he had fit a mathemati 
cal formula to quantitative experimental results.111 A more refined 
nbid., p. 9 and Werke, 3, 34. 
110Heinrich Weber, "Vorwort zum dritten Bande/' Wilhelm Webers Werke (note 81), 3, 
iv-v. 
mOhm, "Vorl?ufige Anzeige des Gesetzes, nach welchem Metalle 
die Contact 
Electricit?t leiten," Journal f?r Chemie und Physik, 44 (1825), 110-116 and 116-118 
("Nachschreiben"); also in Annalen der Physik und Chemie, 4 (1825), 79-86, 86-87 (a 
"Nachschrift" not in Schweigger's Journal or Ohm's Gesammelte Abhandlungen), and 
87-88 ("Sp?terer Nachtrag," the same as the original "Nachschreiben"); reprinted 
in 
Ohm, Gesammelte Abhandlungen (note 76), pp. 1-8. 
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version of this technique was a feature of his second major paper, in 
which he derived his fundamental formula for the electric circuit.112 
Ohm's current source was a copper-bismuth thermocouple whose 
ends were carefully kept at the temperature of boiling and freezing 
water, and he used a Coulomb torsion balance to measure the elec 
tromagnetic action of the resulting current through a series of eight 
copper wires of uniform thickness and varying length. The descrip 
tion of his apparatus and experimental technique was detailed 
enough to permit his method to be reproduced or intelligently 
criticized. He took great care to obtain consistent results, which he 
tabulated and then rechecked in order to establish the validity of his 
proposed mathematical law. 
Ohm noted that his theory was in general agreement with the 
experimental results reported by Poggendorff in 1821.113 Both 
showed that a given multiplier had a certain maximum effect, that 
this maximum was the same for plates of all sizes, that the number of 
turns needed to produce this effect was greater for smaller plates, and 
that a greater maximum effect was achieved with thicker wire in the 
multiplier. Nevertheless, Ohm noted that Poggendorff's data were 
often too variable to permit sure conclusions to be drawn and that 
their general usefulness was limited by their author's failure to make 
them susceptible to quantitative interpretation.114 Although Poggen 
dorff did record numbers, he had no feeling for precision, sought to 
derive no mathematical laws, and contented himself with qualitative 
or only roughly quantitative conclusions. It is indicative of his ap 
proach to physics that he never refined this early work that fairly 
begged for the kind of treatment it received in Ohm's hands. 
Fechner's Massbestimmungen ?ber die galvanische Kette (1831) devoted 
over two hundred pages to the description of 135 meticulously exe 
cuted series of experiments testing the validity and applicability of 
Ohm's mathematical laws by varying and controlling the different 
quantities that appeared in them. Fechner's painstaking experimenta 
tion stood in bold contrast to most other contemporary researches on 
the pile. With dogged conscientiousness he overcame the host of 
obstacles to obtaining consistent and meaningful results with wet 
112Ohm, "Bestimmung des Gesetzes, nach welchem Metalle die Contaktelektricit?t 
leiten, nebst einem Entw?rfe zu einer Theorie des Voltaischen Apparates und des 
Schweiggerschen Multiplicators," Journal f?r Chemie und Physik, 46 (1826), 137-166, on 
151; reprinted in his Gesammelte Abhandlungen, pp. 14-36, on p. 25. His formula wasX 
= a 
I (b + x), where X is the strength of the magnetic effect (later taken explicitly to be directly 
proportional to the current), x is the length of the conductor, and a and b are constants 
depending on the electromotive force and resistance. 
113See note 22. 
114Ohm, op. cit. (note 112), p. 164 and Gesammelte Abhandlungen, p. 34. 
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cells. His data were copious and were made to decide clearly either 
for or against the particular formula under scrutiny. Concerning the 
agreement he found among his different results, Fechner stated: "I 
have shunned any attempt to bring about such an agreement by 
means of falsification or adjustment of the observed to the calculated 
numbers, and no fraction of any number that I once recorded as 
observed has been changed. Where the experiment gave anomalous 
results, I have sought this in the circumstances of the experiment and 
either succeeded in disposing of them by modifying and repeating the 
latter (in which I spared no pains) or convinced myself that these 
apparent anomalies have some constant basis in the nature of the 
circuit [Kette], even though up to now not explained by any 
theory."115 That Fechner thought it appropriate to state explicitly that 
he had not manipulated his results suggests that that was not some 
thing to be taken for granted at the time. He expressed the hope that 
his labor might serve "to make available to others the techniques of 
measurement and thereby guarantee a further treatment of galvanic 
phenomena in terms of quantitative determinations along the path of 
experimentation.''116 
Fechner's feeling that physics was in a state of flux and that pre 
viously acceptable standards of experimentation would no longer suf 
fice was echoed by Riess and Moser in a joint paper that was the 
former's first and the latter's second publication. Their purpose was 
to settle the inconclusively debated question of the influence of sun 
light on magnetism by reviewing and redoing the experiments re 
ported by others. It was their opinion that "the present age [die neuere 
Zeit]... cannot content itself with the affirmation that a needle has 
become magnetic; it may justly require measurements, even if they 
only serve to eliminate the suspicion of an easily possible decep 
tion."117 Their experiments failed to discover any regular effect of 
sunlight on magnetism. Although Moser's physics was predomi 
nantly theoretical, Riess devoted many years to the quantitative 
analysis of static electricity, in particular to the heating of wires by the 
discharge of electricity through them. In the first of a series of five 
papers on this problem, Riess stated that his purpose was to provide 
physics with easily reproducible "quantitative [messend] electrical ex 
periments."118 In these papers he investigated the precise functional 
115Fechner, op. at. (note 99), p. v. 
li6Ibid., p. iv. 
117Riess and Moser, "Ueber die magnetisirende Eigenschaft des Sonnenlichts," Anna 
len der Physik und Chemie, 16 (1829), 563-592, on 564. 
118Riess, "Ueber einige Wirkungen der Reibungselektricit?t im Verh?ltnisse zu ihrer 
Anh?ufung," Annalen der Physik und Chemie, 40 (1837), 321-355, on 322. 
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dependence of that heating on factors such as the charge and surface 
area of battery and the length and radius of connecting wires of a 
variety of substances.119 His work showed skillful reasoning back and 
forth between carefully controlled experiments and their possible 
mathematical description, and he repeatedly compared observed and 
calculated values to test the validity of his formulas. For example, he 
found that the expression for the rise in temperature T of a wire of 
length I and radius r is 
where \ and p are the length and radius of the rest of the connecting 
wire, q and s are the charge and the surface area of the battery, and a 
and b are experimental constants. His ambitious program embraced 
the inductive effect of a circuit parallel to that through which the 
electricity was discharged and the dependence of spark length on 
quantity of electricity and composition of the circuit.120 Although 
Riess's work was in the main innocent of theory, he nevertheless 
showed the extent to which this realm of phenomena could be quan 
tified on the basis of precise experiments. 
Lenz's work further illustrates the extent to which quantitative ex 
perimentation characterized the work of abstracting scientists even 
when no theory was being tested. His first significant paper applied 
the quantitative approach to Michael Faraday's discovery of induc 
tion.121 His next paper applied the same procedure to Humphry 
Davy's discovery of 1821 that "the conducting power of metallic 
bodies [for electricity] varied with temperature, and was lower in 
r4 
' 1 .31 
U9Riess, "Ueber die Erw?rmung im Schliessungsbogen der elektrischen Batterie/' 
Annalen der Physik und Chemie, 43 (1838), 47-88; "Ueber die elektrische Ver 
z?gerungskraft und das elektrische Erw?rmungsverm?gen der Metalle," Annalen der 
Physik und Chemie, 45 (1838), 1-24; "Ueber die W?rmeerregung in einem verzweigten 
Schliessungsbogen der elektrischen Batterie," Annalen der Physik und Chemie, 63 (1844), 
481-505; and "Ueber das Gl?hen und Schmelzen von Metalldr?hten durch Elektricit?t," 
Abhandlungen der K?niglichen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, 1845 (pub. 1847), 
Physikalische Abhandlungen, pp. 89-140. 
120Riess, "Ueber das Maximum der Wirkung eines Nebendrahtes auf die Entladung 
der elektrischen Batterie," Annalen der Physik und Chemie, 51 (1840), 177-196; and "Ueber 
die Schlagweite der elektrischen Batterie," Annalen der Physik und Chemie, 53 (1841), 1-20. 
121See note 138. Moser reported at length on this and the subsequent paper of Lenz's in 
his review article, "Magneto-Electricitat oder induzirter Magnetismus," Repertorium 
der Physik, 1 (1837), 282-342. Of Lenz's experiments he said: "They have led to very 
important conclusions and have at the same time shown the kind of certainty that 
numerical determinations by means of induced currents allow. The method Lenz fol 
lowed in these experiments will be able to supply a norm for other similar investigations" 
(p. 314). 
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some inverse ratio as the temperature was higher."122 Lenz noted 
that following Davy, all textbooks contained the statement that the 
electrical conductivity of metals decreased with increasing tempera 
ture, "without to my knowledge anyone having attempted to deter 
mine numerically the magnitude of the decrease in conductivity with 
the increase in temperature."123 The determination of that relation 
ship was the task he set himself. An indication of the precision of his 
carefully executed and mathematically interpreted experiments is af 
forded by his results, five empirical formulas, for silver, copper, 
brass, iron, and platinum, showing the dependence of conductivity 
yn on temperature n in degrees Reaumur. For example he found that 
yn = 136.250 
- 0.49838? + 0.00080378n2, where the conductivity of 
copper at 0?R was set equal to 100. Lenz's painstaking experiments 
and the quantitative results derived from them should be contrasted 
with Davy's original paper, which had contented itself with the 
above-quoted general statement of the same phenomenon.124 
The Hypothetico-Deductive Method 
Adoption of the hypothetico-deductive method by German 
abstracting scientists marked a fundamental change in the conception 
122Humphry Davy, "Farther researches on the magnetic phaenomena produced by 
electricity; with some new experiments on the properties of electrified bodies in their 
relations to conducting powers and temperature," Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society of London, 111 (1821), Pt. 2, 425-439, on 431 (original in italics). This paper 
appeared in German translation in Annalen der Physik, 71 (1822), 241-261. 
123Lenz, "Ueber die Leitungsf?higkeit der Metalle f?r die Electricit?t, bei verschiede 
nen Temperaturen," Memoires de l'Academie imperiale des sciences de St.-Pttersbourg, 6th 
series, Sciences mathematiques, physiques et naturelles, 2 (1833), 631-655, on 632; reprinted 
in Annalen der Physik und Chemie, 34 (1835), 418-437, on 419. 
124Davy had determined the "conducting power" of 
a given connecting wire by noting 
at what point it was just able to completely discharge a given battery, that is, at what 
point a parallel circuit showed no further decomposition of water. This procedure is 
a 
classic example of the all-or-nothing, nonmeasuring, semiquantitative type of experi 
ment also characteristic of German concretizing science. Davy did not describe his 
procedure in detail, and he knowingly accepted sources of error that 
a more meticulous 
experimenter would have sought to eliminate. Although he knew that his results 
were 
only approximate and not always repeatable, he quoted numbers 
as if he had found 
perfect agreement between experiment and his law, suggesting that he did not distin 
guish clearly between experimental results and ideal exemplifications of the discovered 
relationship. Cf. Davy, op. ext. (note 122), p. 431. To be sure, Davy and Lenz 
were not 
dealing with precisely the same quantity. Davy's notion of "conducting power" 
was 
based upon an imprecisely conceived theory of conduction, according to which the 
power of conduction of a given body had a certain limit, and upon a lack of appreciation 
for the difference between intensity and quantity of electricity. Lenz's "conductivity" 
was a quantity precisely defined in terms of Ohm's mathematical theory of the electric 
current. This does not, I believe, vitiate the significance of the marked contrast in the 
general character of their experimental technique. 
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of the relationship between theory and experiment, according to 
which experimentation followed the elaboration of theory and served 
as a check on the acceptability of the assumptions from which it was 
derived. Physics was thereby freed from the requirement that, at least 
ideally, its basic explanatory principles be immediately demonstrable 
in experience. This section will illustrate the extent to which the new 
methodology became standard practice among abstracting scientists. 
Gauss's use of the hypothetico-deductive method is exemplified by 
his work on terrestrial magnetism. In a paper of 1836 he gave a non 
mathematical exposition of the principles behind the determination of 
the terrestrial magnetic force, considered from both a theoretical and 
a practical, instrumental standpoint. His general discussion of how 
physics treats the various forces it identifies in the world contained a 
clear statement of the hypothetical (postulational) character of scien 
tific knowledge. "All material things," Gauss wrote, "are subject to 
gravity, with the exception perhaps?and only perhaps?of a few 
substances we call imponderables and which we assume hypotheti 
cally, because with their assumption we are able to explain a vast 
number of phenomena and without them we cannot. By explanation, 
however, the scientist understands nothing other than reduction to 
the fewest and simplest possible fundamental laws, beyond which he 
cannot go, but on the basis of which he derives the phenomena with 
exhaustive completeness as necessary."125 
Weber's earliest significant use of the hypothetico-deductive 
method came in his first major theoretical paper, the "Elek 
trodynamische Maassbestimmungen" of 1846, in which he criticized 
Ampere's attempt to derive the basic law of electrodynamics directly 
from a set of four equilibrium experiments. Weber rejected those 
experiments because they did not allow measurements capable of 
indicating quantitatively how closely theory agreed with experiment 
let alone allow any determination of an absolute unit of elec 
trodynamic force.126 Only exact measurement, compared with the 
predictions of theory, could provide the kind of proof Weber re 
quired. In his experimental verification of Ampere's law, its origin or 
supposed direct derivation from experiment was of no consequence; 
what mattered was its subsequent confirmation in hypothetico 
deductive fashion. Although Weber based his new law on three fun 
damental "facts," he made no attempt to prove them directly by 
125Gauss, op. dt. (note 102), pp. 1-2 and Werke, 5, 315-316. Cf. also his monumental 
"Allgemeine Theorie des Erdmagnetismus" (note 90). 
i26Weber, op. dt. (note 81), pp. 5-9 and Werke, 3, 29-34. 
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experiment but let their justification follow from the testable truth of 
the law derived from them. 
Weber began the section entitled "Proof of the Fundamental Elec 
trodynamic Law from Measurements" with an explicit consideration 
of these questions of methodology, quoting long passages from Am 
pere's memoir of 1826 in which Ampere discussed two ways of dis 
covering the law of electrodynamic action.127 The first involved 
measuring the force between current-carrying wires, making a 
hypothesis about the infinitesimal force law, applying it to the ex 
perimental situation, comparing calculated against observed values, 
and modifying the hypothesis until agreement between them was 
reached. The second involved looking for experimental arrangements 
in which the current-carrying wires remain in equilibrium when sub 
jected to certain modifications, then concluding directly what form 
the force law must have. Ampere believed that the directness of the 
second method made it preferable and followed it in his own work. 
Weber denied that Ampere's method had any experimental advan 
tage over the first and conceded only that it might have had some 
theoretical advantage in the discovery of the law.128 Just as Weber 
rejected Ampere's experiments as imprecise, he rejected his 
methodology as inappropriate. Weber insisted that it was the close 
agreement between calculated and observed values that warranted 
the acceptance of the assumptions or laws he tested. For example, he 
used his data to check the applicability to electromagnetic spirals of 
Gauss's deductions concerning the interaction of magnets. Finding 
less than one percent disagreement, he concluded that "one could not 
wish for better agreement between the observed and calculated val 
ues, and Ampere's fundamental law is thus confirmed by experience 
in one of its most general and important consequences."129 And from 
the agreement he obtained between his laboriously observed and 
calculated values of the electrodynamic force he concluded that "this 
complete agreement between the values calculated according to Am 
pere's formula and the observed values?differences never exceeding 
the possible size of the unavoidable observational errors?is, consid 
ering the different relationships on which this agreement is based, a 
complete proof of the truth of Ampere's fundamental law."130 
Just as Weber's use of the hypothetico-deductive method is espe 
cially striking when contrasted to Ampere's approach to the verifica 
7lbid., Art. 5, pp. 25-26 and Werke, 3, 52. 
12*Ibid., p. 26 and Werke, 3, 53. 
129Ibid., Art. 7, p. 41 and Werke, 3, 69. 
130Ibid., Art. 8, p. 50 and Werke, 3, 79. 
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tion of the same mathematical law, so is Fechner's use of the method 
in his Massbestimmungen ?ber die galvanische Kette (1831) even more 
striking when contrasted to Ohm's original work, for Ohm had taken 
Fourier as his model and had thereby been led to deemphasize the 
experimental basis of his theory. Fechner's treatment of Ohm's theory 
was explicitly hypothetico-deductive. He noted that "in presenting 
the circumstances on which the quantitative relationships of the activ 
ity of galvanic circuits depend, I have not so much followed Ohm's 
theory as I have proved by experience that its most essential conclu 
sions are confirmed in reality."131 Fechner's book omitted all mention 
of Ohm's attempt, inspired by Fourier, at a deductive proof of his 
laws from a few basic facts given by experiment. The experimental 
portion of Fechner's work was organized into the proof of fifteen 
major propositions expressing different applications of Ohm's law. In 
each case experimental evidence was adduced in confirmation of the 
previously stated proposition, usually in the form of a tabular com 
parison between calculated and observed values. There was no at 
tempt to present the formulas as summaries of experimental data. 
Fechner expressed his conception of the probative role of experiment 
several times in his concluding synopsis. He wrote that "a precise 
verification of this law can only take place by tracing it into the details 
of the phenomena...; suffice it here to consider a few of its general 
consequences and to indicate their agreement with experience."132 
Fechner then discussed the more important consequences of Ohm's 
law, referring to his experiments for confirmation. The structure of 
the book and its consistent mode of presentation was an extended 
example of the self-conscious use of the hypothetico-deductive 
method. 
Fechner's Atomenlehre defended the view that atomism was only an 
especially clear example of the hypothetical character of all scientific 
knowledge. He contended that atomism was adopted by physicists 
because it was more successful than any competitor, such as 
dynamism.133 He even went so far as to say that "in science as in life, 
might makes right."134 Against some scientists' dissatisfaction with 
certain aspects of atomism, Fechner asserted that what science needs 
is not "words" but "assumptions which lead to the experientially 
131Fechner, Lehrbuch des Galvanistnus und der Elektro-Chemie. Nach den Originalquellen 
bearbeitet (Leipzig, 1829), "Vorwort/' p. x. This book also appeared under the title 
Lehrbuch der Experimental-Physik oder Erfahrungs-Naturlehre von Jean Baptiste Biot 
Zweite Auflage der deutschen Bearbeitung. Mit Hinzuf?gung der neuern und einheimischen 
Entdeckungen. Dritter Band; it was, however, virtually an independent work of Fechner's. 
132Fechner, op. ext. (note 99), p. 227. 
133Fechner, op. at. (note 91); e.g., pp. 1-2, 24, and 52. 
134Ibid., p. 34. 
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confirmed facts."135 Although he doubted that existing methods of 
the "mathematical and mechanical sciences" could in practice dis 
cover the finer properties of atoms, he believed that the only sure way 
of proceeding was either "to infer the closer relationships of atoms 
outward from the phenomena or to test hypothetical relationships of 
them against experience on the basis of the calculation of their conse 
quences."136 The methodology that Fechner had earlier used was in 
the same spirit as that which he here defended with respect to science 
in general. 
The work of Lenz and to a lesser extent of M. H. Jacobi, with whom 
Lenz collaborated at the St. Petersburg Academy after 1838, also ex 
hibited the habitual use of the hypothetico-deductive method charac 
teristic of the younger generation.137 The aim of Lenz's first paper in 
electromagnetism was to set up precise criteria for the production of 
the largest possible electromagnetically induced current given a par 
ticular magnet, length of wire, etc.138 He generated the induced cur 
rent by rapidly pulling a wire-wound iron bar from a position of rest 
across the poles of a horseshoe magnet and measured the resulting 
current by means of a Nobili double-needle multiplier. His first set of 
data consisted of the number of turns of wire in the coil versus the 
average deflection of the multiplier needle; from the deflection he 
determined the velocity given ballistically to the needle by the 
momentary induced current. His expression for this velocity, which 
he took as a direct measure of the induced current, was A = p sin Via, 
where a is the angle of deflection and p is a constant. Using Ohm's 
law (and Lenz was among the first to do so), he derived another 
expression for the induced current equal to the unknown induced 
electromotive force (x) divided by the sum of the reduced lengths of 
the multiplier, connecting wire, and coil (L, Z, and \, respectively). 
These considerations gave him the equation 
L+l + X 
= P Sin 1/2 <* 
^Hbid., p. 24; cf. also pp. 6 and 27. 
>lbid., p. 77. 
137A simple but telling example of Lenz's use of that method was visible in his response 
to Muncke's "thermoelectric" experiments: he predicted the consequences of his expla 
nation of the new pheneomena and then verified them experimentally. 
138Lenz, "Ueber die Gesetze nach welchen der Magnet auf eine Spirale einwirkt wenn 
er pl?tzlich gen?hert oder von ihr entfernt wird und ?ber die vortheilhafteste Construc 
tion der Spiralen zu magneto-electrischem Behuf e," Memoir es de l'Academie imperiale des 
sciences de St.-Pftersbourg, 6th series, Sciences mathematiques, physiques et naturelles, 2 
(1833), 427-457, on 428; reprinted in Annalen der Physik und Chemie, 34 (1835), 385-418, on 
386. 
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From his data and this equation Lenz did not attempt directly to 
derive an expression for the dependence of the induced elec 
tromagnetic force on the number of turns in the coil, as he might 
have. Rather, he explicitly employed the hypothetico-deductive 
method by assuming direct proportionality between these two quan 
tities, developing the implications of this assumption into a formula, 
and testing this formula against his experimental results. He thus 
derived the following equation to be tested (his "equation C"): sin Via 
= n sin V2f, where ? is the assumed deflection due to one turn and n 
is the number of turns in the induction coil, the electromotive force of 
one turn having been set equal to one. Lenz remarked: "If we substi 
tute for Via the values from the last column of our table of experi 
ments we obtain eleven equations from which f can be determined 
according to the method of least squares. If we substitute this value of 
? into equation C we then obtain the deflections a belonging to the 
number of turns n; the differences between these values and those 
observed will inform us whether the assumed hypothesis of the pro 
portionality of the number of turns to the electromotive force is in fact 
confirmed by observation."139 A tabulated comparison between cal 
culated and observed values of a confirmed his original hypothesis, 
which he then reconfirmed in similar hypothetico-deductive fashion 
in two series of experiments in which certain variables were changed. 
He followed the same procedure in showing that the induced elec 
tromagnetic force was independent of the diameter of the coil, the 
thickness of the wire in it, and the substance of which it was made. 
Lenz and Jacobi's first joint paper began with the observation that 
although many researchers had succeeded in building strong elec 
tromagnets, none had had any exact knowledge of the relative role 
played by the many different factors: "It was therefore a requirement 
of science to determine their true laws by means of a series of precise 
experiments. However, there was also an overriding practical neces 
sity for them as soon as it became a question of using the magnetism 
excited in soft iron as a motive power, since in that case everything 
depends on producing the largest possible useful effect with the ma 
terials available."140 The topic of this paper fell clearly into the pattern 
of Lenz's earlier work; namely, by means of controlled measurements 
to find the mathematical law governing the behavior of some already 
139Ibid., p. 435 and Annalen, pp. 393-394. 
140Lenz and Jacobi, "Ueber die Gesetze der Electromagnete," Bulletin scientifique publie 
par YAcademie imperiale des sciences de Saint-Petersbourg, 4 (1838), cols. 337-367, in cols. 
337-338; reprinted in Annalen der Physik und Chemie, 47 (1839), 225-266 and 266-270 (a 
"Nachtrag" by Lenz), on 225-226. 
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known device or phenomenon. The authors' main task was to devise 
means to control and measure two electric currents, one primary and 
one magnetically induced, as well as the strength of the electromag 
net used to produce the secondary current. Their procedure was to 
pass a known current through the coil of an electromagnet, with and 
without an iron core, and then measure the momentary current in 
duced in another, coaxial coil when the primary circuit was broken. 
Again their method was explicitly hypothetico-deductive: "That this 
induced current arising upon the disappearance of the magnetism in the iron 
core is proportional to that magnetism is the presupposition upon which 
our entire procedure is based."141 They used the same method of 
quantitative experimental control over hypothetically derived 
mathematical predictions to determine that the magnetism created in 
iron cores by helical galvanic currents is independent of the thickness 
and shape of the wires making up the galvanic coil, that the diameter 
of the coils is thereby a matter of indifference, and that the total effect 
of all the turns of wire around an iron core is equal to the sum of the 
effects of the individual turns.142 
Neumann's attitude toward the hypothetico-deductive method is 
more difficult to assess than that of other abstracting scientists. One 
of his students, after noting the methodological difference between 
assigning experiment a role either before or after the elaboration of a 
theory, placed Neumann among those who exemplified the latter 
practice: 
In general one can express the relationship between observa 
tion and theory to the effect that observation precedes theory in 
the exploration [Recognoscirung] of the phenomena and then again 
follows it in order to test the theoretically obtained results and 
thereby to guide the correction or further development of the theory. 
Such exploratory [recognoscirend] observations, upon which 
the popular fame of a scientist is wont principally to be based, 
have never significantly attracted Neumann. For him observa 
tion, in the form of exact measurement, always begins after the 
theory, namely, in that for him the method of observation itself is 
also always an object of the theory. 
Doubtlessly influenced by the exemplary work of Bessel on the 
length of the seconds pendulum, he required that every part of 
141lbid., cols. 341-342 and Annalen, p. 230. 
142Cf. their later paper, "Ueber die Anziehung der Electromagnete," Bulletin scien 
tificfuepubliipar VAcademie imperiale des sciences de Saint-Pitersbourg, 5 (1839), cols. 257-272, 
in cols. 257-258; reprinted in Annalen der Physik und Chemie, 47 (1839), 401-^418, on 
401^02. 
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the experiment involved with measurement be accessible to the 
theory; he incorporated the sources of error into the actual calcu 
lations and so arranged the observations as to permit their influ 
ence to be determined quantitatively. Attachment to these prin 
ciples placed him to some extent in opposition to those masterly 
experimenters?especially the French?who contented them 
selves with so contriving the conditions of the experiment that 
the influence of the sources of error was as small as possible, or 
who at most determined their order of magnitude by repeating 
the observations under varying conditions and who increased 
their precision by taking the averages of numerous measure 
ments.143 
The first half of this passage suggests that Neumann made conscious 
use of the hypothetico-deductive method. The second half, though 
not inconsistent with the first, places the burden of his methodology 
on the theoretical analysis of experimental variables, especially 
sources of error. Although not primarily an experimentalist, 
Neumann was always sensitive to the requirement that theory take 
into consideration the possibilities and limitations of actual ex 
perimentation. His seminars in particular stressed the importance of 
making physical phenomena amenable to mathematization on the 
basis of precise experimental control.144 
The extent to which Neumann made use of the hypothetico 
deductive method in his published work is illustrated by his 1845 
paper on the general laws of induced electric currents, in which he 
several times justified making a particular assumption in terms of the 
subsequent verification of the theory based upon it, rather than in 
terms of intrinsic reasonableness or simplicity. In that spirit he based 
his theory of induction on two principles, the first being Lenz's empir 
ical law for determining the direction of an induced current and the 
second the assumption "that the intensity of the momentary induction 
is proportional to the speed with which the conductor is moved."145 
143Voigt, op. cit. (note 78), pp. 256-257 and Neumann, Werke (note 77), 1, 11-12. 
144See the passages from his seminar reports of 1839-1840 and 1847-1849 quoted in 
Albert Wangerin, Franz Neumann und sein Wirken als Forscher und Lehrer (Braunschweig, 
1907), pp. 171 and 156. Cf. Voigt, op. cit. (note 78), p. 258 and Neumann, Werke, 1,13; and 
Stanley Goldberg's article on Voigt in Dictionary of Scientific Biography, ed. Charles C. 
Gillispie, 14 vols. (New York, 1970-1976), 14 (1976), 61-63, on 61. For an early example of 
Neumann's concern with having theory realistically reflect the possibilities of experi 
mental confirmation see his "Untersuchung ?ber die specifische W?rme der Minera 
lien," Annalen der Physik und Chemie, 23 (1831), 1-39; reprinted in his Werke, 2, 1-36. 
145Neumann, "Allgemeine Gesetze der inducirten elektrischen Str?me," 
Abhandlungen der K?niglichen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, 1845 (pub. 1847), 
Physikalische Abhandlungen, pp. 1-87, on p. 13; reprinted in his Werke, 3, 257-344, on 271. 
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These principles had led him to a simple and general law of induction 
"which, as far as my own and others' observations are available, has 
been confirmed in all its consequences."146 In other words Neumann 
staked the validity of his basic law of induction on its hypothetico 
deductive confirmation by experiment. To derive this law he imag 
ined a closed conductor to be moved with velocity v in the neighbor 
hood of a fixed inducing current. He then assumed that the compo 
nent of force of the inducing current in the direction of motion of the 
induced circuit was the same on each element Ds of the induced 
circuit and set this force equal to C -Ds for the case when the induced 
circuit was imagined to carry a unit current, the component of force C 
being calculable on the basis of Ampere's law. If k is the entire length 
of the induced circuit, CX = C is the entire force of the inducing 
current on the induced circuit. If the induced circuit carries not a unit 
current but one of intensity k, then the force on it is kC'. If now k is the 
actual induced current, it must by hypothesis be proportional to the 
momentary velocity of the induced circuit, or k 
= Lv, hence also kC = 
LC'v. Neumann then reasoned as follows: "According to Lenz's law, 
LC'v is always a negative quantity. From this it follows that since C 
changes its sign with the direction of motion, L must be a function of 
C, one, moreover, that changes its sign simultaneously with C The 
simplest assumption one can make in this regard and which proves 
by its consequences to be sufficient is that L be set equal to ?eC', 
where e is a constant coefficient."147 His method here was again 
essentially hypothetico-deductive in that he justified making a basic 
and necessary assumption in terms of the validity of its implications. 
Although Neumann's paper did not contain the kind of extended 
quantitative comparison between theory and experiment that charac 
terized many of the papers of abstracting scientists, he regarded his 
theory as a formal structure, based on a few hypotheses, the validity 
of which could be determined only after the fact by agreement with 
experience. 
Moser and Riess also assigned particular importance to the adapta 
tion of one's mathematical theory to the possibilities of experimental 
realization.148 Unlike Neumann, however, they made much more 
"Hbid. 
147lbid., p. 14 and Werke, 3, 271. 
148Moser and Riess, "Ueber die Messung der Intensit?t des tellurischen Magnetis 
mus," Annalen der Physik und Chemie, 18 (1830), 226-239; Riess and Moser, "Ueber die 
t?gliche Ver?nderung der magnetischen Kraft und weitere Ausf?hrung der Poissonschen 
Methode, die Intensit?t des Erdmagnetismus zu messen," Annalen der Physik und Chemie, 
19 (1830), 161-179; Moser, "Ueber eine Methode die Variationen in der Richtung der 
tellurisch-magnetischen Kraft zu messen, und ?ber einige Anwendungen derselben," 
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consistent and explicit use of the hypothetico-deductive method, and 
they repeatedly subjected to quantitative experimental control con 
clusions based on explicit assumptions or at least recognized that 
their hypotheses were in principle dependent on such after-the-fact 
testing.149 Moser in particular was quite comfortable with the idea 
that physics required such assumptions: "Nature always follows sim 
ple laws in her phenomena, and where these are nevertheless com 
plicated, there disturbing causes have hidden the underlying lawful 
ness. We obtain them by means of experiment, or, where that is not 
possible, by means of an assumption whose consequences can be 
compared with the facts. It is in this latter circumstance that we find 
ourselves with respect to the phenomena of terrestrial mag 
netism."150 Riess, on the other hand, independent of Moser's collab 
oration, often expressed an empiricist's cautious desire to have his 
formulas appear to be direct expressions of observation.151 He may 
have been influenced in this regard by the strong empiricist school in 
Berlin represented by Erman, Poggendorff, Dove, and Magnus.152 
Annalen der Physik und Chemie, 20 (1830), 431^150; Riess, "Zur Bestimmung der magneti 
schen Inclination eines Orts," Annalen der Physik und Chemie, 24 (1832), 193-204; and 
Moser, "Magnetismus und einige Nachtr?ge zum Galvanismus und zum induzierten 
Magnetismus," Repertorium der Physik, 2 (1838), 100-284, esp. 169-170. The occasion for 
their programmatic pronouncements in this regard was in most cases the critique of 
some French mathematical theory (as of Poisson or Biot) or experimental procedure (as of 
Biot or Arago). 
149Moser and Riess, "Ueber den Einfluss der W?rme auf den Magnetismus," Annalen 
der Physik und Chemie, 17 (1829), 403-434, on 426; Moser, "Ueber eine Methode" (note 
148), pp. 435,444, and 448-450; Moser, "Ueber den Magnetismus der Erde," Annalen der 
Physik und Chemie, 34 (1835), 63-84 and 271-292, on 64-65 and 79; Riess, op. dt. (note 118), 
pp. 326 and 345-346; Riess, op. dt. (note 70), p. 231; and Moser, op. dt. (note 72), pp. 
125-126, 129, 167-168, and 328. 
150Moser, "Ueber den Magnetismus der Erde" (note 149), pp. 64-65. According to 
Moser, corroboration of the numerical implications of a hypothesis does not establish its 
"physical" truth (p. 68). After noting in another context that probabilities are not simply 
empirically given numbers but are underlain by some theoretical assumption, he added: 
"But in no science do we have to do with so-called pure facts; they take us no step 
further" (op. at. [note 72], p. 11). 
151Riess, op. dt. (note 118), p. 322; "Ueber Hrn. V. de Heer's Bearbeitung meiner 
W?rmeuntersuchungen an der elektrischen Batterie," Annalen der Physik und Chemie, 48 
(1839), 320-326, on 325; "Fortgesetzte Untersuchungen ?ber den Nebenstrom der elek 
trischen Batterie,"AnnalenderPhysikundChemie, 50 (1840), 1-24, on2;op. dt. (note70), p. 
189; "Ueber die Ablenkung der Magnetnadel durch die elektrische Batterie," Annalen der 
Physik und Chemie, 67 (1846), 535-540, on 539; and "Ueber die Entladungszeit der 
elektrischen Batterie," Annalen der Physik und Chemie, 69 (1846), 426^28, on 426. 
152Cf. Carl Gustav Adolf von Harnack, Geschichte der k?niglich preussischen Akademie der 
Wissenschaften zu Berlin, 3 vols. (Berlin, 1900; rpt. Hildesheim & New York, 1970), 1, Pt. 2, 
808 and 812; John Theodore Merz, A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century, 
4 vols. (Edinburgh, 1896-1914; rpt. New York, 1965), 1 (1896), 205; and Hermann von 
Helmholtz, "Zum Ged?chtniss an Gustav Magnus," Vortr?ge und Reden, 5th ed., 2 vols. 
(Braunschweig, 1903), 2, 33-51, esp. 44 and 48. Heinrich Gustav Magnus (1802-1870), 
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4. EXTERNAL FACTORS IN THE TRANSITION FROM 
CONCRETIZING TO ABSTRACTING SCIENCE 
Until now I have dealt solely with the actual scientific work of two 
distinct groups of nineteenth-century German scientists. In this sec 
tion I intend to show that the character of their work must be under 
stood in terms of both its narrower institutional and its broader social 
context. Granting the validity of my description of the replacement of 
concretizing by abstracting science as paradigms belonging to two 
distinct and for the most part temporally separated groups, the ques 
tion remains how that historical development is to be explained. Ex 
perimental discoveries such as Oersted's of electromagnetism (1820), 
Seebeck's of thermoelectricity (1821-1822), and Faraday's of induction 
(1831) were clearly prerequisites for much of the work of abstracting 
scientists; but particular discoveries could not by themselves have 
brought about such a thorough transformation of electrical science. 
Concretizing scientists continued to treat new discoveries within the 
old paradigm and were not induced to change the kind of science 
they did. Nor was their antimathematical bent simply a reflection of 
the state of electrical science during the early decades of the century: 
the French found certain aspects of electricity amenable to mathe 
matization, and concretizing scientists advanced a philosophical 
justification for their avoidance of mathematics which extended to 
all areas of physics. The new paradigm was not simply taken over 
from another branch of science, nor was German abstracting science 
merely imported from elsewhere. Despite the fact that the younger 
Germans derived their basic knowledge of mathematical physics from 
French sources, German abstracting scientists had a different ap 
preciation of the role of experiment and of the hypothetico-deductive 
method, and an indigenous philosophical tradition gave some of 
them a synthetic perspective quite unlike the narrowly focused ana 
lytical investigations of the French.153 
professor of physics at Berlin from 1834, did experimental work in chemistry, the 
expansion of gases, and the mechanics of rotation. On Dove see the references cited in 
note 185. Dove espoused a strongly empiricist line and did not quantify his electrical 
experiments as, for example, Riess had done; among many examples 
see his "Versuche 
?ber Anziehungen und Abstossungen des galvanischen Schliessungsdrahtes und der 
Magnetnadel," Annalen der Physik und Chemie, 28 (1833), 586-591; "Magneto-elektrische 
Elektromagnete," Annalen der Physik und Chemie, 29 (1833), 461-464; and his grand 
summary article, "Ueber Induction durch elektromagnetisirtes Eisen," Abhandlungen der 
K?niglichen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, 1841, Pt. 1 (pub. 1843), Physikalische 
Abhandlungen, pp. 85-176. 
153On these two points see notes 5 and 68. 
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Since what changed in Germany was the very character of science, 
there must have been a reason why the members of the younger 
generation were dissatisfied with their predecessors' way of doing 
science and why they were receptive to a different set of standards. If 
the case of a contemporary chemist may be cited, the language Justus 
Liebig (1803-1873) used in his autobiography suggests that he was 
intellectually predisposed toward the kind of science he found in 
France before he had acquired any firsthand knowledge of it. Of his 
studies in Erlangen he recounted how "Schelling's lectures attracted 
me for a while, but Schelling did not possess a thorough knowledge 
of the branches of natural science, and the dressing up of natural 
phenomena with analogies and in pictures, which was called explana 
tion, did not appeal to me [sagte mir nicht zu]."154 By contrast, the 
lectures of Gay-Lussac, Thenard, and Dulong "had for me an inde 
scribable fascination [Reiz]," and the experiments they performed 
"spoke to me in a language I understood."155 This is more the lan 
guage of preexisting intellectual disposition than of simple influence. 
The fact that the younger Germans were not trained to do the kind of 
physics they did, as their French contemporaries were, also suggests 
that their approach to science would have been more susceptible to 
influences coming from outside physics. 
These considerations imply that a complete explanation of the 
changes described in this paper must go beyond the internal history 
of science. Of first importance is the recognition that the two oppos 
ing paradigms belonged for the most part to two different generations 
and that this generational split coincided with the transformation of 
German society occasioned by the Napoleonic Wars. The fact that the 
younger generation grew up in a period of disruption and reform 
heightened their awareness of belonging to a new order of things and 
facilitated their break with past modes of science as the intellectual 
property of a superseded generation. Liebig recognized the intrinsic 
connection between the Wars of Liberation, the general destruction of 
faith in authority, and the questioning of previously dominant ideas 
and theories. He wrote: "Exhausting wars which undermined the well 
being of the population and external political pressure had resulted in 
the devastation of our universities and for many years caused people 
agonizing distress and directed their desires and efforts in completely 
different directions; the national spirit had found refuge for its free 
dom and independence in ideal areas, which in many respects had a 
154Justus von Liebig, "Eigenh?ndige biographische Aufzeichnungen," Deutsche 
Rundschau, 66 (1891), 30-39, on 35. 
155Ibid., pp. 35 and 36. 
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beneficial effect through the destruction of faith in authority, espe 
cially in medicine and philosophy."156 Although Liebig mentioned 
only medicine and philosophy, I believe that the same thing hap 
pened in physics. 
This historical setting accounts at most for the timing and perhaps 
the thoroughness of the generational-conceptual change in German 
physics. It fails to explain why the new science took the particular 
form it did. For this one must look more closely at the changing 
institutional and social setting within which science was pursued. I 
will argue that the younger generation's attachment to the new ideol 
ogy of Wissenschaft, together with their disillusionment with the dom 
inant mode of university instruction, not only reinforced their feeling 
of belonging to a new generation but also accentuated the method 
ological aspects of scientific activity and knowledge. I will describe the 
ways in which physics was becoming a more professionalized activity 
with respect to education, employment, teaching, research, and pub 
lications; and I will underscore the profound effect these changes had 
on the scope and quality of the scientific work produced by the 
younger generation. However, the study of electricity and magnetism 
was influenced by more than its institutional and professional con 
text, and I will show how some of the changes it underwent reflected 
larger scale social developments. These two realms are linked in part 
by the assumption that science is an activity that must be socially 
and psychologically legitimated to its practitioners, especially if it is 
a new activity without established institutional definition. I will 
argue that social disruption and reform, by changing the ways in 
which an individual defined his place in society, encouraged the in 
tensive pursuit of a new kind of science. The strongest evidence for 
this connection comes from the individual biographies of several of 
the younger scientists, whose letters and diaries reveal how science 
was used to meet acute personal and religious problems. Although 
such psychological factors can operate in any society, one would ex 
pect their frequency and impact to be greatest during a period of 
extreme social unrest, when the relationship between the individual 
and society was undergoing profound change. Thus Erman's turning 
from religion to science was not only a rarer occurrence for someone 
of the older generation, but the nature and intensity of his work was 
also radically different from that of certain members of the younger 
ls6lbid., p. 34. For further evidence that the Napoleonic Wars fostered 
a feeling among 
German youth of belonging to a new generation, see Konrad H. Jarausch, "The Sources 
of German Student Unrest 1815-1848," The University in Society, ed. Lawrence Stone, 2 
vols. (Princeton, 1974), 2, 533-569, on 535-540 and 564-565. 
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generation, soon to be discussed, who sought in science the certainty 
they had failed to find in religion.157 
At a more general level one still has to explain why people's basic 
conception of scientific explanation changed, why they assigned ex 
perience a new role with respect to their theoretical knowledge, and 
why they were satisfied with an unprecedented degree of abstract 
ness. Here the nature of the new society is of crucial importance, and 
it is necessary to distinguish between psychological and sociological 
modes of explanation. Explanation in terms of legitimation, which 
looks at the individual in his direct biographical relationship to his 
surroundings, cannot deal adequately with factors belonging to the 
general structure of the social system, whose implications may not be 
perceived by the individual. Pursuing an idea of Durkheim's, David 
Bloor has argued that people's image of the way society is organized 
determines their conception of the nature of knowledge.158 According 
to Bloor, metaphorical application of social ideologies provides the 
mediating link between people's social experience and their concep 
tion of knowledge. The possibility of such a metaphorical transfer 
ence of structural patterns finds support in the parallels between the 
two paradigms of science that I have characterized and the societies to 
which their respective representatives belonged. Indeed, either some 
such mechanism exists or the extent and close fit of those parallels 
must be explained away as coincidences or historical artifacts. It is my 
hope that this case study will demonstrate the practical applicability 
of the sociology of knowledge to the history of science. 
The Institutional and Social Context of Scientific Change 
Toward the Professionalization of Science 
The first quarter of the nineteenth century saw a profound reforma 
tion of the German university system. Between 1798 and 1818 nine 
universities were closed, two were absorbed by stronger neighbors, 
and three were founded, not to mention numerous important re 
forms.159 After a decade-long crisis of low prestige and poor enroll 
157Erman had a more empirical conception of knowledge and devoted less of himself to 
scientific research and publication. His son Adolf wrote mat "the conviction that there is 
no science independent of experience drew him away from theology and won him for 
physics," quoted in Wilhelm Erman, op. at. (note 55), p. 30. 
158David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London, 1976), pp. 44^7 and 65-66; see 
also his essay review, "Popper's Mystification of Objective Knowledge," Science Studies, 
4 (1974), 65-76. 
159Johannes Conrad, The German Universities for the Last Fifty Years (Glasgow, 1885), pp. 
290-291. 
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ment, the final defeat of the French in 1815 and the reestablishment of 
control by the German states was followed by a surge of youth into 
the revitalized universities, resulting in a steep rise in university at 
tendance between 1815 and 1830.160 One manifestation of the 
heightened self-consciousness of many German students during this 
period was the idealistic Burschenschaft movement, which began at 
the University of Jena in 1815 and spread to other universities, though 
suppressed in Prussia after 1819. The pan-German sentiments of 
these fraternities and their willingness to admit students of all back 
grounds undercut prior regional and class distinctions among stu 
dents and contributed to the general spirit of rejection of past 
norms.161 
The sweeping reorganization of the Prussian school system began 
under the impetus and direction of Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767 
1835) during his short tenure as Minister of Education from February 
1809 to June 1810. Measures then instituted, such as compulsory test 
ing of university applicants, introduced a new competitive rigor and 
standardization into university affairs and saw the state become 
virtually the sole authority in educational matters. In 1810 the gov 
ernment ban preventing Prussian students from studying outside 
Prussia was rescinded (although it was later reinstated between 1833 
and 1838), resulting in "the century-long competition between in 
stitutions for students, status, and professors."162 To the renovated 
philosophical faculties of the reformed universities fell the job of train 
160Franz Eulenburg, Die Frequenz der deutschen Universit?ten von ihrer Gr?ndung bis zur 
Gegenwart, Vol. 24, No. 2 of Abhandlungen der philologisch-historischen Klasse der k?niglich 
s?chsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften (Leipzig, 1904), pp. 165, 184, and 303. For a 
comparison between Prussian enrollments and those for Germany as a whole during the 
period 1800-1870, see Jarausch's graph in Stone, op. cit. (note 156), p. 557. The depressed 
state of the German universities between 1785 and 1815 probably discouraged many 
from entering academic careers and would help account for the dearth of individuals in 
my sample born between 1780 and 1795. Be that as it may, the virtual nonexistence of 
intermediate figures accentuated the dichotomy between the older and younger genera 
tions. 
161Heinz Degen, "Geschichte der Gesellschaft Deutscher Naturforscher und Aerzte 
IV: Lorenz Oken und seine Isis um die Gr?ndungszeit der Gesellschaft Deutscher 
Naturforscher und Aerzte," Naturwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 8 (1955), 145-150 and 
180-189, on 150. Neumann was a member of such a student society, as was Liebig. 
162Roy Steven Turner, The Prussian Universities and the Research Imperative, 1806 to 1848 
(diss., Princeton Univ., 1972), p. 359. Although the best-known and best-documented 
reforms of both society and the universities were in Prussia, they were by no means 
limited to there. In any event most of the younger generation of abstracting scientists in 
my group?Neumann, Weber, Grassmann, Riess, Moser, and Jacobi?were raised and 
educated in Prussia. Fechner was brought up in Saxony; Lenz, a Baltic German, in 
Dorpat, Estonian Russia. The Kaiserliche Universit?t zu Dorpat was refounded by 
Alexander I in 1802 and was a bastion of German culture in the Baltic until it was 
Russianized in 1893. 
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ing a new corps of Gymnasiallehrer, who as of 1810 were required as 
civil servants to pass a competitive state qualifying examination. In a 
similar spirit the Habilitation, now granting the right to teach only 
specific subjects, became obligatory in 1816 for all privatdocents at the 
University of Berlin. The precedent for making the rigorous Habilita 
tion a prerequisite to university teaching was followed by Bonn, Bres 
lau, and other German universities during the Vorm?rz period.163 The 
new status of the privatdocent "signaled a transition from the older, 
corporate conception of the professorate to a new conception of the 
professorate as an independent career, separate from the other ser 
vice professions and defined through scholarly expertise."164 Despite 
the increased difficulty of the required Habilitation, the number of 
privatdocents increased astoundingly in the expanding Prussian uni 
versities, from 11 percent of the 195 teachers in 1800, to 23 percent of 
the 482 in 1834, to 28 percent of the 531 in 1853. In the philosophical 
faculties alone their number grew from 61 in 1834 to 90 in 1853, their 
increase making up 74.5 percent of the net faculty growth in those 
faculties.165 These and related changes fostered within the teaching 
ranks the same increased competitiveness that marked so many of the 
individual reform measures.166 
Among the liberal measures which further altered the character of 
the professorate was the systematic breakdown of its special corpo 
rate privileges, which had come to be identified with academic 
mediocrity, shortsightedness, and resistance to innovation.167 The 
weakening of corporate identity was only one instance of how socially 
based modes of personal and professional identity were giving way to 
more individualistic, disciplinary, and abstract modes of identity. 
The qualitative change from subjective to objective criteria of personal 
worth was an important element in the rise and ultimate success of a 
new kind of science. A similar spirit infused the reform of the proce 
dures and criteria of professorial appointment in the Prussian univer 
sities, where the passing of control over appointments from the local 
faculties to the ministry in Berlin led to a shift in emphasis from 
163Ibid., pp. 363-364. One writer has attempted to link the office of the privatdocent to 
the growth of the middle class and its need for state-guaranteed institutional security; 
see Alexander Busch, Die Geschichte des Privatdozenten. Eine soziologische Studie zur 
grossbetrieblichen Entwicklung der deutschen Universit?ten, Vol. 5 of G?ttinger Abhandlungen 
zur Soziologie unter Einschluss ihrer Grenzgebiete (Stuttgart, 1959), p. 2. 
164Turner, op. dt. (note 162), p. 369. Turner has given a useful characterization of these 
general changes in "The Growth of Professorial Research in Prussia, 1818 to 1848? 
Causes and Context," Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences, 3 (1971), 137-182, on 138. 
16STurner, op. dt. (note 162), p. 366. 
166Turner, op. dt. (note 164), p. 143. Cf. also Turner, op. dt. (note 162), p. 461. 
167Turner, op. dt. (note 162), pp. 361-362. 
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corporate" to "disciplinary" values and fostered a new "research 
imperative" among increasingly professionalized academics.168 A let 
ter written by Paul Erman to his son in 1827 testifies not only to the 
existence of this new state of affairs but also to the elder Erman's 
cynical attitude toward it. He instructed his son to give Dove the 
advice that he should write something in the interest of his advance 
ment: "The gentlemen in the Ministry [of Education] set great store 
by that, they love tangible literary merit. As soon as he has published 
something or only intended to, it's in the bag for him. It wouldn't 
hurt if the work were at the same time good, too, but it wouldn't help 
much. But he must write, there are just far too few books."169 
Another consequential aspect of the educational reform movement, 
pertaining less to institutions than to ideology, was the populariza 
tion of new ideals of Bildung and Wissenschaft, according to which the 
defining activity of the scholar was the pursuit of new knowledge and 
not simply the mastery of the already known. The Forscher was to 
replace the Gelehrter, and the purpose of the university was to pro 
mote the sciences, both humanistic and natural, for their own sake. 
Brotstudium, the acquisition of merely practical knowledge, was 
scorned. The ideology of Wissenschaft condemned the collection of 
isolated facts and stressed the unity of all knowledge.170 Since this 
unity was often conceived in terms of methodology, it was through 
common methods of investigation that the various disciplines earned 
the right to be called Wissenschaften.171 Grassmann explicitly noted 
that method was the unifying characteristic of scientific activity: 
"Since both mathematics and philosophy are sciences in the strictest 
sense, the method in each must have something in common which 
makes them scientific. Now we ascribe Wissenschaftlichkeit to a mode 
of treatment when the reader is, on the one hand, led by it with 
necessity to the recognition of each individual truth and on the other 
hand enabled at every point in the development to perceive [?berse 
hen] the direction of further progress."172 He attributed this general 
168Ibid. pp. 166 and 170-171 and his Chapter 7, "The Prussian State and the Professo 
rial Career," pp. 426-485, esp. pp. 449-450 and 455-456. 
169Letter of 24 April 1827 to Adolf Erman (1806-1877), in Wilhelm Erman, op. cit. (note 
55), p. 247. 
170Turner, op. cit. (note 162), p. 247. Turner has distinguished between the 
speculative-synthetic and the critical-analytic strains which coalesced into the popular 
Wissenschaftsideologie (ibid., pp. 250-253). On this subject see also Merz, op. cit. (note 152), 
1, 168-172. 
171The common home of all the Wissenschaften was the burgeoning and increasingly 
prestigious philosophical faculties; see Joseph Ben-David, The Scientist's Role in Society: A 
Comparative Study (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1971), p. 113. 
172Grassmann, op. cit. (note 96), pp. xxix-xxx and Werke, 1, Pt. 1, 30. 
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methodological conception of science to the influence of Schleier 
macher.173 Indeed, since the ideology of Wissenschaft was espoused 
especially by men of romantic spirit such as Schleiermacher, Fichte, 
and Wilhem von Humboldt, it was important that the younger gener 
ation did not reject Naturphilosophie out of hand. 
A concern with methodology was intrinsic to the role definition of 
the new professor, who was expected to be both teacher and re 
searcher. Since research was to be pursued according to an explicit 
methodology, it was reasonable to try to train others to become scien 
tists. The tendency of this development was to democratize scientific 
work by externalizing and standardizing its procedures. Whereas in 
the eighteenth century scientific or scholarly discovery was regarded 
as the rare product of special genius, in the nineteenth century it was 
seen as the natural consequence of using the right method of re 
search.174 
These changes in the definition of science exerted tremendous in 
fluence on the generation of German scientists and scholars coming 
of age between 1815 and 1830. Having taken to heart lofty ideals of 
science and education, they found their own university instruction in 
the hands of an older generation relatively untouched by the new 
developments, whose lecturing tended toward the dry, anecdotal, 
encyclopedic presentation of "facts." The contradiction between their 
ideals and reality contributed to their disenchantment with, and rejec 
tion of, the old order. 
Neumann's case is a clear example of idealism disillusioned by the 
existing state of affairs. He was an enthusiastic follower of Fichte's 
"Reden an die deutsche Nation," delivered in Berlin during the 
winter of 1807-1808, in which Fichte urged that the student be stimu 
lated "above all to individual intellectual activity."175 In 1813 he was 
confirmed by Schleiermacher, who was dean of the Berlin theological 
faculty when Neumann matriculated in 1817. Schleiermacher, like 
Fichte, believed that the universities "should train the critical facul 
ties, awaken the scientific spirit, and encourage originality."176 On 19 
January 1818 the Protestant theologian Philipp Konrad Marheineke 
(1780-1846) delivered a rectoral address exhorting the student to de 
vote himself to the cultivation of pure knowledge and demanding 
173See his Lebenslauf of 1834 in Grassmann, Werke, 3, Pt. 2, 21-22, and cf. 28. 
174Turner, op. cit. (note 162), pp. 206-207. This point is further elaborated in Turner, 
"University Reformers and Professorial Scholarship in Germany 1760-1806," in Stone, 
op. cit. (note 156), 2, 495-531, on 525-529. 
175Luise Neumann, Franz Neumann. Erinnerungsbl?tter von seiner Tochter (T?bingen & 
Leipzig, 1904), p. 29. 
176Turner, op. cit. (note 162), p. 256 (the words are Turner's). 
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complete rejection of Brotstudium. Neumann took these sentiments 
completely to heart.177 But what kind of teachers did Neumann en 
counter? The professor of mathematics at Berlin, Johann Georg Tral 
les (1763-1822), did not normally lecture at all. When Neumann and 
some friends persuaded him to do so, he succeeded in driving away 
all but two students and then used this "lack of interest" as an excuse 
to stop lecturing.178 Even worse was Neumann's experience at the 
University of Jena, where he had gone in April 1818 and where he 
was again sorely disappointed. The lectures on Naturphilosophie by 
Oken and others failed to satisfy him; botany consisted in memoriz 
ing names and classifications; his minerology professor told stories of 
his trip to Switzerland; and his zoology professor began by saying 
that there were so many different kinds of fish he didn't know how 
else to begin than by talking about the tastiest!179 Here was nothing 
for an idealistic student who wished to devote himself to Wissenschaft. 
Significantly, his daughter later remarked that "Neumann praised the 
spirit which prevailed among the students" during this period?not 
the spirit embodied by the professors.180 If Neumann was correct in 
sensing a common spirit among the students, then many students 
must have felt the same disappointment with their teachers. Certainly 
Neumann's experience convinced him that if he wished a scientific 
education he would have to obtain it on his own. 
Medicine, too, evidently continued to be taught in the traditional 
encyclopedic and eclectic manner. Fechner, who began the study of 
medicine at Leipzig in 1817, was repulsed by the absence of method 
in the practice of medicine and as a result sought stimulation for a 
time in Oken's Naturphilosophie.181 Nor did he find much stimulation 
in his other courses at Leipzig, attending most of them only at the 
beginning or intermittently because he found he could instruct him 
self better and more conveniently from books.182 
Liebig's recollection of the situation at the University of Bonn in the 
early 1820's reflects a similar dissatisfaction with the character of in 
struction: 
At that time there had sprung up at the newly founded univer 
sity in Bonn an extraordinarily lively scientific life, but in the 
177Luise Neumann, op. at. (note 175), p. 89. The text of Marheineke's address is on pp. 
419-^121. 
lbid., pp. 94-95. 
179Ibid., pp. 90-94. 
180JM., p. 96. 
18Johannes Emil Kuntze, Gustav Theodor Techner (Dr. Mises). Ein deutsches Gelehrtenle 
ben (Leipzig, 1892), p. 43; cf. also p. 39. 
\bid., p. 37. 
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branches of the natural sciences the degenerate philosophical 
research as embodied in Oken and, still worse, in Wilbrand had 
exerted the most pernicious influence, for it had led to a disre 
gard, in lecture and in study, of experiment and of the sober 
observation of nature, which was ruinous for many gifted young 
men. The listener received ex cathedra an abundance of ingenious 
views [Anschauungen], but incorporeal as they were, one could do 
nothing with them. The lecturing by Kastner, who was consid 
ered to be the most famous chemist, was unorganized, illogical, 
and entirely like the jumble [Tr?delbude] of knowledge I carried 
around in my head.183 
Although Naturphilosophie may have set the tone of instruction in 
certain disciplines, Liebig's criticism of Kastner's chemistry lectures 
was that they were an unordered mass of facts, not that they were too 
speculative.184 Liebig's well-known reaction against Oken and Schel 
ling, who had captured his imagination for two years, should not 
obscure the fact that his disenchantment with the chemistry taught at 
German universities reflected a different state of affairs. For the his 
tory of science it is less important that men like Neumann, Fechner, 
and Liebig eventually turned from Naturphilosophie?and only Liebig 
spoke contemptuously of it later on?than that the younger genera 
tion as a whole felt no sympathy toward the way science was pursued 
by the members of the older generation of concretizing scientists and 
declined to take them as models. The failure of the latters' teaching to 
meet their students' expectations encouraged the younger men to 
forge their own model of science and contributed to the decisiveness 
of the generational split. 
These institutional and ideological developments within the uni 
versities were important elements in the increasing professionaliza 
tion of German science. Their impact can be gauged by comparing the 
career patterns of the members of the two generations. Although all 
representatives of concretizing science by definition devoted them 
selves at one time or another to a particular branch of physics, they 
were hardly all "physicists" in the sense of professional identification 
or limitation to subjects that either we or they would assign un 
equivocally to physics. Not only were Seebeck, Pfaff, J?ger, and Ritter 
all trained to be doctors, but J?ger was professionally never anything 
183Liebig, op. tit. (note 154), p. 33. Johann Bernhard Wilbrand (1779-1846) was a 
physiologist; Karl Wilhelm Gottlob Kastner (1783-1857) was Liebig's chemistry teacher. 
184In the 1820's Kastner lectured on "Encyklop?die der Naturwissenschaften/7 Die 
Tageb?cher des Grafen von Platen, eds. Georg von Laubmann and Ludwig von Scheffler, 2 
vols. (Stuttgart, 1896-1900), 2, 459. 
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but a physician, and Pfaff, professor of chemistry in the medical fa 
culty at Kiel, regarded the practice of medicine as his "true profes 
sion."185 The independently wealthy Seebeck remained a Privatmann 
his entire life, and the perennially impoverished Ritter held no 
academic position until he went to the Munich Academy of Sciences 
in 1805. Nor does the fact that Erman, Muncke, Pfaff, Poggendorff, 
Pohl, Schmidt, and Schweigger were university professors imply that 
they had any strong sense of identification as physicist (Muncke, for 
example, was always called "Hofrat," not "Professor") or that they 
had received specialized training in physics. Erman never attended a 
university; and Poggendorff, Pohl, Schmidt, and (possibly) Muncke 
never earned a doctorate. Schweigger was the only member of the 
older generation to earn a Dr. Phil, and that was in classics. 
By way of contrast, all the members of the younger generation 
attended a university, and all but Grassmann, Jacobi, and (possibly) 
Lenz earned a doctorate. The dissertation topics of those earning a Dr. 
Phil, were in every case "physical": crystallography (Neumann), ter 
restrial magnetism (Riess), and acoustics (Weber). Moser's doctorate 
was in medicine, although he was awarded an honorary Dr. Phil. 
upon his Habilitation in K?nigsberg. Fechner went to Leipzig to study 
medicine and passed his exams in that field, but he did not take a 
medical degree.186 As for employment, only Grassmann, a secondary 
school teacher all his life, failed to gain a university appointment, 
though the independently wealthy Riess was an amateur until his 
appointment as associate professor of physics at Berlin in 1842. Ohm, 
a forerunner of the younger group, became professor of physics near 
the end of his life after languishing for years in secondary schools. 
Not only were all but Grassmann eventually university professors, 
but all except Jacobi, a professor of civil engineering, were professors 
of physics. 
185Christoph Heinrich Pfaff, Lebenserinnerungen (Kiel, 1854), p. 267. For the sources of 
most of the biographical data presented here see Caneva, op. tit. (note 2), pp. 543-618. 
On Riess see Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, 56 vols. (Leipzig, 1875-1912; rpt. Berlin, 
1967-1971), 28 (1889), 584-586, and the obituary notice by C von Voit in Sitzungsberichte 
der mathematisch-physikalischen Classe der k. b. Akademie der Wissenschaften 
zu M?nchen, 14 
(1884), 241-244. On Moser see Briefwechsel zwischen C. G. J. Jacobi und M. H. Jacobi, ed. 
Wilhelm Ernst Martin Georg Ahrens, Vol. 22 of Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der 
mathematischen Wissenschaften mit Einschluss ihrer Anwendungen, begr?ndet 
von Moritz 
Cantor (Leipzig, 1907), and Hans Prutz, Die K?nigliche Albertus-Universit?t 
zu K?nigsberg i. 
Pr. im neunzehnten Jahrhundert, octavo ed. (K?nigsberg, 1894), passim. On Dove see esp. 
the article by his son, Alfred Dove, in Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, 
48 (1904), 51-69; also 
Gustav Karsten, "Doves Doktorjubil?um," Im neuen R?ch, Jg. 6,1876, Bd. 1, pp. 381-387; 
and Hans Neumann, Hamich Wilhelm Dove. Eine Naturforscher-Biographie (Liegnitz, 
1925). 
186I have not been able to determine the date, place, or subject of Fechner's reported 
Dr. Phil. 
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More than half the university professors of the older generation 
also held other jobs. After his appointment at the University of Berlin 
in 1810, Erman kept his job at the College francais until 1820 and at 
the Allgemeine Kriegsschule until the 1840's; Pohl kept his position at 
the Friedrich-Wilhelms-Gymnasium after becoming associate (aus 
serordentlich) professor at Berlin in 1829; Schmidt taught from 1811 
to 1818 at the Giessen P?dagogium as well as at the University; and 
Pfaff continued to practice medicine. Perhaps Poggendorff and 
Schweigger should be included here, too, since their editorship of 
two of the most important German physical science journals must 
have been extremely time consuming. Whatever the reason for hold 
ing several jobs?usually because the pay of a university professor 
was inadequate to support a family?the practice militated against the 
development of a professional self-consciousness. Among the 
younger generation of abstracting scientists none except Lenz held 
outside jobs at secondary schools after he had attained professorial 
rank, and none maintained any kind of private practice. 
Although most members of the older generation had studied some 
science at a university, none were or could have been trained to be 
physicists. The career scarcely existed, and a course of study lead 
ing to it did not exist at all. In eighteenth- and early nineteenth 
century Germany, science was taught in the lower, philosophi 
cal,faculty, where instruction was subordinated to the limited needs 
of the three professional faculties. Instruction in science and mathe 
matics was consequently elementary and unspecialized and aimed 
at giving the student "a comprehensive survey of the whole field, 
an understanding of how the parts of science related to each 
other, and the basis of all in some philosophical ground."187 Not 
until the 1830's did advanced courses in the sciences appear in the 
lecture catalogs of the German universities. This state of affairs 
characterized both the education and the teaching of the members of 
the older generation. Said Pfaff of his own teaching experience: "In 
physics, especially in the first years, I had listeners from all faculties, 
but [the lectures] were later less [well] attended, especially by theolo 
gians. It was necessary to avoid a truly penetrating or, as it were, 
scientific presentation; in particular I sought continually to instill 
interest in my listeners and to hold their attention by means of exper 
iments."188 The superficial character of physics instruction meant that 
the professor received no stimulation from the classroom to occupy 
himself more deeply with his subject. 
187Turner, op. cit. (note 162), p. 123. 
188C H. Pfaff, op. cit. (note 185), p. 276. 
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The connection between the requirements of teaching and the dis 
position to keep physics as unmathematical as possible was expressed 
by the professor of physics at Dorpat, Georg Friedrich Parrot (1767 
1852), in a letter venting his displeasure with Laplace's theory of 
capillarity: "I confess I would consider it unfortunate if physical 
phenomena and laws as simple as those of capillarity could [only] be 
understood [durchschauen] and handled with such an expenditure of 
analysis as would banish them forever from physics lectures, unless 
one wanted to proceed merely historically."186 The professional con 
cern of the university-affiliated concretizing scientists with the or 
ganization and presentation of material suggests an institutional 
rationale for the fact that their inductivism was directed more toward 
demonstration than toward discovery. As Thomas Kuhn observed, 
"it is... direct demonstrations, like those of Atwood, that figure most 
largely in natural science texts and in elementary laboratory exercises. 
Because simple and unequivocal, they have the greatest pedagogic 
value."190 Erman's use of demonstration-like experiments in present 
ing his theory of transversal magnetism exemplifies the influence of 
the pedagogic tradition on the scientific style of concretizing scien 
tists.191 
Closely allied with the elementary nature of the older generation's 
teaching was the great variety of subjects on which one individual 
might lecture. Pfaff gave a vivid description of this state of affairs: 
From 1799 on I lectured continuously on physics as well as on 
chemistry, often on both sciences in one semester, as well over 
189Letter of circa 1809 to Johann Friedrich Pfaff (1765-1825), the famous mathematician 
and brother of Christoph Heinrich Pfaff, in Sammlung von Briefen gewechselt zwischen 
Johann Friedrich Pfaff und Herzog Carl von W?rtemberg, F. Bouterwek, A. v. Humboldt, A. G. 
K?stner und Anderen, ed. Carl Pfaff (Leipzig, 1853), pp. 180-181. On the connection 
between teaching and the character of science see Johann G?nther GrassmamYs Gym 
nasialprogramm of October 1827, passages from which are quoted in H. G. Grassmann's 
Werke (note 96), 3, Pt. 2, 5. Note also the motivation behind the experiments undertaken 
by Paul Ludwig Simon (1767-1815) to test Coulomb's law in "Ueber die Gesetze, welche 
dem electrischen Abstossen zum Grunde liegen," Annalen der Physik, 28 (1808), 277-298, 
on 278, and cf. Oersted's lecture of 20 September 1830 before the ninth Versammlung 
deutscher Naturforscher und Aerzte, "Ueber die Verschiedenheit des physikalischen Vor 
trages von dem mathematischen, auch wenn beyde dieselben Wahrheiten darstellen," 
Isis von Oken, 24 (1831), cols. 854-857, in col. 857 (not in his Skrifter). 
190Thomas S. Kuhn, "The Function of Measurement in Modern Physical Science," Isis, 
52 (1961), 161-193, on 169. 
191For Erman the pedagogical use of demonstration experiments had epistemological 
implications as well. In a program written in the 1790's for the College francais in Berlin 
he said that "400 to 500 experiments, thoroughly discussed with respect to possible 
deceptions and to the consequences necessarily resulting [from them], are the best 
preparation for the logical theory of sensible perception and of conceptual thought" 
(quoted in Wilhelm Erman, op. cit. [note 55], p. 45). 
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the whole subject as on individual parts thereof, especially gal 
vanism, magnetism, electromagnetism, electricity, meteorology, 
and steam engines; then from 1821 on analytical chemistry and 
(already earlier) pharmaceutical chemistry, as well as on the 
chemistry of materia medica, toxicology, [and] history of modern 
chemistry. In the first years I also lectured on mineralogy and 
geology, which Wiedemann then took over later. Notwithstand 
ing this heavy load I could not in the meantime completely give 
up that science to which in earlier years I had almost exclusively 
devoted my energies, namely, medicine and its theoretical part; 
and in particular I lectured continuously till 1828 on general and 
special physiology, which were especially well liked, and in addi 
tion gave lectures on GalTs skull and brain theory (occasioned in 
part by the appearance of that original man in our circle), then on 
animal magnetism and, from 1820 until the end of my career, 
with particular predilection on macrobiotics.192 
The contrast between this situation of superficial diversity and the 
specialized teaching of the younger generation of abstracting scien 
tists is epitomized by the contrast between Neumann, who taught 
only physics and mineralogy (the latter primarily at the start of his 
career), and the man he replaced at K?nigsberg, Karl Gottfried H?gen 
(1749-1829). Hagen represented the encyclopedic teaching of the 
nonspecialist: he was professor of medicine, chemistry, physics, and 
natural history; he lectured on botany, zoology, mineralogy, chemis 
try, physics, medicine, and pharmacy; and he was a practicing phar 
macist to boot! None of the younger generation was involved in this 
kind of teaching. Except for Dove, who taught a large number of 
physical science courses at the university and in secondary schools, 
none of the younger generation taught chemistry, much less 
medicine. 
The necessity to lecture on more subjects than any one person 
could reasonably master reinforced the disposition of concretizing 
scientists to remain content with relatively superficial and unambiti 
ous researches. This is reflected in the frequent lack of depth and 
continuity shown by the different topics investigated successively by 
one individual. Erman, for example, seldom followed up the prob 
lems arising out of his own work, and his later investigations were 
often prompted by some chance observation, to which he would de 
vote a single inexhaustive paper.193 Schweigger was a true polymath 
192C. H. Pfaff, op. cit. (note 185), pp. 275-276. For a sketch of the situation in chemistry 
in the 1820,s see Liebig, op. cit. (note 154), p. 33. 
193Emil DuBois-Reymond, "Ged?chtnissrede auf Paul Erman," Abhandlungen der 
K?niglichen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, 1853 (pub. 1854), pp. 1-27, on pp. 8-11. 
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who devoted himself with apparently equal enthusiasm to physics, 
chemistry, and philology. Poggendorff, after his first paper on the 
electromagnetic multiplier (1821), directed his energies variously to 
chemistry, meteorology, and physical geography until 1838 when he 
turned his attention to electrochemistry and the pile. 
Although science was becoming truly professionalized in 
nineteenth-century Germany, the first-generation representatives of 
abstracting science did not themselves embody all its mature charac 
teristics. One reason for this is that they were not trained in the kind 
of physics that they eventually did, nor could they have been, given 
the nature of concretizing science and its status at the universities. 
The younger men received no significant help or stimulation from 
their predecessors, and there is a striking absence of any meaningful 
teacher-student relationship between the members of the two 
groups. The members of the younger generation taught themselves 
mathematics and mathematical physics from French works, especially 
Fourier's, where they learned a kind of physics not taught at the 
German universities. Among German authors only Euler seems to 
have been of comparable, though lesser, importance.194 
The younger generation introduced the first seminars and ad 
vanced courses to train students to become professional physicists. 
The most famous and important was the mathematics and physics 
seminar set up by Neumann and Carl Gustav Jacob Jacobi (1804-1851) 
at K?nigsberg in 1834.195 Not Neumann but his pupil Gustav Robert 
Kirchhoff (1824-1887) represents the full-fledged German profes 
sional physicist of the last century.196 As a result of the efforts of the 
first generation of abstracting scientists, it was becoming possible by 
1840 to receive university instruction designed to prepare specialists 
for original research. Weber's lectures, for example, "assigned princi 
pal importance not to particulars but to the thought process and 
method of scientific research."197 Weber himself stressed the impor 
tance of well-equipped laboratories for the training of competent re 
searchers and recommended his and Gauss's magnetic and elec 
tromagnetic observations as models to be followed.198 
194For evidence see Caneva, op. at. (note 2), pp. 216-218. 
195Dove and Moser had also taken part in earlier proposals to set up scientific seminars 
there; see Prutz, op. at. (note 185), pp. 172-173. 
196As identified, for example, by Russell McCormmach, "Editor's Foreword," Histori 
cal Studies in the Physical Sciences, 3 (1971), xii. 
197Heinrich Weber, Wilhelm Weber. Eine Lebensskizze (Breslau, 1893), p. 107. 
198Letter of 20 February 1845 to Sir Edward Sabine in Report of the Fifteenth Meeting of the 
British Association for the Advancement of Science; held at Cambridge in June 1845 (London, 
1846), as part of the "Proceedings connected with the Magnetical and Meteorological 
Conference, held at Cambridge in June 1845," p. 15; reprinted in Weber, Werke (note 81), 
2, 275-276. 
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Just as the teaching of abstracting scientists was limited to physics, 
so was their research restricted to a few areas of it. The depth and 
ambitiousness of the research programs of Weber, Neumann, Riess, 
and Lenz were totally unlike the casual eclecticism that had marked 
much of the work of the older generation. Most of the younger 
generation physicists had done substantial scientific research before 
their first appointment: Fechner and Lenz had published good work 
in electricity; and Moser, Neumann, Riess, and Weber all had disser 
tations and a few publications behind them before they began their 
professional careers. The pattern that would become standard in 
Germany later in the century and which defined the possibility of a 
career in science is indicated by the way Neumann, Weber, Fechner, 
and Moser all proceeded up the university ladder from privatdocent 
through associate professor to full professor. An early commitment to 
physics was surely an important factor in the dedication shown by 
virtually all abstracting scientists to their work. In contrast, the rela 
tively advanced age at which many of the older generation began to 
publish or at which they became professors reflects the weakness of 
their professional commitment to physics. Erman was thirty-seven 
before he published his first scientific paper and forty-six before he 
became professor of physics at Berlin. Pohl had been a secondary 
school teacher of a variety of subjects for nineteen years before be 
coming extraordinary professor of physics at the age of forty-one; and 
Schweigger had to wait until he was forty before being called to Halle 
as professor of physics and chemistry, having also taught at a variety 
of secondary schools. Several concretizing scientists became full pro 
fessors before they had published anything at all (Schmidt, at age 
twenty-two) or anything significant even by the modest standards of 
the day (Muncke, at age thirty-eight). Among the amateurs, Seebeck 
was thirty-eight before he published his first paper. 
One of the most important characteristics of eighteenth- and early 
nineteenth-century scholarship was the kind of literary activity it 
encouraged. As Turner put it, "in keeping with his pedagogical con 
ception of his post and the encyclopedic preferences of his age, the 
professor devoted much of his publishing activity to handbooks, 
translations, and works of a pedagogical or encyclopedic nature."199 
The scholarly values that ranked highest in this tradition were "the 
synthetic view, sensitivity to the relationship of the parts to the 
whole, breadth and clarity in presentation."200 These literary de 
mands reflected a conception of the professor as primarily a teacher 
199Turner, op. at. (note 162), p. 198. 
200Ibid., p. 199. 
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and only secondarily a discoverer of new knowledge. In contrast to 
the "research imperative" which came to dominate university think 
ing during the Vorm?rz period, a viable and actively defended older 
viewpoint was that "the professor had no obligation to publish or to 
make discoveries."201 The distinction that thereby existed between a 
person's professorial or professional work and his disciplinary or sci 
entific work, a distinction which would have no validity for the 
younger generation, was given vivid expression in a letter by Johann 
Friedrich Pfaff. After mentioning three books he was writing, two on 
mathematics and one on the Leibniz-Newton controversy, he added: 
"By means of these three books I hope soon to have honorably satis 
fied the demand on a professor to write. Then for a time I will again 
study, properly speaking, in order to prepare myself for greater works 
and in peace contemplate working for science and, as much as within 
my power, to recommend my name to posterity."202 Most of my 
sample of university-affiliated concretizing scientists fit this generali 
zation about the characteristic literary productions of eighteenth- and 
early nineteenth-century scholars. Muncke, for example, published 
three elementary physics texts.203 Schmidt wrote two texts on physi 
cal science, two on mathematics, and a volume of tables.204 Pfaff's 
major literary productions in the field of electricity were critical and 
expository books.205 His total output was immense and included 
many texts and compendia on a variety of medical and chemical top 
ics.206 In his autobiography Pfaff identified himself as a writer 
201Ibid. p. 188. The sentiment was that of the influential critical defender of the 
universities Johann David Michaelis (1717-1791). 
202Letter of 6 March 1796 to his brother Christoph Heinrich Pfaff, in Carl Pfaff, op. dt. 
(note 189), pp. 146-147. 
203Muncke, Anfangsgr?nde der Naturlehre zum Gebrauche academischer Vorlesungen sys 
tematisch zusammengestellt, 2 vols. (Heidelberg, 1819-1820); Die ersten Elemente der 
gesammten Naturlehre zum Gebrauch f?r h?here Schulen und Gymnasien (Heidelberg, 1825; 
2nd ed. 1829; 3rd ed. 1833; 4th ed. 1842); mdHandbuch der Naturlehre, 2 vols. (Heidelberg, 
1829-1830); in addition to his earlier System der atomistischen Physik nach den neusten 
Erfahrungen und Versuchen dargestellt (Hanover, 1809), and Physikalische und kosmologische 
Abhandlungen zur Erlernung der Naturkunde (Giessen, 1815). I have not seen any of the 
works cited in notes 203, 204, and 206 but have relied upon (sometimes inconsistent) 
bibliographic citations. 
204Schmidt, Handbuch der Naturlehre. Zum Gebrauch f?r Vorlesungen, 2 vols. (Darmstadt 
& Giessen, 1801-1803; 2nd ed. 1813); Hand- und Lehrbuch der Naturlehre (Physik). Zum 
Gebrauch f?r Vorlesungen und zum dgnen Studium entworfen (Giessen, 1826 or 1827); 
Anfangsgr?nde der Mathematik. Zum Gebrauch auf Schulen und Universit?ten, 5 pts. in 3 vols. 
(Frankfurt am Main, 1797-1807; 2nd ed. 1806-1829; 3rd ed. 1822-1830); Ebene und 
sph?rische Trigonometrie (Giessen, 1817); and Kubische und logarithmische Tafeln (Giessen, 
1821). 
205See the books cited in note 43. 
206For example, Pfaff, Grundriss einer allgemeinen Physiologie und Pathologie des 
menschlichen K?rpers. Zum Gebrauch bd academischen Vorlesungen (Kopenhagen, 1801); 
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(Schriftsteller) whose goal was the career of a scholar (Gelehrtenberuf) 
and whose motto was "famam extendere, si non factis, tarnen scrip 
tis."207 Never striving much after originality, he sought rather a sys 
tematic and clear arrangement of material derived mostly from oth 
ers.208 Although Poggendorff did not write any texts, his Geschichte 
der Physik (1879) and his monumental Biographisch-literarisches Hand 
w?rterbuch zur Geschichte der exacten Wissenschaften (1863) place him, 
too, in the literary tradition. 
The specialization in research spearheaded by the younger genera 
tion was reflected in the specialized nature of the sophisticated mon 
ographs and journal articles they published. Although Fechner wrote 
a number of Repertorien and textbooks and translated Biot's and 
Thenard's multivolumed physics and chemistry texts, he did so only 
early in his career to support himself financially and to popularize 
French science in Germany. These were not activities of the mature 
and established scientist. Dove's editorship of the Repetrorium der 
Physik reflects the extent to which his style of physics shared stronger 
affinities with concretizing science than with that of his age-cohort. 
The vigor of the older textbook and compendium tradition, as well 
as the writing of books intended for a general readership, should not 
obscure the fact that all representatives of concretizing science pub 
lished many more papers in journals than they did books. The most 
important journals were the Annalen der Physik and the journal f?r 
Chemie und Physik, which together published roughly ten times as 
many papers as either the academy journals or the other independent 
journals.209 The existence of the widely accessible and frequently pub 
lished Annalen der Physik was probably the most important determi 
nant of a sense of community among German scientists during the 
first third of the nineteenth century. Publishing one's work in it, as all 
members of my sample did, effectively meant that one had joined the 
supraregional physical science community. The Annalen's role in this 
regard, supplemented for a period of years (1811-1833) by Schweig 
ger's Journal, can hardly be overemphasized in a region like Germany 
containing so many centers of scientific activity of varying quality and 
Handbuch der analytischen Chemie f?r Chemiker, Staats?rzte, Apotheker, Oeconomen und 
Bergwerkskundige. Zu akademischen Vortr?gen und zum Selbststudium, 2 vols. (Altona, 
1821-1822; 2nd ed. 1824-1825); System der Materia medica, nach chemischen Principien, 7 
vols. (Leipzig, 1808-1824); and Pharmacopoea Slesvico-Holsatia (Kiliae, 1831 or 1832). He 
also published a medical critique, Revision der Grunds?tze des Brown'sehen Systems 
(Kopenhagen & Wien, 1804) and a book on potatoes, ?ber unreife, fr?hreife und sp?treife 
Kartoffeln... (Kiel, 1807). 
207C H. Pfaff, op. dt. (note 185), p. 282. 
20SIbid., p. 283. 
209For a first-approximation analysis of changing publishing patterns see Caneva, op. 
cit. (note 2), pp. 226-229. 
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at a time when effective membership in the scientific community was 
still open to amateurs unaffiliated with university or academy. How 
ever, essential as these journals were, they were not without a possi 
ble negative influence on the tone of the science they published. Since 
they were private ventures supported by subscriptions, their desire to 
appeal to as broad a readership as possible discouraged the inclusion 
of overly technical papers as long as the mathematically adept portion 
of the German scientific community was small.210 
One of the possible kinds of community determinant that became 
important only during the second half of the century was member 
ship in a professional society, and the claim that the founding of the 
Gesellschaft deutscher Naturforscher und ?rzte in 1822 represented an 
important step in the professionalization of German science is not 
supported by the evidence.211 On the contrary, until it was revitalized 
by Rudolf Virchow (1821-1902) in 1858 the society remained an un 
structured hodgepodge of doctors and scientists of all stripes, without 
formal membership.212 Specialized physical societies emerged only 
just before midcentury. The founding of the Berlin Physikalische 
Gesellschaft in 1845 marked the self-conscious appearance of the gen 
eration of German scientists born around 1820.213 
Toward the Redefinition of the Individual in Society 
The institutional and professional changes affecting science were 
taking place within a wider context of profound social change precipi 
210See Ludwig Wilhelm Gilbert, "Vorrede," Annalen der Physik, 60 (1818), iv. Gilbert 
(1769-1824) was editor of the Annalen der Physik from 1799 to 1824. 21 Everett Mendelsohn, "The Emergence of Science as a Profession in Nineteenth 
Century Europe," The Management of Scientists, ed. Karl B. Hill (Boston, 1964), pp. 3-48, 
on pp. 23-26. Mendelsohn failed to distinguish between the program put forth by its 
founder, Lorenz Oken (1779-1851), and the actual character of the membership, and he 
did not weigh the propagandistic motives of the enthusiastic English reports he cited. 
212Max Pfannenstiel, Kleines Quellenbuch zur Geschichte der Gesellschaft Deutscher Natur 
forscher und Aerzte; Ged?chtnisschrift f?r die hundertste Tagung der Gesellschaft (Berlin, 
G?ttingen, & Heidelberg, 1958), passim. 
213The society's founders were Wilhelm Beetz (1822-1886), Emil Heinrich 
DuBois 
Reymond (1818-1899), Ernst Wilhelm Br?cke (1819-1892), Wilhelm 
Heinrich Heintz 
(1817-1880), Gustav Karsten (1820-1900), and Karl Hermann Knoblauch (1820-1895). 
Harnack called it "the rallying place of the new generation of German physicists" 
in 
Berlin, regarding the older generation as having been made up of Poggendorff, Dove, 
Magnus, and Riess (op. at. [note 152], p. 812). There is 
a remarkable similarity in the 
family background of Poggendorff, Dove, and Magnus, 
all of whom shared a style of 
physics that was at odds with that of most of their age-cohort. Poggendorff's 
father 
owned a factory, Dove's was a wholesale merchant, and Magnus 
had founded a large 
trading firm. The only others of their generation to 
come from commercial backgrounds 
were the two Jews: Riess's father was a jeweler, Jacobi's a banker. See also the other 
references cited in note 185. 
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tated by the Napoleonic Wars. Many of the new developments had 
their roots further back in German history, but the timing of their 
maturation was a function of the possibilities for rapid change 
brought about by war.214 From Napoleon's invasion of the Rhineland 
in 1792 to his final defeat in 1815 the multitude of German states 
experienced a bewildering succession of mergers, divisions, disso 
lutions, and other territorial, political, economic, social, and legal 
changes. Old patterns of stability were gone and change was now 
expected, whether it was wanted or not. In the view of one historian, 
the old Germany, "marked by traditionalism in Weltanschauung and 
obsolescence in political institutions," was gone by 1806.215 Drastic 
measures were called for after the collapse of the Prussian state, espe 
cially by the need to reform finances to meet the indemnity imposed 
by the French and to pay for the occupation forces. Rosenberg, who 
dated the Prussian reform period as roughly from 1807 to 1812, has 
shown in detail how Prussian leaders used this urgent need for im 
mediate reform to serve their own economic and social ends.216 The 
reformers had in mind nothing less than the creation of a radically 
new society according to their own design.217 The spirit of reform, as 
embodied by the pivotal Prussian ministers Friedrich Karl, Freiherr 
vom und zum Stein (1757-1831) and Karl August, F?rst von Harden 
berg (1750-1822) was marked by the desire to promote economic 
liberalism, which meant doing away with traditional class restrictions 
on economic activity.218 The Royal Edict of 9 October 1807 erased the 
differential legal rights of the separate classes. Class distinctions 
214In addition to the works later referred to specifically, see John R. Gillis, "Aristocracy 
and Bureaucracy in Nineteenth-Century Prussia," Past and Present, No. 41 (December 
1968), 105-129; Hajo Holborn, A History of Modern Germany: 1648-1840 (New York, 1967); 
and Reinhard Koselleck, Preussen zwischen Reform und Revolution. Allgemeines Landrecht, 
Verwaltung und soziale Bewegung von 1791 bis 1848 (Stuttgart, 1967). For parallel develop 
ments in two non-Prussian states see Wolfgang Zorn, "Gesellschaft und Staat im Bayern 
des Vorm?rz," and Wolfram Fischer, "Staat und Gesellschaft Badens im Vorm?rz," Staat 
und Gesellschaft im deutschen Vorm?rz 1815-1848, ed. Werner Conze (Stuttgart, 1962), pp. 
113-142 and 143-171; for an excellent general account of political, economic, and social 
changes in the several German states see Conze, "Das Spannungsfeld von Staat und 
Gesellschaft im Vorm?rz," ibid., pp. 207-269. 
215Klaus Epstein, The Genesis of German Conservatism (Princeton, 1966), p. 672. 
216Hans Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy: The Prussian Experience, 
1660-1815 (Boston, 1966), p. 203; see esp. Chapter 9, "The Emergence of Bureaucratic 
Absolutism," pp. 202-228. 
217Reinhart Koselleck, "Staat und Gesellschaft in Preussen 1815-1848," Moderne 
deutsche Sozialgeschichte, ed. Hans-Ulrich Wehler (K?ln & Berlin, 1966), pp. 55-84 and 
474-481, on p. 61. 
218On the importance of the Stein-Hardenberg reforms in changing the character of 
German society, especially by redefining the character of the aristocracy and the middle 
class, see Ernest K. Bramsted, Aris tocracy and the Middle-Classes in Germany; Social Types in 
German Literature, 1830-1900, rev. ed. (Chicago & London, 1964), pp. 36-37 and 44-45. 
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themselves were not yet wholly abolished, but movement between 
classes became possible on a large scale, especiably according to one's 
economic position. The new society was to be constructed according 
to certain consciously chosen and externally imposed principles, such 
as freer trade and increased competition between individuals.219 
One far-reaching effect of the implementation of these views was 
the redefinition of the idea of citizenship as a direct relationship be 
tween citizen and state as opposed to a relationship between subject 
and sovereign mediated by class or estate.220 The weakening of class 
distinctions was accompanied by a change in the concept of nobility, 
which a number of writers in the 1790's had already begun to redefine 
in terms of personal worth or service and not merely in terms of 
birth.221 These and other changes radically altered the basis on which 
a person defined himself in society.222 An address by Henrich Stef 
fens in 1812 provides vivid evidence of the unsettling effect of these 
changes: "Before us, in the most recent past..., lay a time in which 
definite, established, [and] traditional forms seemed to guarantee 
[one's] life a peaceful, secure course. The force of custom had hal 
lowed them and everyone felt that satisfaction which belongs to a 
person when he is able clearly to survey an already completed whole; 
everyone felt himself more at home, at peace, and a certain measure, 
a certain dominant order and agreement of the multitude seemed to 
carry everyone [along]."223 But an irresistable current of events had 
destroyed all this, plunging the individual into a chaos of uncertainty. 
"Have not the customary supports of thought, belief, and life become 
shaky for all," Steffens asked, "so that no one dares to devote himself 
to them with the same old confidence?"224 
Previously a person had known his place within a hierarchical class 
structure, and that place was felt to be an inalienable part of his 
219Rosenberg, op. at. (note 216), pp. 210-221. 
220John G. Gagliardo, From Pariah to Patriot: The Changing Image of the German Peasant, 
1770-1840 (Lexington, Ky., 1969), pp. 198-199 and 286. 
221Ibid., pp. 170-171. 
222Conze listed a number of specific ways in which personal relationships 
were 
perceived to have changed and elevated Entsittlichung to 
one of three Grundtendenzen 
characterizing the changes in German society between 1789 and 1848 (op. at. [note 214], 
pp. 248 and 258-259). See also J?rgen Gebhardt, "Zur Physiognomie einer Epoche," Die 
Revolution des Geistes. Politisches Denken in Deutschland 1770-1830. Goethe-Kant-Fichte 
Hegel-Humboldt, ed. J?rgen Gebhardt (M?nchen, 1968), pp. 7-16, 
on p. 12; and Robert 
Anchor, Germany Confronts Modernization. German Culture and Society, 1790-1890 
(Lexington, Mass., 1972), where "The Problem of Self-Redefinition" 
is the title of the first 
chapter and a major theme throughout. 
223Henrich Steffens, "Ueber das Verh?ltniss unserer Gesellschaft zum Staate," Schrif 
ten. Alt and Neu, 2 vols. (Breslau, 1821), 1, 133-147, on 141; from a lecture delivered on 19 
December 1812 before the Schlesische Gesellschaft f?r vaterl?ndische Kultur. 
224Ibid., p. 143. 
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nature. Now he had become, ideally, a free agent whose place was 
determined by what he did. Oken's account of the 1828 meeting of 
the Gesellscha? deutscher Naturforscher und ?rzte described this de 
velopment as it manifested itself within intellectual circles. He noted 
the open and relaxed character of Berlin society, cited its deemphasis 
of class distinctions, and observed that intellectual accomplishment 
(Bildung) had become the surest way to establish oneself socially: "In 
Berlin society people of all classes [St?nde] and of every rank, from the 
highest to the lowest, are found together without claiming any other 
title than that of a cultured or educated person."225 
Profound change also marked economic affairs. The Royal Edict of 
9 October 1807, in conjunction with Hardenberg's trade legislation 
three years later, abolished the monopoly of the guilds and opened all 
trades to anyone who paid the appropriate tax. The statutory eco 
nomic distinctions between city and country were abolished, and city 
government was restructured. In 1812 the Jews in Prussia were eman 
cipated, in accordance with Hardenberg's belief in a free competitive 
economy. As a result of these economic and social reforms, which 
upset the closed corporate order of the ancien regime and saw the 
St?ndestaat replaced by the Klassenstaat, wealth became to an ever 
increasing extent the common measure of men and things.226 Nobles 
could now buy up peasants' and burghers' lands, and the reverse was 
also true in principle. Conservative contemporaries were dismayed 
because the management of large estates was thus transformed from 
a way of life into a business venture. These changes, already begun 
during the eighteenth century, were accelerated and given legal re 
definition during the reform period. They came increasingly to be 
seen as exemplifying the unprecedented abstractness of the new so 
cial order.227 
225[Lorenz Oken], "[Bericht ?ber die] Versammlung der Naturforscher und Aerzte zu 
Berlin, im September 1828," Isis von Oken, 22 (1829), cols. 217-450, in col. 230; quoted in 
Heinz Degen, "Geschichte der Gesellschaft Deutscher Naturforscher und Aerzte e. V. 
VII: Die Naturforscherversammlung zu Berlin im Jahre 1828 und ihre Bedeutung f?r die 
deutsche Geistesgeschichte," Naturwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 9 (1956), 333-340, on 
338. 
226Cf. the useful summary in Helmut B?hme, Prolegomena zu einer Sozial- und 
Wirtschaftsgeschichte Deutschlands im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt am Main, 1968), 
pp. 26-36. Conze noted that during the Vorm?rz, "Klasse became a category of the 
decorporated society, while Stand was regarded as belonging to the old civil society" (op. 
cit. [note 214], p. 249). 
227Cf. Conze, op. cit. (note 214), pp. 249-250; Koselleck, op. at. (note 217), p. 65; and 
Epstein, op. cit. (note 215), p. 320. Steffens referred to the new Germany as an "abstrac 
tion" which wished to dissociate itself from its past (Was ich erlebte. Aus der Erinnerung 
niedergeschrieben, 10 vols. [Breslau, 1840-1844], 9 [1844], 58-59). He noted a new prefer 
ence for "abstract expressions" for people instead of just "Mensch" and condemned 
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Another keynote of the reform movement was the increased com 
petition that accompanied the breaking down of traditional barriers 
and restrictions. This feature, which was common to many of the 
economic and educational reforms, also characterized the decree of 
1808 which formally opened the officer corps to talent on a competi 
tive basis.228 Although examinations had been introduced into the 
bureaucracy as early as 1770, it was only after the Prussian reforms of 
1807 to 1812 that there was a "stiffening of competitive examinations 
on the basis of costly higher education and long in-service training," 
by which the Prussian bureaucracy came into a position of real 
power.229 With the increased bureaucratization of the state came the 
need for trained functionaries, which was in turn a major motive 
behind the reform of secondary schools and universities. In sharp 
contrast to eighteenth-century German society, competitiveness had 
become socially respectable. 
Among the disruptions occasioned by the Napoleonic Wars was an 
attack on the wealth and political power of the Church. The ecclesias 
tical states were secularized, the Church's assets were widely confis 
cated by secular authorities, and many Church schools were forced to 
close. Even in Catholic Bavaria, "monastic libraries were sold by 
paper-weight as cheese paper and the cathedral of Freising was auc 
tioned for a time to a local butcher."230 During this period the 
Church lost its control over primary education, the powers of censor 
ship and of prosecuting heresy, and the ancient exemption of the 
clergy from civil jurisdiction.231 Weakening of Church power and 
corporate independence, together with the many territorial changes, 
strengthened the case for religious tolerance.232 These institutional 
losses came just when religion was again under heavy intellectual at 
tack.233 Enlightenment rationalism had discredited traditional concepts 
"the revolutionary, abstract rights of a restless bourgeoisie which destroy all variety of 
existence" (ibid., 10 [1844], 281 and 285). Cf. also his criticism of the tendency of the 
Prussian economic and social reforms and his own organic-hierarchical conception of the 
ideal state (ibid., 9 [1844], 39^1 and 8 [1843], 230-277). 
228Rosenberg, op. cit. (note 216), pp. 214-215. 
229Ibid., p. 213; see also pp. 163, 178, and 202-228. 
230John Walsh, "Religion: Church and State in Europe and the Americas," War and 
Peace in an Age of Upheaval, 1793-1830, ed. C. W. Crawley, Vol. 9 of The New Cambridge 
Modern History (Cambridge, 1965), pp. 146-178, on p. 155. 
231Ibid., p. 170. 
232Ibid., p. 155. Other examples are Prussia's annexation of the Catholic Rhineland (p. 
174) and the Bavarian Religious Edict of 1818 which granted equality of civil rights to 
non-Catholics (p. 171). 
233Although both Protestant and Catholic Churches were in a state of flux, the former 
seemed relatively more beset by doctrinal, the latter by institutional and financial, 
problems. 
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of revelation; miracles had become not evidences of Christianity but 
problems for it. The old proofs of God's existence had been denied by 
Hume and Kant (although the romantic reform of theology, due espe 
cially to Schleiermacher, drew heavily on the idealistic philosophy of 
Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel) and a "higher criticism" was 
being developed which questioned much of the assumed integrity of 
the Bible. Steffens recorded that he sensed a "depreciation of all 
religiosity" among the German people as a whole after the Wars of 
Liberation.234 Besides reinforcing the impression of an unsettled 
period in which old norms could not be taken for granted, such reli 
gious developments were of particular importance to the intellectual 
development of several members of the younger generation. 
The point is frequently made that the Prussian reform movement 
failed and that by 1820 reaction was back in control.235 This may be 
true as far as political developments are concerned, but from the 
standpoint of German society as a whole post-1820 Germany was in 
no way a return to an earlier era. By the early Vorm?rz Germans felt 
that society had undergone profound qualitative changes. In trying to 
explain to his son in the 1830's how it was possible that those who 
had fought the French nevertheless considered themselves fran 
cophiles, the father of a friend of Neumann's said: 
It's good you weren't born fifty or sixty years ago! If you had 
seen the unbelievable political and economic misery we were in 
then, you'd judge Napoleon differently. The Holy Roman Em 
pire was patched together out of a thousand bits and pieces, most 
colorfully and detestably in the Upper Rhine. Here sat in confu 
sion the members and estates of the Empire, puffed up with 
empty pride in their Imperial immediacy [Reichsunmittelbarkeit] 
but in miserably tattered robes: dukes and princes, counts and 
barons, princely and unprincely abbots and bishops, together 
with the Teutonic Order, free cities and towns?not to mention 
the reichsunmittelbar hamlet of Hammersbach!... 
From the political misery flowed the economic. Each region 
clung to its own toll barriers, its own courts and gallows, its own 
weights and measures, and paralyzed the traffic, trade, and in 
dustry of its neighbors in the delusion thereby to promote its 
own interests.... 
I'm no worse a patriot than you, but we old-timers remember 
Napoleon with gratitude. Only his iron hand was capable of 
234Steffens, op. cit. (note 227), 8, 417-418. 
235See esp. Walter M. Simon, The Failure of the Prussian Reform Movement, 1807-1819 
(Ithaca, 1955). 
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pushing the broom which swept out the Augean stables of the 
Holy Roman Empire. I won't allow him to be rebuked, nor the 
French, either; without them there would be no constitutions in 
South Germany, nor the one in Baden which Grand Duke 
Charles bestowed upon his subjects in 1818 with shrewd under 
standing.236 
While such anecdotes and impressions, taken singly, record only one 
individual's sense of change, taken together with other examples they 
become evidence of a far-reaching transformation of the social fabric. 
The Social Dimension of Scientific Knowledge 
The Legitimation of Scientific Activity: A Functional Analysis 
If one looks at science in terms of the factors which define and 
legitimate it to the individual practitioner, one can begin to draw into 
a coherent picture a number of its disparate internal and external 
aspects. In this section I consider how socially induced changes in the 
professional and personal definition of the younger generation of 
abstracting scientists affected the kind of science they did. 
A number of developments induced the scientist to identify more 
closely with his work. Not only were there more university posi 
tions, but these were also more specialized and more clearly related to 
career possibilities. Because of the new, natural progression from 
Promotion through Habilitation to associate or even full professor, an 
earlier and more rational decision could be made to devote oneself to 
a particular science. At the same time, the practice of maintaining 
second careers in secondary school teaching, medicine, or pharmacy 
all but disappeared. More rigorous criteria for appointment, 
a more 
sophisticated audience for scholarly publications, and a new concep 
tion of pedagogy that included the training of others to do research all 
reinforced the professional image of the scientist and influenced his 
notion of scientific work. These new career patterns and a culturally 
motivated emphasis on original research marked the transition from a 
corporate-collegiate to a disciplinary conception of the professorate. 
One subtle but important theme in the transition from concretizing 
to abstracting science was a shift from a view of scientific truth as 
depending on the honesty of the individual to one in which commu 
236Adolf Kussmaul, Jugenderinnerungen eines alten Arztes, llth-13th ed. (Stuttgart, 
1899), pp. 73-74. Cf. also Conze's quotation of several contemporaries' observations 
on 
the decisiveness of the recent break with the past (op. tit. [note 214], p. 256, esp. a letter of 
1820 cited there from Johann Carl Bertram Str?ve nach Briefen und pers?nlichen Erinnerungen, 
ed. Gustav Str?ve, 2 vols. [Hannover & Leipzig, 1900], 2, 41). 
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nity control was the only practical guarantee of objectivity.237 Con 
cretizing scientists repeatedly asserted their honesty in really having 
performed a series of experiments in the order finally presented, in 
not having contrived any antecedent hypotheses, and in using cor 
roborating witnesses as opposed to subsequent verification by some 
one else. Their internal standard of truthfulness?as if a scientific fact 
depended on the moral character of the scientist?differs completely 
from abstracting scientists' external reliance on public, objective test 
ing. Although members of the younger generation undoubtedly per 
sonally believed in "the existence of truth," their public science did 
not concern itself with such considerations. 
This distinction between private-internal and public-external 
modes can be used to analyze other aspects of the change from 
Gelehrter to Forscher. Where the former tended "to regard discovery as 
a matter of occasional inspiration or as the prerogative of genius," the 
latter believed that elaboration of a teachable methodology placed 
discovery within the reach of the merely competent or diligent.238 
Turner has contrasted the internal character of the older scholarship 
to the external, objective character of the new science. Gelehrsamkeit, 
the traditional scholarly ideal, was characterized by "its status as a 
personal quality, the characteristic of a learned man; one is a scholar 
who possesses Gelehrsamkeit. In this sense the term differed from the 
nineteenth century's more external and objective Wissenschaft or wis 
senschaftlich, for Gelehrsamkeit always connoted style, evidence of in 
tellectual refinement, fitness for the mode of life associated with a 
scholar."239 By defining science in terms of method one has in effect 
abstracted from the concreteness of particulars in order to achieve 
wider applicability. To a considerable extent knowledge was coming 
to be regarded as scientific because it had been arrived at or verified 
according to a specific rigorous procedure. 
The increasingly "objective" character of scientific knowledge, 
where objectivity is understood as belonging to the group and not to 
the individual, can also be identified in the use of the hypothetico 
deductive method, which makes acceptability a matter of repeatable 
public testing according to community standards. That method ig 
nores the origin of a hypothesis and thus represents a clear exclusion 
237Cf. the treatment of objectivity as a social institution in Bloor, Knowledge and Social 
Imagery (note 174), pp. 85-87. 
238Turner, op. cit. (note 162), p. 320. See the passage by August Boeckh from 1839 
quoted there, and compare pp. 203-210 and 279. 
239Ibid., p. 51. Turner's allusion is to Johann Georg Meusel, Leitfaden zur Geschichte der 
Gelehrsamkeit (Leipzig, 1799). Cf. Johann Friedrich Pfaff's letter of 11 December 1785 to 
his brother Carl Friedrich Pfaff (1764-1836), in Carl Pfaff, op. cit. (note 189), p. 42. 
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of the personal element from public science. Furthermore, insofar as 
the use of the hypothetico-deductive method means that practical 
success is the measure of the acceptability of a scientific proposition, it 
may be regarded as the manifestation within science of the more 
general social enhancement of the role of competition and the crite 
rion of success.240 
The role of the German universities as teachers of future 
functionaries, including the new Gymnasiallehrer, future profession 
als, and future scientists, coupled with the fact that the teachers 
themselves were servants of the state, may have introduced a certain 
bureaucratic mentality into the practice of science.241 Bureaucratiza 
tion seeks the establishment of an objective, rational order, deper 
sonalized and calculable according to clearly formulated and publicly 
known rules. Successful bureaucratic operation requires reliability of 
behavior and conformity to prescribed principles of action. The 
bureaucrat's job is to perform a certain function and to apply a fixed, 
learned procedure to different particular circumstances. By carrying 
out his job according to the letter, the bureaucrat justifies his activity 
and is above reproach. Similarly, by carrying out research according 
to established methodological guidelines, the scientist or scholar jus 
tifies both his professional activity and his results. 
These changes in the definition of the professor's role were con 
temporaneous with other developments that profoundly changed 
modes of personal definition within the larger society. As already 
noted, the reform period saw a major attack on the older corporate 
society, with a weakening of class, regional, and religious distinctions 
and priviledges, as well as the beginnings of a new generalized con 
cept of citizenship. Economic developments and the enhancement of 
competition also unsettled traditional behavior patterns. Both 
bureaucratization and the acceptance of the ideal of Bildung contrib 
uted to the notion that a person is defined by what he does or has 
done, not by where and to whom he was born. A person was to an 
increasing extent no longer automatically defined by his place in the 
social structure. Of particular importance is how social and religious 
240For an extensive discussion of the importance and function of competition see Karl 
Mannheim, "Competition as a Cultural Phenomenon" and "On the Nature of Economic 
Ambition and its Significance for the Social Education of Man," Essays on the Sociology of 
Knowledge, ed. Paul Kecskemeti (London, 1952), pp. 191-229 and 230-275; also Helmut 
Plessner, "Zur Soziologie der modernen Forschung und ihrer Organisation in der 
deutschen Universit?t?Tradition und Ideologie," Diesseits der Utopie. Ausgew?hlte Bei 
tr?ge zur Kultursoziologie (D?sseldorf & K?ln, 1966), pp. 121-142. 
241On the general character of bureaucratization see Robert K. Merton, "Bureaucratic 
Structure and Personality," Social Theory and Social Structure, rev. ed. (New York & 
London, 1968), pp. 249-260. 
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changes made traditional values uncertain and led some to seek defi 
nition and security within the realm of abstract and unchanging scien 
tific truth. The extent to which one's work could become the defining 
characteristic of one's life and the determinant of one's worth is 
suggested in a letter by Carl Gustav Jacob Jacobi to his brother Moritz. 
He asked rhetorically: "Does that which you have to do so make up 
the content of your life that you can say, 'I am the thing, if you respect 
it you must also respect me'?"242 For several members of the younger 
generation, science served to replace nonexistent or deficient per 
sonal relationships. In a world of change and uncertainty, where 
traditional modes of social definition were weakened and personal 
relationships were unable to give security, science, both as activity 
and as knowledge, could provide something fixed and certain around 
which to organize one's life. 
These developments were reinforced by changes in the religious 
definition and justification of the individual and in the increasingly 
abstract way in which immortality could be assured. A number of 
abstracting scientists made scientific work an outlet for religious 
drives. Grassmann, for example, realized that although God cannot 
be seen directly, He can be seen mediately in His works by means of 
science.243 Neumann and Grassmann, both deeply influenced by 
Schleiermacher, provide the strongest evidence of this relationship. It 
is probably also significant that Weber's father was a Protestant pro 
fessor of theology, that Fechner's father and several other close rela 
tives were Protestant preachers, and that Ftiess and Jacobi were 
among the first Jews to enter the world of science in Germany.244 All 
this suggests that widespread religious uncertainty contributed to the 
formation of a new generation of physicists. That some members of 
the younger generation required a theological justification for science 
at a time when the social and institutional definition of the new pro 
fessional scientist was still in the process of development further 
suggests that they saw their own activity as something essentially 
different from that of the traditional scholar-teacher. As Robert Mer 
ton observed, institutionalized values are conceived as self-evident 
242Letter of 28 December 1832, in Ahrens, op. at. (note 185), p. 19. 
243See note 253. 
244Kuntze gave the following description of Fechner's father: "His ambitious disposi 
tion was open to all noble and liberating progress. On the steeple of his church, which 
had been struck twice by lightening, he had the first lightening rod installed; his children 
were the first in the area to be innoculated; [and] he was the first among his neighboring 
colleagues to enter the pulpit without a wig, which so disconcerted the people that they 
were only calmed down when the mayor with presence of mind pointed out to them that 
the Lord Jesus himself had preached without a wig. He was also a diligent promoter of 
arboriculture" (op. at. [note 181], p. 20). 
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and require no vindication, but new patterns of conduct must some 
how be justified if they are to be made personally and socially accept 
able.245 
Neumann affords the clearest and most dramatic case of a person 
who turned to science to fulfill basic psychological and religious 
needs. His unsettled and unhappy youth, marked by the total ab 
sence of his mother and the infrequent presence of his father, crip 
pled his ability to establish close relationships with other people, and 
it was precisely his failure to find fulfillment in personal relationships 
that motivated him to turn away from the world and allowed him to 
find fulfillment in devotion to abstract science.246 Neumann's father, 
who had been employed as manager by the countess of an estate near 
Berlin, died in May 1821, whereupon Neumann left Berlin and his 
studies to help out with the administration of the estate. Sometime 
that summer he learned that the countess was actually his mother, 
whom he had been told had died at his birth. He soon decided to 
leave behind both the estate and his mother.247 In a letter to his 
mother he expressed the tension he felt between the demands of 
eternally valid science and the immediacy of human values: 
Since I felt so unwell and so unhappy here, that ardent longing 
has now again awakened which from early youth drove me to 
science, which always tore me away with such force, in whose 
attainment I have always forgotten and neglected what people 
otherwise care for, for the convenience and comfort of life. 
So be it! I am going back in order to direct my mind and my 
thoughts to that which [exists] beyond all time and its 
vicissitudes?to the eternal laws as revealed in human life and 
nature, in the formation of the world?I wish to submerge and 
engross myself in research [in order to see] whether I can thus 
perhaps forget myself and my harsh fate in association with the 
highest.248 
In another letter to his mother years later he wrote that "life is a 
difficult task, it is a dangerous game. The world early taught me to 
245Robert K. Merton, "The Puritan Spur to Science," The Sociology of Science: Theoretical 
and Empirical Investigations, ed. Norman W. Storer (Chicago & London, 1973), p. 231, 
reprinted from his Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth-Century England (1938). 
246See passages from his diary of 1817 and 1827 in Luise Neumann, op. cit. (note 175), 
pp. 80-82 and 252. See also a letter of 15 December 1831 from Carl Gustav Jacob Jacobi to 
his brother Moritz, lamenting Neumann's social ineptitude, in Ahrens, op. cit. (note 185), 
p. ii. 
247Letter of (presumably) August 1821 to his best friend, in Luise Neumann, op. cit. 
(note 175), p. 175. 
248Letter of (presumably) September 1821, ibid., p. 179. 
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renounce it, [and] I have built myself another alien world. Only by 
submerging and engrossing myself in this world of mine, in science 
and in books, am I capable of bearing the other world. That is what 
sustains me."249 
Neumann also saw science as a way of establishing contact with 
eternity, of attaining immortality. His diary is filled with passages 
expressing his religious doubts and uncertainties and his desire to 
devote himself to something beyond the temporally and spatially 
immediate.250 At one place in his diary, after listing thirteen precepts 
exhorting himself to work, simplicity, self-sacrifice, and abstinence, 
he expressed his feelings of profound guilt with respect to his coun 
try, the world, God, and eternity and noted the importance of science 
in fulfilling these duties: "I owe it to the fatherland?it is a holy 
duty?I owe it to the world, to Thee, Almighty, to Thy son, to eter 
nity. How magnificent is occupation with science, I study through it 
how Thy power has operated, how Thy will has been expressed 
among the peoples of the earth!"251 Neumann's religious sentiments 
did not allow him to take God's grace for granted. Grace had to be 
earned by hard work, and science offered the additional advantage of 
providing an insight into God's working in the world. 
These same considerations of personal uncertainty, guilt, duty to 
God, knowledge of Him, and attainment of a kind of immortality 
through science also appear as motivations behind Grassmann's ded 
ication to science. Grassmann expressed his doubts concerning reli 
gion and the role it should have in his practical life in several letters to 
his father and brother. He wrote in 1835: "My views won't really let 
themselves be pinned down, especially with respect to everything 
concerning my practical life, where my views change almost daily, 
one view placing itself over another without entirely driving it out. 
And thus my religious disposition, too, oscillates still between de 
spair and an external security at rest with itself, and [I] cannot yet 
grasp the correct vigilance in the trust in God, the correct joy in the 
consciousness of God's unearned grace. Nevertheless, my hope is 
becoming ever firmer, and God will establish in me, too, the joy of 
His faith and the power of His love."252 The connection between 
religious doubts and science came out in another letter from 
Grassmann to his father, where the dominant theme was personal 
and religious uncertainty. Grassmann feared appearing selfish and 
249Undated, but probably from March or April 1827, ibid., p. 248. Cf. his Prorektorats 
rede of 1844, ibid., p. 440. 
2S0Ibid., pp. 75-76 and 81-82. 
251Ibid., p. 77. 
252Letter of 24 January 1835 to his father, in Grassmann, Werke (note 96), 3, Pt. 2, 53. 
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wrote of his struggle for truth and virtue against sinful drives and 
pleasures. Although his life was still without a firm foundation, he 
was in the process of finding solace in devotion to science: 
I have recently become much calmer, and in particular my whole 
religious orientation has begun to reconcile itself more with my 
life. I increasingly recognize how it is a futile endeavor to wish to 
see God always directly ...; I increasingly recognize how God can 
also be seen indirectly in the activity of life in the study of science, 
how we there, too, can aspire toward the kingdom of God; I feel 
in myself how it is in precisely this way that the senses are again 
sharpened in order to see the divine directly from the other side 
and to grasp it with greater spirit and truth. Thus I also believe 
that it is in no way a transgression when one so submerges him 
self in science that he forgets himself in it in order to find truth, 
that is, his higher self.253 
Grassmann felt that it was through his scientific work that his spirit 
would live on after him. Even if one had not been successful in pro 
ducing students during one's lifetime, one might still be able to reach 
future generations through one's published work. This thought ap 
pealed to Grassmann. In the preface to the second edition of his Aus 
dehnungslehre (1862) he explained why he was offering a new version of 
a work which had thus far scarcely been noticed: 
I am firmly confident that the work which I have expended on 
the science presented here, and which has required a significant 
period of my life and the most intense exertion of my powers, 
will not be lost.... I know that even if I do not succeed in gather 
ing around me a circle of students, in a position I have hitherto 
longed for in vain, whom I could impregnate [befruchten] with 
those ideas and stimulate to develop and enrich them further, 
nevertheless these ideas will some day arise anew, even if in a 
different form, and will interact vigorously with the develop 
ments of the time. For truth is eternal and divine.254 
As with Neumann, Grassmann's intellectualized approach to im 
mortality through abstract science went along with his failure to 
es 
tablish close personal relationships with other people. According to a 
253Letter of 9 March 1835, ibid.; cf. the letter of the same date to Robert, pp. 54-55. 
254Grassmann, Die Ausdehnungslehre. Vollst?ndig und in strenger Form bearbeitet (Berlin, 
1862), "Vorrede," pp. ix-x; reprinted in his Werke, 2, Pt. 2 (1896), 10. This 
was a new 
edition of the work originally published in 1844. The statement in Caneva, op. 
at. (note 
2), p. 506, that Grassmann was unmarried and childless is incorrect. 
154 KENNETH L. CANEVA 
report concerning Grassmann's application for a position at the Berlin 
Trade School, "Herr Grassmann is a young man who does not lack 
knowledge. It is also evident that he has thought long and hard about 
the elements of mathematics in particular and thinks clearly about 
them. But he seems to have had little social intercourse and is there 
fore, in the customary forms of social life, backward, shy, easily em 
barrassed, and then awkward. None of that can be seen in the 
classroom as soon as he does not know he is being observed. He then 
moves easily, appropriately, and with assurance."255 
There is some indication that Moritz Hermann Jacobi also sought in 
scientific work the solace and security that escaped him in his per 
sonal life. To his brother Carl he expressed both his profoundly felt 
sense of insecurity and his feeling, here shaken but later regained, 
that science was the surest and most stable thing in life: 
Since, as you know, I am in life and in the flux of the phenomena 
without a stationary pole or any secure support; since every con 
sequence and every force that appears seems to me more and 
more bottomless and superficial, pointing out to me the station 
ary abyss with greater severity; since this is just the way things 
are and can't conveniently be changed, it pains me all the more 
when I see how that which I have up to now considered to be the 
most stable and secure thing, namely, science, is transformed in 
my hands into a chaos of unutterable confusion, into a whirl, that 
is, [how it] becomes increasingly entangled [and] desolate as it 
continues to move back and forth, nowhere able to be seized, 
affording no foothold and having no bottom, and flinging one 
back and forth. I don't know what I want, what others want, 
what science wants or should be, and in order to find all this out, 
as well in science as in life, I've sought refuge?be amazed, but 
make no rejoinder!?in Hegel's Logic, for it now lies constantly on 
my desk, full of marks, lines, dog-ears, etc. Naturally my confu 
sion has now become greater, the little bit of common sense gets 
lost, for I must, if I want to understand him, go beyond 
aforementioned common sense; but I'll be damned if I've under 
stood even the slightest thing except for a few remarks.256 
The direction of his later work shows that it was not in Hegel but in 
physics that he again found satisfaction. The feelings of insecurity 
and worthlessness which Moritz expressed in many of his letters 
25-Report of 17 October 1834 by the school's director, Karl Friedrich Kl?den (1786 
1856), in Grassmann, Werke, 3, Pt. 2 (1896), 46. 
256Letter of 5 October 1826, in Ahrens, op. cit. (note 185), pp. 3-4. 
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were probably intensified by the example of his brother, a brilliant 
and famous mathematician. The latter's advice in times of uncertainty 
and self-doubt was always to devote oneself fully to one's work, 
through which one could command a respect independent of per 
sonal contingencies: "The inclination and disinclination which we 
find [in social relationships] are variable and accidental, and nothing 
can be built upon them, but an honestly achieved piece of work 
affords us our securest foundation and commands the respect from 
others that for the ethical person is the vital air he breathes. Thus I 
have found it, and thus have you no doubt found and will find it."257 
Here again is the pattern of public scientific work filling the 
psychological role of giving one's life focus and definition and of 
proving one's worth in an impersonal way. For Carl, science served 
also as a justification of one's existence both to oneself and to 
"fate."258 
Neumann, Grassmann, and Jacobi all tended to define themselves 
in terms of their scientific work. They sought in science the security, 
stability, and immortality that they could not derive from personal 
relationships, society, or conventional religion.259 Of course such fac 
tors can and do exist for some people at all times, but it is plausible to 
suggest that their occurrence and force were enhanced by the wide 
spread and profound changes which virtually all aspects of German 
society were undergoing during the first decades of the nineteenth 
century. 
Social and Scientific Styles of Thought: A Structural Comparison 
I have so far sought to interpret some of the major features of the 
new science of the abstract by analyzing the role it played in the 
professional and personal lives of its representatives, with the origin 
of those new modes of professional and personal definition being in 
turn sought within the larger historical context of events. In this final 
section I will attempt to bridge the gap between the individual and 
society by calling attention to certain close structural parallels be 
257Letter of 20 November 1835, ibid., p. 23. Cf. the remark quoted at note 242 and 
Moritz's diary entry of 4 May 1832 (Ahrens, op. at., p. 10). 
258Letter of 27 November 1831, ibid., p. 10. Cf. an earlier letter to Moritz where he 
spoke of having to earn his own marital happiness through vigorous scientific work (pp. 
8-9). 
259The unprovable but believed truth of some kind of scientific knowledge must be 
distinguished from the conventionalist conception of public scientific knowledge as that 
which meets certain methodological tests. 
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tween the two different conceptions of knowledge exemplified by 
concretizing and abstracting science and the character of the society 
within which their representatives lived. My presentation assumes 
that a mechanism exists by which a perception of social relations can 
be transformed into a metaphysical conception of the nature of 
knowledge in general. Building upon an earlier tradition in the 
sociology of knowledge, David Bloor has used recent work in an 
thropology, educational psychology, and the philosophy of science to 
argue that this mechanism is the creation of social and political 
ideologies that reflect existing social relations and that are then 
applied metaphorically to general epistemological questions.260 
This approach gains plausibility from the presence in early 
nineteenth-century Germany of two contrasting ideologies whose 
characteristics closely correspond to those of concretizing and 
abstracting science. The ideology congruent with concretizing science 
was associated with the older traditional and class-structured society, 
while the one associated with abstracting science belonged to the 
reformist, rationalizing, and competitive society which replaced it 
after the Napoleonic Wars. The identification of these two contrasting 
ideologies, as styles of thought that recur in various historical con 
texts, was one of the central insights of Karl Mannheim, who charac 
terized them as "romantic-conservative" and "liberal-rationalist," re 
spectively. As Mannheim emphasized, they are not just political 
ideologies but represent basic attitudes toward reality. The following 
pairs of contrasting characteristics make up the constellation of basic 
intentions belonging to Mannheim's "conservative" and "progres 
sive" styles of thought:261 
CONSERVATIVE 
concrete 
qualitative 
intuitive representation 
internal essences 
directed toward the past or 
to the actually existing 
particularist 
organismic 
spatial coexistence, 
transcending time 
PROGRESSIVE 
abstract 
quantitative 
rational analysis 
external relations 
directed toward the future or 
to the potentially existing 
universalist 
mechanistic 
temporal succession 
260See note 158. 
261This list was derived from two of Mannheim's essays. Although it makes no claims 
to completeness, it captures all the major traits. See "Conservative Thought/' Essays on 
Sociology and Social Psychology, ed. Paul Kecskemeti (London 1953), pp. 74-164; and 
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This table reveals the basic affinity between concretizing science and 
Mannheim's conservative style of thought on the one hand and be 
tween abstracting science and progressive thought on the other. This 
essential congruence suggests that the two scientific paradigms are 
only specific manifestations of more general attitudes rooted in the 
social experience of their different representatives.262 
The two characteristics of abstracting science which seem, in their 
opposition to the corresponding characteristics of concretizing sci 
ence, most clearly related to social structures are its abstractness and 
its use of the hypothetico-deductive method. I have already under 
scored the extent to which social relationships had become more 
abstract. From a general standpoint the entire enterprise of reforming 
society, of replacing traditional institutions by others conceived as 
being more rational, may be seen 
as a change of focus from the con 
creteness of the historically and actually given to the abstractness of 
that which exists only in the future.263 In the same way the schematic, 
representational, and anschaulich science of the concrete finds its 
parallel in the social definition of 
a person or class in terms of its 
natural place within a preexisting structure. 
One difference between a traditional and a progressive society is 
that for the former the existing state of affairs is, as it were, the source 
of one's social principles, whereas society is conceived by the latter 
as 
the result of antecedently chosen principles. In a traditional society 
one derives generalized social patterns from that which already 
exists, whereas the social knowledge desired by someone bent on 
reform is not given by the experience of the actually existing. This 
reversal in the relationship between the concrete (experience) and the 
abstract (principles) parallels the change in methodology from the 
empiricism of concretizing science to the hypothetico-deductivism 
of 
abstracting science. Whereas empiricism regards experiment 
as pre 
ceding theory, the hypothetico-deductive method has experiment 
fol 
low theory. Moreover while concretizing scientists 
were concerned 
that their theories had a natural and unforced relationship to experi 
"Competition as a Cultural Phenomenon," (note 240). Mannheim's terminology 
is 
somewhat variable. For a more extended discussion of related aspects of the sociology of 
knowledge see Caneva, op. at. (note 2), pp. 485-501 and 
524-529. 
262Mannheim's stricture against applying the sociology of knowledge 
to the natural 
sciences has been attacked on theoretical grounds by David Bloor in "Wittgenstein 
and 
Mannheim on the Sociology of Mathematics," Studies in the History and Philosophy of 
Science, 4 (1973-1974), 173-191. Bloor applied Mannheim's categories to the Popper 
Kuhn debate in Knowledge and Sodal Imagery (note 158), pp. 48-65. 
263The enhanced importance of abstract thought to groups bent 
on changing the 
existing social order was noted by Paul Szende, "Das System 
der Wissenschaften und 
die Gesellschaftsordnung," K?lner Vierteljahrshefte f?r Soziologie, 
2 (1922), 5-17, on 10. 
